חומר רקע

OLG Frankfurt am Main, Judgment of November 30, 2021 - 5-3 StE 1/20 - 4 - 1/20 https://openjur.de/u/2397259.html I. Preliminary Remark In 2023, the Bundestag recognized the crimes of the terrorist militia Islamic State (IS) in 2014 against the Yazidi women and men as genocide. II. Facts In its striving to establish a worldwide Islamic caliphate, the foreign terrorist organization "Islamic State" (IS) active in Syria and Iraq persecuted the religious minority of the Yazidis, predominantly settled in the Sinjar area in northern Iraq, who were considered "apostates" by it. To achieve the complete destruction of the Yazidi religion, Yazidism as such and its members, IS fighters carried out a centrally planned, organized and coordinated military attack against the members of the group settled in the vicinity of the Sinjar area in the night from August 2 to 3, 2014, purposefully and intentionally. In the aftermath, the IS forced male Yazidis to convert to Islam, compelled them to forced labor, enslaved Yazidi girls and women, and massacred members of the religious community on a large scale. In the framework of its assault on the Sinjar area in August 2014, the IS perpetuated its terrorist methods of warfare. Insofar as the IS succeeded in bringing areas under its control, its members proceeded against enemy fighters and the civilian population with utmost brutality. Thus, since autumn 2013, public shootings and beheadings were committed. In some cases, the heads of the beheaded were impaled on nails and displayed. IS fighters also presented the severed heads of their opponents on the internet. Since the proclamation of the caliphate in June 2014, opponents were sometimes also burned alive, drowned, or executed with explosives. The defendant, who had been in Raqqa in Syria since at least March 2015 and there acted as head of the IS office for Ruqia, a religious practice of exorcism for healing ailments, bought in June 2015 in Syria the witness A belonging to the religious group of the Yazidis and her five-year-old daughter B as slaves. These had been captured by members of the IS in the framework of the attack on the Sinjar area in the summer of 2014. Subsequently, he transported them to Fallujah in Iraq, where he forced them to stay in his household shared with witness C for several weeks. There they were subject to the instructions of the defendant, who completely determined their lives, forbade them to leave the property, and chastised them daily to discipline and keep them submissive, so that they lived in constant fear of him. Under the living conditions dictated by the defendant and his treatment, witness A and B suffered both physically and mentally to a great extent. Through the infliction of grave bodily and mental impairments to the detriment of B on the one hand and witness A on the other hand, the defendant wanted, in the sense of IS ideology, to purposefully destroy the Yazidi religion, Yazidism as such and its members, who were worth nothing to him, for the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. The defendant forbade witness A and her child to independently consume the drinks and food available in the household. In particular, he denied them access to the refrigerator contents. He allowed them only the consumption of tap water, which was strongly heated due to the high outside temperatures and tasted bitter. Only after the defendant and witness C had finished their meals was food allocated to witness A and her daughter, consisting of consistently simple food like rice, noodles, eggs, or rolls. The food was also too scant, so that they hungered and witness A in turn gave part of her allocated food to her child. The defendant further forbade witness A and her daughter B to use detergent for cleaning their clothes, which was only to be used for cleaning his laundry and that of witness C, so that they could only wash their own laundry with water. They were also only allowed to wash themselves at a sink in the courtyard of the house, for the bathroom in the house was reserved solely for the defendant and witness C. Sometimes the slaves were given away. Especially in Raqqa, a flourishing trade with Yazidi girls and women developed shortly after the assault on the Sinjar region. Rapes and beatings as well as a high frequency of location changes within a short time due to owner changes were commonplace. Moreover, the defendant disposed of B like an object and "lent" her after the end of Ramadan against the expressly and pleadingly expressed will of witness A to a stranger acquaintance of the defendant, where B had to spend the night without her mother. Although witness A even kissed his feet, he was not deterred from this. The defendant ordered witness A and the child to pray regularly at Muslim prayer times contrary to their religious practice as Yazidis, according to Islamic faith rules, whereby they had to recite the Quran on his instruction. He further ordered that witness A fully veil herself when leaving the house. The defendant designated the name B as the name of an "apostate", so that he renamed the child to "E" and the defendant and witness C addressed it only with this name from then on. In particular, he did this for the purpose of breaking them in their religious faith and their Yazidi identity. The defendant ordered witness A to perform the daily household chores. She had to wash the dishes, clean the house, wash the laundry, sweep the courtyard, and fetch water. However, he did not remunerate the work performance of witness A. The physical chastisements occurred in various ways. Thus, the defendant regularly slapped witness A on the head with the flat hand and with the stick of the floor mop, causing her pain on the leg below the knee. Moreover, he beat her at least on one day with his fist on one of her eyes, so that she suffered swelling and a bruise on the eye. At least once, the defendant beat witness A because water had dripped on the sofa during her cleaning work, which caused her severe pain. On another occasion when a glass fell to the floor in the kitchen, the defendant beat both witness A and B such that witness A trembled with fear and wet herself. The defendant also beat the child during the Muslim prayer when B did not perform it correctly in his opinion, and threatened to kill her. Furthermore, the defendant pushed the child in the courtyard of the house, so that it injured its elbow. Similarly, the defendant slapped B with his hand because he and witness C felt disturbed by the child. Once, the defendant slapped the girl with his hand multiple times with such violence that it suffered bruises on the back and severe pain, whereupon witness A at least managed to get the defendant to allow B to stay in bed for four days. On an undetermined day, the defendant ordered witness A at lunchtime to stand barefoot on the stone floor of the house-surrounding courtyard in the sun to punish and discipline her again. In Fallujah, daytime maximum temperatures between 38.1 and 51 degrees in the shade prevailed at that time. On the defendant's order, witness A returned to the house after a while and turned again to the cleaning work in the ground floor of the house as instructed. The defendant was meanwhile angry because the child had urinated on a mattress due to illness. To now also punish and discipline B, the defendant tied the five-year-old child to the external grid of the living room window in the courtyard. B was thereby exposed to direct sunlight and could not move. After fixing the girl, the defendant returned to the house. When he went back to the courtyard after some time, he untied the child, which had suffered a heatstroke due to the tying under direct sunlight, from whose consequences it had either already died at that time or died in the immediate aftermath. This was foreseeable, and the defendant could have recognized it as well. After the defendant had left the house, witness A remained alone with witness C. Witness A could no longer find sleep due to the previous events. Due to the deeply felt worry about her child, she cried constantly. After a few days, they received a visit from the defendant's uncle, who informed that B had died, which shocked witness A severely. Again a few days later, the defendant returned to the house with members of the IS. Together with witness A, he was taken to an IS base and questioned about the events in connection with B. An unknown IS member now again explained to witness A that her daughter had died. The defendant was beaten by IS members during the questioning and taken into custody. The background of the custody was that the groundless killing of a slave was not allowed even according to the rules that the IS had set for itself. After an undetermined period, the defendant was released from IS custody again. Due to the tying under direct sunlight and the prevailing high outside temperatures, the child ultimately suffered a heatstroke, from whose consequences it died either already at that time or in the immediate aftermath. After some time, the defendant went back to the courtyard. When he now recognized that the child was at least unconscious, he untied B, whose body had already become stiff. When witness A saw the condition of her daughter, she screamed and pulled her own hair. The defendant carried B into the living room and laid her on the floor. The child's eyes were open and the pupils pointed upward. B's lips and skin were dry, her facial skin was pale, and her hands were clenched into fists. Since B's mouth could not be opened, the attempts now undertaken to give her water failed. Now the defendant also became afraid and declared that he wanted to take B to the hospital. However, he forbade witness A, contrary to her request, to accompany him, so that he left the house alone with the child and went to a hospital. Witness A suffered greatly from not being allowed to accompany her child. Through this and because the defendant never informed her about the immediate further fate and the still unclear whereabouts of B's body, he inflicted deep mental pain on witness A. III. Genocidal Ideology of the IS 1. The IS strove for the establishment of a worldwide caliphate. With the beginning of the civil war in Syria as well as the proclamation of the "ISIG", the organization aimed at the establishment of an Islamic state both in Iraq and including Syria and the adjacent areas. Thereby, the existing borders of the nation-states in the Arab East were to be overcome. However, the establishment of an Islamic state on the territory of Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon was only the near goal of the IS. The organization also strove for the conquest of Palestine and the "liberation" of Jerusalem and ultimately the creation of a worldwide caliphate, which found its expression in the proclamation of the same under renewed renaming to the "Islamic State" in June 2014. From the beginning, the ideology of the organization had, besides the anti-Israeli and anti-Jewish orientation, also an anti-Shiite component. Thus, the IS, in agreement with the ideology of al-Qaeda, considered the Sunnis as the only true believers, but the Shiites, who form the majority of the population in Iraq and whose representatives have dominated the government in Iraq since 2005, were to be fought as so-called apostates and to be destroyed both in Iraq and in Syria. Since President al-Assad and large parts of the political and military elite in Syria were Alawites and also the regime-loyal parts of the Syrian army and security forces consisted mostly of Alawites, the IS also strove for the physical destruction of the Alawite minority in Syria. Similarly, the IS fought all other members of religious minorities in the territory occupied by it due to their religious affiliation, including members of the religious community of the Yazidis. 2. The IS conducted broad public relations work. Among its diverse media products were, among others, the online magazine Dabiq as well as the Maktabat al-Himma publishing house founded by it, in which religious-ideological works by Sharia scholars of the IS and writings of Salafist and jihadist authorities accepted by the IS were published. The IS classified the Yazidis as "apostates" and therefore wanted to physically destroy the Yazidi religion, Yazidism as such and its members, for which purposefully and intentionally all the established actions of the IS in the aftermath of the attack of August 2/3, 2014, were to serve. The assessment made by both experts in this regard is particularly comprehensible because that attitude of the IS is documented by the content of the article of the IS "The revival of slavery before the hour", translated: "The Revival of Slavery Before the Hour" from the fourth issue of the English-language online magazine of the IS Dabiq of October 2014 with the title "The Failed Crusade". In this article, reference is made to the procedure of the IS after the conquest of the Sinjar area. As the main argument for the destruction of the Yazidis through killing and enslavement, the unbelief or the alleged devil worship of the Yazidis as polytheists is cited there. It is expressly stated that Yazidis - unlike Christians and Jews - could not buy themselves free through a head tax. It is further demanded that the Yazidi women and children must be enslaved, while the men should be slain after granting the possibility of repentance and performing the prayer. Women and children would be distributed according to Sharia as a kind of war booty among the fighters. One fifth of this war booty must be handed over to the "institutions of the Islamic State". The enslaved women and children must furthermore be sold as was traditionally done with polytheists. It is forbidden to separate a mother from her small children. That the slaves bear children for their "master" is necessary to spread Islam in the conquered areas through common children. Overall, this procedure represents a religious obligation. Furthermore, the existence and content of a price list of the IS for female slaves fit into the explanations of the experts and provide evidence for the sales practice itself as well as for the pricing within the slave trade. From the price list, it emerges that different prices can be demanded staggered according to the age of the slave; the younger the slave, the higher sums had to be paid. The experts have moreover congruently described the settlement by the Yazidis along with the population number in 2014 in Iraq and Syria corresponding to the findings made. Besides the congruent description of the treatment of the Yazidi prisoners, especially the enslavement of Yazidi girls and women and the details of the slave trade, the witness has also reported corresponding to the findings made about the subsequent discovery of a multitude of mass graves in the original settlement area of the Yazidis in northern Iraq as well as the destruction of their sanctuaries, pilgrimage sites and cultural sites as well as the use of the boys as child soldiers. The persecution of those of other faiths by the IS is finally evidenced by the content of the partially excerpted memos of KHKin K from the Federal Criminal Police Office on the international criminal law relevant events of the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq in the months June to September 2014, which mainly describe individual expulsion measures and executions by IS members in the corresponding months in Syria and Iraq. The memo concerning the month of August 2014 moreover explicitly describes the attack of the IS on the members of the religious group of the Yazidis settled in the Sinjar area and thus fits seamlessly into the explanations of the experts. 3. Like Hamas on October 7, 2023, [footnoteRef:1] the IS terrorists also designated female “unbelievers” or female members of the hostile party as “sabiya”. The court is convinced that witness C used the term "sabaya" here with the meaning of war prisoners or slaves. [1: “Sabaya” is a term in Islam that describes women and children as the property of a Muslim man. It also means slave and handmaiden. The most difficult use of “sabaya” was by ISIS terrorists, who called the captured Yazidi women this, Hagari says, IDF spokesperson: UNRWA staff recordings prove Hamas treated young women 'like animals' | The Times of Israel; “But to assert that sabaya is devoid of sexual connotation reflects ignorance, at best. The word is well attested in classical sources and refers to female captives; the choice of a classical term over a modern one implies a fondness for classical modes of war, which codified sexual violence at scale. Just as concubine and comfort woman carry the befoulments of their historic use, sabaya is straightforwardly associated with what we moderns call rape. Anyone who uses sabaya in modern Gaza or Raqqah can be assumed to have specific and disgusting reasons to want to revive it.”, What Hamas Called Its Female Captives, and Why It Matters - The Atlantic. ] In this regard, the expert has convincingly and comprehensibly explained that "sabaya" is the plural for the Arabic word "sabiya". "Sabiya" can have two different meanings depending on pronunciation. One meaning is "war prisoner or slave", this is a technical term used by the IS. The other meaning is "little girl". However, in general Arabic usage, the Arabic term "bind" is usually used for the term "little girl". The use of the word "sabiya" is atypical for designating a little girl. Therefore, "sabaya" stands in the shown conversational context from his view for "slaves" or "war prisoners". Besides the statements of the expert, press products of the IS itself also speak for the fact that the IS terrorists meant "slaves" or "war prisoners" with the terminology “sabiya”. Besides the article "The revival of slavery before the hour" already presented above, the question-and- answer catalog from the IS's own Maktabat al-Himma publishing house with the Arabic title "Su´al wa-Jawab fi al-Sabi wa Riqb", translated: "Questions and Answers on the Keeping of Slaves and Prisoners", also presents the attitude of the IS to the slave trade with Yazidi women and the theoretical behavioral or trade specifications of the IS regarding Yazidi slaves. The IS leadership provides information in this question-and-answer catalog about the rights of the owner towards slaves as well as theoretical instructions for dealing with and keeping slaves. Israel Law Review (2025), 1–40 doi:10.1017/S0021223725100009 A RT I C L E S Hamas’ October 7th Genocide: Legal Analysis and the Weaponisation of Reverse Accusations – A Study in Modern Genocide Recognition and Denial Avraham Russell Shalev Kohelet Policy Forum, Jerusalem, Israel Email: [email protected] Abstract This article analyses the October 7th 2023 Hamas attack on Israel through the lens of the Genocide Convention, arguing that these actions constitute genocide under inter- national law. Drawing on international case law, the analysis demonstrates how Hamas’ actions meet both the physical element and specific intent requirements for genocide, evidenced by its ideology, systematic policies and leadership statements. The article also examines how reverse accusations of genocide against Israel have functioned as a rhetor- ical shield to deflect recognition of Hamas’ own genocidal actions. It analyses the legal implications for state parties and the international community. Keywords: Hamas; October 7th; Genocide Convention; International Court of Justice (ICJ); Israel 1. Introduction The attack on October 7th 2023 by Hamas on Israeli civilians marked one of the dead- liest assaults in modern history, resulting in over 1,200 deaths and raising critical questions about the legal classification of these acts under international law. While much attention has been focused on Israel’s military response in Gaza, there has been limited scholarly analysis of whether Hamas’ actions themselves constituted genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.1 This article examines the attacks of October 7th through the lens of international law, analysing both the physical acts committed and the evidence of specific intent required to establish genocide. It argues that the systematic targeting of Israeli Jews by Hamas, combined with its documented ideology and statements, meets the legal threshold for genocide under international law. The analysis also 1 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (entered into force 12 January 1951) 78 UNTS 277 (Genocide Convention). © The Author(s), 2025. Published by Cambridge University Press in association with the Faculty of Law, the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution licence (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted re-use, distribution and reproduc- tion, provided the original article is properly cited. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 2 Avraham Russell Shalev explores how accusations of genocide against Israel, mainly through South Africa’s application to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), have served as a rhetorical shield to deflect attention from Hamas’ own genocidal actions. The implications of this determination extend beyond legal classification, affecting issues of account- ability, deterrence and the international community’s obligations to prevent and punish such acts. The article examines why correctly classifying the events of October 7th as genocide matters, particularly for deterrence and collective memory. It then estab- lishes the theoretical framework by analysing the responsibility of armed groups under international law and reviewing recent ICJ case law on genocide. The arti- cle proceeds to examine the elements of genocide under international law before presenting a detailed analysis of Hamas’ attack on October 7th, demonstrating how the acts committed constitute the physical element (actus reus) of genocide. It then marshals extensive evidence of Hamas’ genocidal intent, including its foundational ideology, systematic policies, documented preparations and statements by its lead- ersbeforeand duringtheattack.Theanalysis thenturnstoexaminehowaccusations of genocide against Israel, particularly the South African application to the ICJ, have been deployed as a rhetorical shield to deflect recognition of Hamas’ own genocide. Finally, the article considers the legal consequences of the violation of the Genocide Convention by Hamas, including obligations for state parties and the international community to prevent and punish these acts. 2. The significance of genocide recognition: Deterrence, memory and justice In addition to the legal duties that the Genocide Convention imposes on state parties, the proper labelling of the events of October 7th 2023 as ‘genocide’ is crucial for reasons of deterrence, combating denial, recovery, and the shaping of social memory. On 22 August 1939, following the German invasion of Poland, Adolf Hitler informed his generals of his plans to settle Poland en masse with Germans. His plans for German ‘living space’ would require the mass murder of Poles and Jews. Hitler dismissed any international opposition or harm that the mass killings might do to Germany, reportedly telling his generals: ‘Who after all is today speaking about the destruction of the Armenians [during the First World War]?’2 This anecdote empha- sises that failure to recognise and punish the perpetrators of genocide emboldens future genocidaires. The historian of antisemitism, Robert Wistrich, has identified ‘eliminationist’ or genocidal antisemitism as the shared core of the totalitarian ideologies of Nazism, Communism and Islamism. As he describes the ideology that motivates Hamas and other Islamic groups:3 2 ‘Contents of the Speech by the Fuhrer to the Chief Commanders and Commanding Generals on the Obersalzberg, August 22 1939’, in EL Woodward and Rohan Butler (eds), Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919–1939 (3rd series, Vol 7, Foreign Office 1995) 258. 3 Robert S Wistrich, A Lethal Obsession: Anti-Semitism from Antiquity to the Global Jihad (Random House 2010) 6. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 3 Much of this antisemitic worldview has infected the body politic of Islam during the past forty years. Its focus has become the ‘collective Jews’ embod- ied in the State of Israel. Its geographic center of gravity has moved to the Middle East, but the tone and content of the rhetoric, along with the manifest will to exterminate the Jews, are virtually identical to German Nazism. The leadership of Iran does not even disguise its desire for a juden-frei (Jew-free) Middle East – a ‘world without Zionism,’ to adopt a more politically correct lan- guage. Radical Islamists of every stripe openly proclaim at every opportunity that the eradication of Israel is a divine commandment, the will of God, and a necessary prologue to the liberation of mankind. In a manner reminiscent of the Nazis, they see themselves as engaged in a war of civilizations against terminal Western decadence (analogous to jahiliya, or pre-Islamic barbarism), equated with social chaos, sexual permissiveness, idolatry, and apostasy. All these evils are symbolized by perfidious ‘Jewish influence.’ As in Nazi anti- semitism … Islamofascism today builds on the same mythological figure of the satanic, ubiquitous, immoral, and all-powerful Jew that once haunted the European antisemitic imagination from Richard Wagner to Adolf Hitler. This eliminationist antisemitism is the defining feature of the Hamas ideology. It is shared by a wide range of Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, al- Qaeda, the Islamic State (ISIS) and Khomeinist Iran.4 The aftermath of the genocide of October 7th has seen the worst wave of anti-Semitic violence against Diaspora Jewish communities since the end of the Second World War.5 Islamic groups such as al-Qaeda and ISIS have called on their followers worldwide to follow the Hamas example and attack Jews.6 The use of the label ‘genocide’ may prompt a systematic examination of Islamist ideology and the threat that it poses to Jews, among others. It would also undermine certain defensive arguments made in favour of Hamas – namely, that it is acting in self-defence against Israeli aggression and is a legitimate response to occupation. Hamas, although a Palestinian nationalist movement, has its origins in the virulently anti-Zionist and antisemitic Muslim Brotherhood movement founded in Egypt in the 1920s. The Muslim Brotherhood was violently opposed to any form of Jewish state- hood in Israel far before 1948 or the post-1967 Israeli administration of Gaza, Judea and Samaria.7 Furthermore, Hamas was emboldened by the Israeli withdrawal from Gaza in 2005 and stepped up its violent attacks on Israel.8 That is because Hamas’ 4 Markos Zografos, ‘Genocidal Antisemitism: A Core Ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood’, ISGAP Occasional Paper Series, No 4, June 2021, https://isgap.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/ GenocidalAntisemitism-Markos-Zografos.pdf. 5 Rosa Freedman and David Hirsh (eds), Responses to 7 October: Antisemitic Discourse (Taylor and Francis 2024); Cary Nelson, ‘October 7 and the Antisemitic War of Words’ in Rosa Freedman and David Hirsh (eds), Responses to 7 October: Universities (Routledge 2024) 88–94. 6 Anti-Defamation League, ‘Islamic State, Al-Qaeda Call for Violence Against Jewish Communities Following October 7 Attack’, 1 December 2023, https://www.adl.org/resources/article/islamic-state-al- qaeda-call-violence-against-jewish-communities-following-october. 7 Zografos (n 4). 8 Michael Herzog, ‘A Wind in Hamas’s Sails: Palestinian Militants Gather Post- Disengagement Momentum’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 13 Sept. 2005, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 4 Avraham Russell Shalev goal is not a Palestinian state within the 1967 lines alongside Israel but an Islamic state in place of Israel. The State of Israel and its Jewish population remain under genocidal threat, mainly from Iran and its proxies, which include Hamas, Hezbollah and the Houthis. Less than one month after the attacks of October 7th , Hamas official Ghazi Hamad told a Lebanese news outlet that ‘Israel is a country that has no place on our land … We must remove that country … The Al-Aqsa Flood [the October 7th massacre] is just the first time, and there will be a second, a third, a fourth’.9 Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to Israel’s destruction in a meet- ing on 23 May 2024 with Hamas leader, Ismail Haniyeh, in Tehran. At this meeting Khamenei said, ‘The divine promise to eliminate the Zionist entity will be fulfilled, and we will see the day when Palestine will rise from the river to the sea’, to which Haniyeh responded, ‘God willing, we will see that day together’.10 The October 7th genocide has been met with persistent denial, especially among Muslim communities and the far right. According to one poll, only 25 per cent of UK Muslims believe that Hamas terrorists committed rape and murder in that attack. Additionally, 46 per cent of British Muslims expressed support for Hamas, and 39 per cent denied that atrocities were committed on October 7th .11 Conspiracy theorists have spread claims that Israel was responsible for the killing of its own citizens. Especially pernicious is the denial of mass rape and sexual violence com- mitted by Palestinian armed groups against Israeli women. For example, during the United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council’s 56th session, the Palestinian representative insisted that the UN Commission of Inquiry found no evidence of rape.12 Recognition of the events of October 7th as genocide may have a deterrent effect, both in signalling Israel’s resolve to prevent its repetition and by prompting the international community to act against Iran and its genocidal proxies. In 1998, Rwandan officials argued that the prosecution of Hutu genocidaires in the Rwandan courts would serve as a deterrent against Hutu guerillas who were still targeting Tutsis at the time. Similarly, Pol Pot and Ieng Sary were tried in absentia while they still controlled Cambodian territory. The Cambodian government sought to deter https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/wind-hamass-sails-palestinian-militants-gather- post-disengagement-momentum. 9 Jerusalem Post Staff, “‘We Will Repeat October 7 Again and Again” – Hamas Official’, The Jerusalem Post, 1 November 2023, https://www.jpost.com/arab-israeli-conflict/article-771199. 10 ‘Iran’s Khamenei Tells Visiting Hamas Chief that Israel “Will One Day Be Eliminated”’, The Times of Israel, 23 May 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/irans-khamenei-tells-visiting-hamas-chief-that- israel-will-one-day-be-eliminated. 11 ‘Only One in Four British Muslims Believe Hamas Committed Murder and Rape in Israel on October 7th’, Henry Jackson Society, 8 April 2024, https://henryjacksonsociety.org/2024/04/08/only-one-in-four- british-muslims-believe-hamas-committed-murder-and-rape-in-israel-on-october-7th. 12 Jerusalem Institute of Justice, ‘Echoes of Denial – Oct. 7th Atrocities & Rising Antisemitism’, 22 July 2024, 6, https://jij.org/advocacy-materials/echoes-denial-october-7th-atrocities-rising-antisemitism- report; Elizabeth Dwoskin, ‘Denial of the Oct. 7 Hamas Attack on Israel Is Spreading’, The Washington Post, 21 January 2024, https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2024/01/21/hamas-attack-october-7- conspiracy-israel; Anti-Defamation League, ‘Denial and Distortion of the Hamas-led October 7 Attack: An Overview of False Narratives’, 28 June 2024, https://www.adl.org/resources/article/denial-and- distortion-hamas-led-october-7-attack-overview-false-narratives. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 5 futurecrimes.13 Therefore,legalrecognitionoftheOctober7thatrocitiesasgenocide by both international and Israeli authorities will allow the exposure of the extent of Hamas’ crimes and the network of perpetrators and their supporters. Recognition of the genocidal nature of the Hamas attacks alongside a public trial may also serve as a catharsis for Israeli society. As Caroline Fournet explains:14 The impact of legal recognition, and thus of the legal memory, of the crime of genocide on shaping collective memory and remembrance of the crimes lies precisely in the recognition of the victims. And indeed, by legally qualifying the crime of genocide as genocide, trials would simultaneously acknowledge the status of victims as victims … Because genocide is precisely nothing but the denial of the victims’ identity, dignity and humanity, victims of genocide want justice not only to see the perpetrators punished but also to be recog- nized as victims through the official public recognition of the perpetration of the crime. In the course of such trials, and therefore of the recognition of vic- tims as victims, it is also argued here that it is essential for those victims who wish to do so to be able to testify; whether for individual purposes – testifying might somehow help them to exorcize their pain and to heal their wounds – or for collective reasons – they might feel that their testimonies will ultimately reinforce, if not ensure, the collective memory of the crime. Historical precedents, suchas Hitler’s dismissal of the repercussionsof the Armenian genocide, underscore the importance of recognising and punishing genocide to prevent future atrocities. Israel faces ongoing genocidal threats from Iran and its proxies, including Hamas. Recognising October 7th as genocide may deter further violence, prompt international action, and provide societal catharsis by acknowl- edging victims’ suffering. Legal recognition can also expose the extent of Hamas’ crimes and support a robust collective memory. While the destruction of Israel is an integral part of Hamas ideology, recently captured documents demonstrate that on October 7th Hamas believed that Israel’s destruction was a goal that they could achieve. According to documents seized by the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) in the Gaza Strip, following the 2021 Guardian of the Walls Operation, the Hamas leadership began to consider Israel’s elimination as being highly feasible in the near future. On October 7th, Hamas intended to pro- voke a multi-front war against Israel, including Israeli Arabs and other Iranian ‘axis of resistance’ groups, which would result in Israel’s collapse.15 Therefore, distinct from other acts of terrorism carried out by Hamas, the attack of October 7th was perpetrated with the real and immediate intention of Israel’s destruction and the genocide of its Jewish population. 13 John Quigley, The Genocide Convention: An International Law Analysis (Ashgate 2006) 282. 14 Caroline Fournet, The Crime of Destruction and the Law of Genocide: Their Impact on Collective Memory (Ashgate 2007) 132–33. 15 Uri Rosset, ‘Hamas’ Strategy to Destroy Israel: From Theory into Practice, as Seen in Captured Documents’, Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 13 March 2025, https:// www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/hamas-strategy-to-destroy-israel-from-theory-into-practice-as-seen-in- captured-documents. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 6 Avraham Russell Shalev 3. Legal framework: Non-state actors and international criminal responsibility A preliminary issue that must be examined is whether Hamas, as a non-state entity and an armed group (the two terms are used interchangeably), can be held col- lectively responsible for the crime of genocide. Scholars have pointed out that armed groups now play an outsized role in armed conflicts worldwide. According to Annyssa Bellal’s The War Report 2018, 51 of the 59 active armed conflicts involved armed groups.16 The UN Secretary-General has noted the preponderance of human rights abuses committed by armed groups:17 The consequences for civilians have been devastating, as armed groups have often sought to overcome their military inferiority by employing strategies that flagrantly violate international law. These range from deliberate attacks against civilians, including sexual violence, to attacks on civilian objects such as schools, to abduction, forced recruitment and using civilians to shield military objectives. While it is widely accepted that armed groups have international obligations under international humanitarian law,18 the degree to which they bear collective responsibility as a group is unclear. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) study on customary international humanitarian law (IHL) has admitted that armed groups ‘incur responsibility for acts committed by persons forming part of such groups’.19 However, the content of such responsibility is unclear. In its 2016 Commentary to Common Article 3, the ICRC stated that it is still undeter- mined whether international law can attribute collective responsibility to non-state actors for the acts committed by their members.20 Alternately, the Articles on State Responsibility offer the possibility ‘that the insurrectional movement may itself be held responsible for its conduct under international law, for example for a breach of international humanitarian law committed by its forces’.21 16 AnnyssaBellal, TheWarReport:ArmedConflictsin2018 (GenevaAcademyofInternationalHumanitarian Law and Human Rights 2019) 32–34, https://www.geneva-academy.ch/joomlatools-files/docman-files/ The%20War%20Report%202018.pdf. 17 UN Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (10 November 2010), UN Doc S/2010/579, para 8. 18 Sandesh Sivakumaran, ‘Binding Armed Opposition Groups’ (2006) 55 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 369; Jann K Kleffner, ‘The Applicability of International Humanitarian Law to Organized Armed Groups’ (2011) 93(882) International Review of the Red Cross 443; Cedric Ryngaert, ‘Non-State Actors in International Humanitarian Law’ in Jean d’Aspremont (ed), Participants in the International Legal System: Multiple Perspectives on Non-State Actors in International Law (Routledge 2011) 284. 19 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck (eds), Customary International Humanitarian Law, Vol I: Rules (International Committee of the Red Cross and Cambridge University Press 2005, revised 2009) 536 (ICRC Study). 20 ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention: Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field (2nd edn, ICRC and Cambridge University Press 2016), https:// ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary (Commentary GC I (2016)), Commentary on Article 3, para 892. 21 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Act (2001), UN Doc No A/56/10, Commentary on Article 10, para 16. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 7 The current international legal framework has several responses to violations of international humanitarian law by non-state actors: international criminal law, truth-seeking mechanisms, naming and shaming, and sanctions.22 Although inter- national criminal law focuses on the responsibility of individual perpetrators, it recognises that certain international crimes require group action. These exist- ing mechanisms may form the basis for a more expansive notion of armed group responsibility. According to the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY):23 Most of the time these [international] crimes do not result from the crimi- nal propensity of single individuals but constitute manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals acting in pursuance of a common criminal design. Although only some members of the group may physically perpetrate the criminal act…, the participation and contribution of the other members of the group is often vital in facilitating the commission of the offence in question. According to Article 7(2)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, a key element of crimes against humanity is the existence ‘of a State or an orga- nizational policy to commit such attack’. In Prosecutor v Tadić, the ICTY recognised that armed groups exercising de facto control over territory may perpetrate crimes against humanity.24 In the Tadić Appeals Chamber judgment, the Court established the doctrine of joint criminal enterprise (JCE), which holds that each member of an organised group can be individually responsible for crimes committed as part of a commonplanorpurpose,eveniftheydidnotphysicallyparticipateinthecrime(s).25 The JCE doctrine has been incorporated in Article 25(3)(d) of the Rome Statute. The United Nations has set up many investigative mechanisms to monitor inter- national humanitarian law violations of armed groups.26 A small number have explicitly examined the collective responsibility of armed groups, including their obligation to provide reparations to victims. Referring to violations committed by the Sudan Liberation Movement and the Justice and Equality Movement, the Commission of Inquiry in Darfur stated:27 Serious violations of human rights law and humanitarian law may amount to international crimes, subject to the conditions set out by the ICTY in Tadić (Interlocutory Appeal) and largely codified in the ICC Statute. In other words, these violations may entail the individual criminal liability of their author 22 Laura Íñigo Álvarez, Towards a Regime of Responsibility of Armed Groups in International Law (Intersentia 2019) 35–52. 23 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Judgment, IT-94-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 15 July 1999, para 191. 24 ICTY, Prosecutor v Tadić, Judgment, IT-94-1-T, Trial Chamber, 7 May 1997, para 654. 25 Tadić (n 23) paras 185–229. 26 Íñigo Álvarez (n 22) 39. 27 Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secretary- General, pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1564 of 18 September 2004 (25 January 2005), para 175. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 8 Avraham Russell Shalev or authors. These violations may also involve the international responsibility of the State or of the international non-state entity to which those authors belong as officials (or for which they acted as de facto organs), with the conse- quence that the State or the non-state entity may have to pay compensation to the victims of those violations. Similarly, the Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka recognised that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) could be held responsible for international humanitarian law violations:28 The Panel considers three forms of responsibility. State responsibility con- cerns whether the State of Sri Lanka would be responsible for violations were the alleged facts found to be true. Under international law, state responsibility applies only to the acts of the State of Sri Lanka. Actions by non-state actors, such as paramilitary groups or private citizens who act under the instruc- tions of, or are directed or controlled by, the State are imputable to the State. Organizational responsibility is a concept that recognizes that international humanitarian law also places duties on non-state armed groups, including, in this case the LTTE. Individual responsibility generally concerns whether par- ticular individuals regardless of their affiliation in an armed conflict would be criminally responsible for violations. Criminal responsibility attaches to certain acts, regardless of whether the individual was acting on behalf of the Government or the LTTE (or neither). The UN Secretary-General has appointed a Special Representative to examine the abuse of children and sexual violence in armed conflicts. The Special Representative submits annual reports to the General Assembly and the Human Rights Council. In the 2023 report to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General notes that armed groups perpetrated close to 50 per cent of grave violations.29 Such ‘naming and shaming’ is another mechanism used to address human rights violations by armed groups. Finally, Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows the Security Council to impose sanctions against armed groups and states.30 The Security Council has imposed sanc- tions on Bosnian Serb militias in the former Yugoslavia, armed groups in Sierra Leone, the Taliban in Afghanistan and other groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo, among others.31 Sanctions, among other mechanisms, demonstrate that 28 Report of the Secretary General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka (31 March 2011) para 191. 29 Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children: Children and Armed Conflict, Report of the Secretary-General (3 June 2024) UN Doc A/78/842-S/2024/384, para 10. 30 Charter of the United Nations (entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS XVI. 31 UNSC Res 942 (23 September 1994), UN Doc S/RES/942; UNSC Res 1132 (8 October 1997), UN Doc S/RES/1132; UNSC Res 1171 (5 June 1998), UN Doc S/RES/1171; UNSC Res 1267 (15 October 1999), UN Doc S/RES/1267; UNSC Res 1493 (28 July 2003), UN Doc S/RES/1493; UNSC Res 1807 (31 March 2008), UN Doc S/RES/1807. See also Jann K Kleffner, ‘The Collective Accountability of Organised Armed Groups’ in André Nollkaemper and Harmen van der Wilt, System Criminality and International Law (Cambridge University Press 2009) 238, 253. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 9 the international system recognises the need for action against armed groups, in addition to the individual criminal responsibility of its members. Laura Íñigo Álvarez suggests a comparison of the common principles of attri- bution rules for states codified in the Articles of State Responsibility (ASR) and the rules of attribution for international organisations codified in the Articles of Responsibility of International Organizations (ARIO), and applying these to armed groups.32 These common principles are: (a) attribution based on the conduct of organs and agents belonging to the organisation, including ultra vires acts; (b) attri- bution based on the conduct of other individuals or entities under the direction and control of the organisation; and (c) attribution based on acknowledgement of the conduct of the organisation as its own.33 These principles are particularly appropri- ate to apply to groups like Hamas, which since 2007 has served as the de facto gov- erning authority in Gaza. The governing apparatus of Hamas was highly centralised, and included a parliament, numerous ministries and a large bureaucracy.34 It should be noted that while this article focuses specifically on Hamas, a similar analysis can be made regarding crimes committed by members of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad. Gazan civilians who participated in the October 7th atrocities could potentially be charged with complicity in genocide or aiding and abetting geno- cide.35 As non-state actors increasingly play a central role in armed conflicts and often display the characteristics of states, the current non-attribution of group respon- sibility is inadequate. In recent years, German courts have set a precedent in convicting members of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) of genocide and related crimes against the Yazidi minority.36 Multiple international entities, such as the UN and the US State Department, have recognised the ISIS campaign against the Yazidis as genocide.37 However, the restrictive attribution of responsibility limits 32 Íñigo Álvarez (n 22) Ch IV. 33 ibid 133. 34 See Devorah Margolin, ‘Retreating from Legitimacy: Hamas’s Engagement in and Disengagement from Governance’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Jihadist Governance and Statecraft Series, 6 August 2024. 35 ICTY, Prosecutor v Blagojević, Judgment, IT-02-60-A, 9 May 2007, para 122; ICTR, Prosecutor v Ntakirutimana, Judgment, ICTR-96-10-A and ICTR-96-17-A, 13 December 2004, para 364. 36 See Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt (Germany), Genocide to the Detriment of the Yazidi Religious Group, Case No. 5-3 StE 1/20.4.1/20, 30 November 2021, ECLI:DE:OLGHE:2021:1130.5.3STE1.20.4.1.20.00, unofficial English translation available: https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/assets/ taha-aj-higher-regional-court-of-justice-5-3-ste-120.pdf; BGH (German Federal Court of Justice), Case No 3 StR 230/22, 17 January 2023; Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf (Germany), Judgment of 21 April 2021, Case No 7 StS 2/20, https://nrwe.justiz.nrw.de/olgs/duesseldorf/j2021/7_StS_2_20_Urteil_ 20210421.html; Higher Regional Court of Koblenz (Germany), Case No 1 StE 3/21, 24 February 2021, https://www.eurojust.europa.eu/sites/default/files/assets/files/13-de-1-ste-321-higher-regional- court-of-koblenz-24-february-2021.pdf. 37 UN Security Council, Fourth Report of the Special Adviser and Head of the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da’esh/ISIL in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD) (11 May 2020), UN Doc S/2020/386; UN Human Rights Council, ‘ “They Came to Destroy”: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis’ (15 June 2016), UN Doc A/HRC/32/CRP.2; US Department of State, ‘2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Iraq’, 22 April 2024, https://www.state.gov/reports/2023- country-reports-on-human-rights-practices/iraq; supplemented by statements from the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, USCIRF Annual Report, May 2024, 58. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 10 Avraham Russell Shalev victims’ access to justice. An organisational conviction could implicate the entire chain of command and support structure without targeting each person individ- ually. It might allow for reparations or asset seizure to be redirected to victims. Therefore, attribution of group responsibility to Hamas may lead the way in redefin- ing how armed groups are treated under international law as well as promote broader recognition and justice for victims. 4. Evolution of genocide jurisprudence: Key ICJ precedents The evolving jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on genocide pro- vides essential interpretive guidance for analysing Hamas’ actions. Three aspects are particularly relevant. First, the Court’s decisions in Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Croatia v Serbia establish the framework for proving genocidal intent through patterns of conduct and circumstantial evidence. Second, the Ukraine v Russia case demonstrates how accusations of genocide can be weaponised for political pur- poses, a dynamic relevant to understanding the broader context of the events of October 7th. Third, the Gambia v Myanmar decision expands our understanding of state obligations to prevent and punish genocide, which has direct implications for states currently providing safe haven for Hamas leaders. This jurisprudential frame- work helps us to evaluate both the substantive elements of Hamas’ actions and the international community’s legal obligations in response. The ICJ decision, issued on 26 February 2007, on the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro) was the first to hear a case brought by one state against another for allegations of genocide. The Court held that the Genocide Convention imposes a duty on state parties not to commit genocide and other related acts, such as con- spiracy to commit genocide, direct and public incitement to genocide, attempt to commitgenocide,and complicity in genocide.38 TheCourtalsoheldthatthetargeted group’s legal definition was positive. Therefore, the ICJ examined whether genocide was committed against Bosnian Muslims, as opposed to ‘non-Serbs’. The Court also concluded that genocide against ‘part’ of the group must target a part that is sub- stantial enough to have an impact on the entire group.39 In terms of proof, the ICJ held that ‘charges of exceptional gravity must be provided by evidence that is fully conclusive’.40 In this regard, the ICJ relied on the fact-finding procedures of the ICTY and other UN reports and resolutions. In keeping with the ICTY findings, the ICJ held that genocide occurred in Srebrenica only in July 1995. As regards state responsibility, the Court found that the Applicant could not prove that orders to commit genocide were issued by the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) or that the army of the Republika Srpska, the entity that committed the geno- cide, was under FRY effective control.41 However, the Court found that Serbia failed to prevent the genocide at Srebrenica by not taking all measures within its power to stop the massacre, despite being aware of the grave risk of genocide. Serbia 38 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 43, [142]–[179]. 39 ibid [198]–[201]. 40 Ibid [209]. 41 Ibid [396]–[412]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 11 influenced the Bosnian Serb forces responsible for the massacre and failed to act to prevent the killings, which constituted a breach of its obligation under the Genocide Convention to prevent genocide. Following the genocide, Serbia did not cooper- ate fully with the ICTY, specifically in failing to arrest and extradite suspects or to provide evidence requested by the Tribunal.42 In 2015, the ICJ issued its judgment in the case of Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), which was broadly consistent with its findings in the Bosnia and Herzegovina case and the ICTY findings. The Court found that Croatia demonstrated the commitment of the actus reus of genocide (denial of medical care, food and water; deportation; killings) against Croats without proving the necessary intent to commit genocide. The Court reaffirmed the ICTY’s finding that for a pattern of conduct to be accepted as evi- dence of genocidal intent, it would have to be ‘the only reasonable [one] available on the evidence’.43 As such, patterns of actus reus of genocide were committed not to destroy Croats but rather to induce them to leave or to punish the Croat pop- ulation. Similarly, the Court rejected Serbia’s counterclaims of Croatian genocide against Serbs, ruling once again that Serbia failed to prove the dolus specialis (special intent) required of genocide.44 On 27 February 2022, Ukraine introduced proceedings against Russia before the ICJ, asking the Court to issue provisional measures, inter alia, ordering Russia to end its military operations in Ukraine. Prior to and during its invasion, Russia accused Ukraine of committing genocide against Russian co-ethnics in the Donbas region of Ukraine.45 Ukraine requested the Court to rule that, contrary to Russian claims, no genocide had occurred in Ukraine and that the Genocide Convention did not autho- rise Russia to take military action to prevent such a genocide.46 The uniqueness of the proceedings lies in it being a reverse genocide accusation, in which Ukraine sought the jurisdiction of the ICJ based on the Charter to counter Russian claims of Ukrainian genocide. The Court, having established its prima facie jurisdiction over the dispute, held that it had not been presented with evidence substantiat- ing Russian allegations of genocide in Ukraine and that it was ‘doubtful’ whether the Convention authorised the unilateral use of force on the territory of another state to prevent or punish alleged genocide.47 The Court ordered an immediate halt to Russian military actions based on the urgency of the matter and the risk of irreparable harm to the civilian population in Ukraine before the Court’s final decision.48 42 Antoine Ollivier, ‘The Judgment of the International Court of Justice in the “Genocide” Case between Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro’ (2007) 46 International Legal Materials 185. 43 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v Serbia), Judgment [2015] ICJ Rep 3, [148]; reaffirming ICTY, Prosecutor v Tolimir, Judgment, IT-05-88/2-T, Trial Chamber, 12 December 2007, para 745. 44 Hemi Mistry, ‘The International Court of Justice’s Judgment in the Final Balkans Genocide Convention Case’ (2016) 16(2) Human Rights Law Review 357. 45 Andreas Kulick, ‘Provisional Measures after Ukraine v Russia (2022)’ (2022) 13 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 329. 46 ICJ, Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order [2022] ICJ Rep 212, [2(a)]–[2(b)]. 47 ibid [60]. 48 ibid [74]–[75], [77]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 12 Avraham Russell Shalev In July 2022, the ICJ delivered its judgment on preliminary objections in the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar). This decision has important ramifications, expanding the notion of state standing before the ICJ in cases involving the Genocide Convention. In November 2019, the Republic of The Gambia (The Gambia) filed proceedings against Myanmar alleging violations of the Genocide Convention with regard to the Rohingya minority. The ICJ rejected Myanmar’s claim that The Gambia had brought the proceedings on behalf of the Organization of Islamic States, a non-state actor, without standing before the Court. According to the Court, The Gambia seized the Court in its name, and there was no legal reason to look beyond that.49 The Court also rejected Myanmar’s argument that there was no dispute between the parties, thereby denying ICJ jurisdiction. According to the Court, a dispute is a disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or interests between parties. Four statements made by Gambian representations before the United Nations General Assembly, decrying Myanmar’s actions, and a note verbale sent to the Permanent Mission of Myanmar to the United Nations were sufficient to establish the exis- tence of a dispute.50 Most importantly, the Court rejected Myanmar’s claim that The Gambia was not an ‘injured state’ and had suffered no wrong by Myanmar’s sup- posed violations of the Convention. By committing to the obligations within the Convention, all state parties to the Genocide Convention share a common interest in preventing, suppressing and punishing genocide. This shared interest means that each party has obligations towards all other parties, known as erga omnes partes obli- gations, implying that each state party has a vested interest in ensuring compliance with these obligations in every instance. Therefore, every state party is entitled to invoke the responsibility of another party for alleged breachesbyseizing theCourt.51 Canada, Denmark, France,Germany,the Netherlands andtheUKsubmittedajoint declaration of intervention in The Gambia v Myanmar, arguing for a broad interpreta- tion of the Genocide Convention.52 The declaration represents opinion juris, without accompanying evidence of state practice. Therefore, the declaration has important, although not binding, interpretative value. Among the significant points made in the declaration, the states argue that genocide is not limited to mass killing and that there is no hierarchy among the acts of genocide. Mass killing and other acts of geno- cide can be perpetrated in a coordinated manner to destroy a protected group.53 As for specific intent, this can be established based on circumstantial evidence, namely, widespread patterns of conduct.54 The Court’s finding of genocidalintent as ‘theonly reasonable inference’ refers only to alternative explanations reasonably supported by the evidence.55 The number of victims killed is not determinative of genocidal 49 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar), Preliminary Objections, Judgment [2022] ICJ Rep 478, [34]–[50]. 50 ibid [51]–[77]. 51 ibid [93]–[114]. 52 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v Myanmar), Intervention, Joint Declaration of Intervention of Canada, the Kingdom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland [2023] ICJ Rep 1. 53 ibid [25]. 54 ibid [49]. 55 ibid [52]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 13 intent. However, sexual and gender-based violence may play an important role since it has no military value besides harm to the group.56 The positions expressed in this declaration have yet to crystalise into state practice, although they may point to future developments. With this jurisprudential framework established, we can now examine the spe- cific elements of genocide that must be proved, and apply them to the Hamas actions on October 7th. 5. Defining genocide: Legal elements and evidentiary requirements The crime of genocide is one of the most fundamental and severe in international law. Since at least the end of the Second World War, genocide has been consid- ered ‘the crime of crimes’. The Genocide Convention codified the crime of genocide for the first time. It was the first human rights treaty adopted in the UN General Assembly and represents the international community’s determination to prevent the recurrence of the atrocities committed during the Second World War. The Convention has been ratified by 150 states. The crime of genocide consists of two parts: an act of genocide accompanied by genocidal intent. The Genocide Convention defines genocide as the following (Article II): In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts commit- ted with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. Genocide is unique among war crimes and crimes against humanity as it requires a dolus specialis (a specific or a special intent), which requires that the crime be com- mitted with the intent to destroy in whole or in part, a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such.57 This dolus specialis is met by demonstrating that genocide was ‘the only reasonable inference which can be drawn from the said pattern of con- duct’.58 The specific intent to destroy the group is the distinguishing feature of the crime of genocide. According to the ICTY in the Jelisic case, ‘it is in fact the mens rea which gives genocide its specialty and distinguishes it from an ordinary crime and other crimes against international humanitarian law’.59 Similarly, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in the Akayesu case defined the dolus specialis 56 ibid [56]–[66]. 57 ICTR, Prosecutor v Kambanda, Judgment and Sentence, ICTR 97-23-S, Trial Judgment, 4 September 1998, para 16. 58 ICJ, ApplicationoftheConventiononthePreventionandPunishmentoftheCrimeofGenocide(CroatiavSerbia), Judgment [2015] ICJ Rep 9, [407]. 59 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisic, Judgment, IT-95-10-T, Trial Chamber, 14 December 1999, para 66. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 14 Avraham Russell Shalev as ‘the specific intention, required as a constitutive element of the crime, which demands that the perpetrator clearly seeks to produce the act charged’.60 The ICTR and ICTY jurisprudence are in agreement that the perpetrator of geno- cide must act with the goal or purpose of destroying the group, as opposed to merely knowing that the campaign is aimed at group destruction.61 Where the accused do not reveal their mental state, the desire to destroy may be inferred from facts on the ground. As the Court says in Prosecutor v Akayesu:62 The Chamber considers that it is possible to deduce the genocidal intent inher- ent in a particular act charged from the general context of the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, whether these acts were committed by the same offender or by others. Other factors, such as the scale of atrocities committed, their general nature, in a region or a country, or furthermore, the fact of deliberately and systematically tar- geting victims on account of their membership of a particular group, while excluding members of other groups, can enable the Chamber to infer intent of a particular act. The destruction of the group refers to its physical destruction, as opposed to its dis- solution as a social concept. After considering recent developments in domestic law, the ICTY Trial Chamber in Prosecutor v Krstić held:63 It therefore recognizes that, despite recent developments, customary inter- national law limits the definition of genocide to those acts seeking the physical and biological destruction of all or part of the group. The Krstić Appeal Chamber judgment clarifies the meaning of ‘part of the group’ as referring to a substantial part of that group. The determination of ‘substantial- ity’ begins but is not limited to the size of the targeted group. It must also consider the targeted group’s overall size and the prominence of the part within the group – whether the specific part is emblematic of the overall group or essential to its survival.64 However, the Court noted:65 The historical examples of genocide also suggest that the area of the perpetra- tors’ activity and control, as well as the possible extent of their reach, should be considered. Nazi Germany may have intended only to eliminate Jews within Europe alone; that ambition probably did not extend, even at the height of its power, to an undertaking of that enterprise on a global scale. Similarly, the perpetrators of genocide in Rwanda did not seriously contemplate the 60 ICTR, Prosecutor v Akayesu, Judgment, ICTR-96-4-T, Trial Chamber, 2 September 1998, para 498. 61 ibid; ICTR, Prosecutor v Rutaganda, Judgment, ICTR-96-3-A, Appeals Chamber, 26 May 2003, para 524; ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33-A, Appeals Chamber, 19 April 2004, para 134. 62 Akayesu (n 60) para 523; ICTR, Gacumbitsi v Prosecutor, Judgment, ICTR-2001-64-A, 7 July 2006, para 40. 63 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstić, Judgment, IT-98-33-T, Trial Chamber, 2 August 2001, para 580. 64 ICTY, Prosecutor v Krstić, Appeals Chamber (n 61) paras 6–23. 65 ibid para 13. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 15 elimination of the Tutsi population beyond the country’s borders. The intent to destroy formed by a perpetrator of genocide will always be limited by the opportunity presented to him. While this factor alone will not indicate whether the targeted group is substantial, it can – in combination with other factors – inform the analysis. TheICTY intheTadić AppealsChamber judgment developedthejointcriminalenter- prise (JCE) doctrine to consider the individual criminal responsibility of perpetrators of a common plan. The Appeals Chamber defined the actus reus as follows: (i) a plu- rality of persons; (ii) a common plan or purpose to commit a crime; and (iii) the participation of the accused in the common design involving the perpetration of a crime. As to the mens rea, the Court distinguished between three categories of JCE. According to the first category, all co-perpetrators share a common intent to per- petrate a certain crime (JCE I). The second category requires a personal knowledge of the system of ill-treatment, as well as the intent to further this system (JCE II). The third category consists of the intent to participate in and advance the criminal purpose, along with the foreseeability that a crime might be perpetrated by one or other group members and that the accused willingly took that risk (JCE III).66 In the Tadić case, the Appeals Chamber applied JCE to hold a perpetrator at the bottom of the command hierarchy responsible for the killing of five men. Dusko Tadić took part in the violent attack on a non-Serbian village, although his direct role in the killing of the men was unclear. According to the Appeals Chamber, Tadić had the intention of advancing the criminal purpose of ethnically cleansing the region of its non-Serbian population by committing inhumane acts against them. Tadić will- ingly took the risk that co-perpetrators might foreseeably kill non-Serbs in pursuit of this common plan.67 The ICTY has applied JCE to other low-ranking perpetrators,68 commanders or wardens of prison camps,69 mid-level perpetrators70 and the highest echelon of power.71 To refine the application of the JCE doctrine to Hamas’ actions on October 7th 2023, it is critical to identify the specific mens rea category that aligns with the group’s collective criminality. The most applicable framework is JCE I, where all co- perpetrators share a common intent to commit genocide against Israeli Jews. The Hamas leadership – including Yahya Sinwar, Mohammed Deif and Ismail Haniyeh – demonstrated this intent through explicit statements, such as Deif’s October 7th call to ‘kill them wherever you may find them’, and through operational planning, evidenced by captured documents instructing fighters to murder women 66 Tadić (n 23) paras 227–28. 67 ibid para 232. 68 ICTY, Prosecutor v Vasiljevic, Judgment, IT-98-32-T, Trial Chamber, 29 November 2002. 69 ICTY, ProsecutorvKvockaandOthers, Appeals Chamber, IT-98-30/1-A, 28 February 2005; ICTY, Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Judgment, IT-97-25-A, Appeals Chamber, 17 September 2003. 70 ICTY, Prosecutor v Stakic, Judgment, IT-97-24-T, Trial Chamber, 31 July 2003; ICTY, Prosecutor v Simic and Others, Judgment, IT-95-9-T, Trial Chamber, 17 October 2003. 71 ICTY, Prosecutor v Brđanin, Decision on Motion for Acquittal under Rule 98bis, IT-99-36T, Trial Chamber, 28 November 2003; ICTY, Prosecutor v Brđanin, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal, IT-99-36- A, Appeals Chamber, 19 March 2004; ICTY, Prosecutor v Milošević, Decision on Motion for Judgment of Acquittal, IT-02-54-T, Trial Chamber, 16 June 2004. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 16 Avraham Russell Shalev and children. The organisation’s foundational ideology, rooted in the call of the 1988 Convention to ‘obliterate’ Israel,72 and its decades-long indoctrination of fighters via militarised education, ensured that lower-ranking perpetrators acted in concert with this shared purpose. The coordinated massacre of 1,200 Israelis across 22 towns and the Nova Festival, marked by systematic targeting of Jews, aligns the actus reus of killing and causing serious harm with a collective mens rea to destroy the group ‘as such’, satisfying the requirements of JCE I as established in Prosecutor v Tadić.73 Attributing genocidal intent from Hamas leaders to lower-ranking perpetrators is further justified by the group’s centralised command and pervasive ideological conditioning, bridging any gap in individual comprehension of the broader goal. Operating as Gaza’s de facto authority since 2007 with a ‘highly organized’ struc- ture,74 Hamas disseminated its intent through detailed attack plans – like those for Kibbutz Sa’ad and Be’eri – executed by the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades. Even if some fighters lacked a nuanced understanding of genocide, their enthusiastic par- ticipation, evidenced by audio recordings bragging of killing Jews ‘with my own hands’, reflects alignment with the leadership’s directives. The ICTY in Krstić held that intent can be inferred from participation in a coordinated plan.75 At the same time, Akayesu emphasised the role of context76 – here, the systematic dehumanisa- tion by Hamas of Jews as ‘sons of pigs and monkeys’. For peripheral actors, JCE III supplements this analysis: their willing execution of orders in a foreseeably geno- cidal campaign, marked by torture and rape, imputes liability even absent personal intent, ensuring the concurrence of actus reus and mens rea across the organisation. 6. The physical element: Analysing Hamas’ actions on October 7th While the events of October 7th are well known in Israel and much of the western world, it remains necessary to describe them briefly. On October 7th 2023, thousands of armed Hamas terrorists tore down large parts of the Gaza security perimeter and invaded southern Israel. The invasion was accompanied by a barrage of thou- sands of rockets fired at Israel. Hamas’ highly trained terroristfighters breachedover 30 points in the 40-mile security fence, using an array of technologies and tactics. Hamas terrorists also crossed the barrier into Israeli territory using paragliders. The terrorists split up, conquering and taking control of over 20 Israeli towns. Terrorists also attacked the Nova Music Festival near the town of Re’im. Their goal was to murder as many Jews as possible. During that day, over 1,200 Israelis were tortured, mutilated and massacred, including women, children and the elderly, and 72 Covenant of the Islamic Resistance Movement, 18 August 1988, The Avalon Project, https://avalon. law.yale.edu/21st_century/hamas.asp (Hamas Covenant). 73 Tadić (n 23) para 227. 74 Brian Carter with Daniel Mealie, ‘The Order of Battle of Hamas’ Izz al Din al Qassem Brigades, Part 1: North and Central Gaza’, Institute for the Study of War, 8 December 2023, https://www.understandingwar. org/backgrounder/order-battle-hamas%E2%80%99-izz-al-din-al-qassem-brigades-part-1-north-and- central-gaza. 75 Krstić Appeal (n 61) para 135. 76 Akayesu (n 60) para 523. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 17 over 200 were abducted back to Gaza.77 Comparatively, the October 7th attack was the most deadly in Israel’s history and the third most lethal attack in modern history.78 Hamas’ murderous attack was also accompanied by sexual violence and rape. According to a report issued by the Association of Rape Crisis Centres in Israel, sys- tematic sexual assaults took place at the site of the Nova Festival, kibbutzim and villages,IDFarmy basesandagainst hostagesheld incaptivity.Manyoftheseassaults were carried out by multiple perpetrators and in front of family members. Women at the festival who tried to escape were hunted down and then assaulted. The report also notes evidence of tying and binding, as well as the mutilation of the sexual organs of girls, women and men.79 A report by the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict summarised its findings after a two-and-a-half-week mission to Israel:80 Based on the information gathered by the mission team from multiple and independent sources, there are reasonable grounds to believe that conflict- related sexual violence occurred during the 7 October attacks in multiple locations across Gaza periphery, including rape and gang rape, in at least three locations. Across the various locations of the 7 October attacks, the mission team found that several fully naked or partially naked bodies from the waist down were recovered – mostly women – with hands tied and shot multiple times, often in the head. Although circumstantial, such a pattern of undressing and restraining of victims may be indicative of some forms of sexual violence. The above-mentioned acts clearly fall within Article II(a) and (b) of the Genocide Convention: killing members of the group (Israeli Jews) and causing serious bodily and mental harm to members of the group. 7. Establishing specific intent: Hamas’ ideology, planning and actions While the scale and brutality of the attacks of October 7th establish the physical ele- ment of genocide through killings and serious bodily harm to Israeli Jews, the more complex question is whether these acts were committed with the specific intent to 77 For a description of the events see Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ‘Hamas-Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects’, 2 November 2023, https://www.gov.il/BlobFolder/news/hamas-israel-conflict2023- key-legal-aspects/en/English_Documents_Hamas-Israel%20Conflict%202023%20-%20Some%20Factual% 20and%20Legal%20Aspects%20-%20Israel%20Ministry%20of%20Foreign%20Affairs%20(2%20NOV% 202023).pdf; Israel Defense Forces, ‘The October 7 Inquiries’, https://www.idf.il/en/mini-sites/7-10-the- inquiries. 78 Daniel Byman and others, ‘Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Data’, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), 19 December 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamass-october-7- attack-visualizing-data. 79 Carmit Klal-Chalamish, ‘Silent Cry – Sexual Violence Crimes on October 7’, Association of Rape Crisis Centers in Israel, 24 February 2024, https://www.1202.org.il/wp-content/uploads/2025/01/ARCCI- report-sexual-crimes-on-october-7-updated-26.3.pdf. 80 Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict (SRSG-SVC), ‘Mission Report: Official Visit of the Office of the SRSG-SVC to Israel and the Occupied West Bank 29 January – 14 February 2024’, 4 March 2024, para 12. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 18 Avraham Russell Shalev destroy this group ‘as such’. As the ICJ and international tribunals have consistently held, genocidal intent can be inferred from both direct evidence and patterns of con- duct. In Hamas’ case, the systematic nature of the attacks – their careful planning, coordinated execution across multiple locations and deliberate targeting of civilians – provides the first indication of such intent. However, to fully establish the dolus spe- cialis required by the Genocide Convention, we must examine these actions within the broader context of the Hamas ideology, its preparations and stated objectives. This analysis reveals that these attacks were not merely acts of terror or military strategy, but rather the culmination of a systematic policy aimed at the destruction of Israeli Jews as a distinct national, ethnic and racial group. The Hamas killings on October 7th were motivated by an intent to destroy Israeli Jews as a distinct ethnic, racial and national group. The specific genocidal intent can be inferred from a careful examination of Hamas’ antisemitic worldview enshrined in its foundational Covenant, the systematic anti-Jewish policies that it has advanced over decades, statements of top officials both before and during October 7th , and the existence of a specific plan to destroy Israel and its Jewish population. As Professor Schabas explains:81 The specific intent necessary for a conviction of genocide is even more demanding than that required for murder. The crime must be committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a protected group, as such. If the accused accompanied or preceded the act with some sort of genocidal declaration or speech, its content may assist in establishing the special intent. In practice, because of the large scale of genocide, its association with a State plan or policy, and the requirement of a racist climate in public opinion, as a mini- mum, there is actually no shortage of examples in the case law of perpetrators betraying their intent through public speeches or in meetings with others. Otherwise, the prosecution will rely on the context of the crime, its massive scale, and elements of its perpetration that suggest hatred of the group and a desire for its destruction. This article adopts the narrowest definition of intent, as opposed to more expan- sive knowledge-based definitions,82 as finding that the acts committed satisfy this definition inherently satisfy the broader concepts. The death toll on October 7th was limited only by the capabilities of Hamas to murder Israeli Jews, and not by any redline or moral inhibition. While Hamas may not have been able to destroy all Israeli Jews realistically, their weakness should not work to their benefit. As international tribunals have already stated, the perpe- tration of genocide is always limited by the capacity and reach of the genocidaires themselves.83 81 William A Schabas, Genocide in International Law: The Crime of Crimes (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press 2009) 265. 82 See, eg, Katherine Goldsmith, ‘The Issue of Intent in the Genocide Convention and its Effect on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide: Toward a Knowledge-based Approach’ (2010) 5(3) Genocide Studies and Prevention: An International Journal 238. 83 Krstić (n 61) para 13. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 19 7.1. Hamas’ genocidal worldview and its systematic propagation Hamas is both a Sunni Islamist and a Palestinian nationalist movement. Emerging out of the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood into an independent organisation in the 1980s, it is ideologically committed to the destruction of Israel and the establishment of an Islamic state in all of historical Palestine. Hamas emphasises jihad and violent struggle as the sole means of achieving its goal.84 The war against Israel is a religious and existential one:85 [I]n the view of Hamas, the Palestinian–Israeli conflict is not merely a territo- rial dispute between Palestinians and Israelis: it is first and foremost a ‘war of religion and faith’ between Islam and Judaism and between Muslims and Jews. As such, it is portrayed as an unbridgeable dichotomy between two opposing absolutes—as a historical, religious, and cultural conflict between faith and unbelief, between the true religion that supersedes all previous religions, that is, Islam, and the abrogated superseded religion, Judaism. It is a war between good, personified by the Muslims representing the party of God (Hizballah), and ‘the party of Satan’ (hizbal-shaytan) represented by the Jews. Consequently, the conflict is considered an ‘existential battle, rather than a dispute over borders’ (ma’rakat wujud wa-la hudud). While Sunni movements generally de-emphasise the millennialist end goal of jihad, Hamas has invested the war against the Jews with messianic and eschatological meaning. The destruction of the Jews is required for the establishment of the divine kingdom on earth.86 Its foundational Covenant, adopted in August 1988, references an Islamic tradition according to which ‘[t]he Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees. The stones and trees will say “O Moslems, O Abdulla, there is a Jew behind me, come and kill him”’.87 Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, following a brief civil war with the Palestinian Authority and its ruling Fatah party. According to a 2014 survey carried out by the Anti-Defamation League, 93 per cent of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank hold hard-core antisemitic views.88 In November 2013, Hamas introduced a new curriculum to Gazan schools, devi- ating from the approved Palestinian Authority textbooks. The Hamas curriculum serves as a critical means to impart the movement’s anti-Semitic ideology to younger generations. As described by The New York Times:89 84 Hamas Covenant (n 72). 85 Meir Litvak, “‘Martyrdom is Life”: Jihad and Martyrdom in the Ideology of Hamas’ (2010) 33 Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 716, 717–18; Shaul Bartal, ‘Ḥamās: The Islamic Resistance Movement’ in Muhammad Afzal Upal and Carole M Cusack (eds), Handbook of Islamic Sects and Movements (Brill 2021) 379. 86 Litvak (n 85) 727. 87 Hamas Covenant (n 72) art 7. 88 ‘Global 100: Index of Antisemitism – West Bank and Gaza’, Anti-Defamation League, 2014, https:// www.adl.org/adl-global-100-index-antisemitism. 89 Fares Akram and Jodi Rudoren, ‘To Shape Young Palestinians, Hamas Creates Its Own Textbooks’, The New York Times, 4 November 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/04/world/middleeast/to-shape- young-palestinians-hamas-creates-its-own-textbooks.html. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 20 Avraham Russell Shalev What Gaza teenagers are reading in their 50-page hardcover texts this fall includes references to the Jewish Torah and Talmud as ‘fabricated,’ and a description of Zionism as a racist movement whose goals include driving Arabs out of all of the area between the Nile in Africa and the Euphrates in Iraq, Syria and Turkey. ‘Palestine,’ in turn, is defined as a state for Muslims stretching from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea. A list of Palestinian cities includes Haifa, Beersheba and Acre – all within Israel’s 1948 borders. And the books rebut Jewish historical claims to the territory by saying, ‘The Jews and the Zionist movement are not related to Israel, because the sons of Israel are a nation which had been annihilated’. Since September 2012, Hamas has run a programme for high school students in Gaza, providing them with theoretical and practical military training. In the course of its youth programme, students learn to handle assault rifles, hand grenades and other deadly arms. The programme is directed by the Hamas-run Ministries of Education and the Interior, with the cooperation of the Hamas security services and the Izz al- Din al-Qassam military wing. Hamas has explicitly stated that the goal of its youth military training is to prepare Gazans for ‘the expulsion of the Zionist occupation from the land of Palestine’.90 In March 2023, UN Watch and the Institute for Monitoring Peace and Cultural Tolerance in School Education (IMPACT-se) released a report detailing the incite- ment to hatred, antisemitism and terrorism rampant in the United Nations Relief and Works Agency in the Near East (UNRWA) school system in Gaza. Examples given in the report are conspiracy theories about Jewish world domination; prais- ing Hitler; glorifying terrorists such as Diaa Hamarsheh, who murdered five people in a March 2022 attack in the Israeli city of Bnei Brak; praising Lion’s Den terror- ists who carried out recent terrorist attacks in the West Bank; and glorifying other terrorists affiliated with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades.91 It must be stressed that Hamas is the de facto ruling authority in Gaza and its fighters in Gaza have gone through either the UNRWA or Hamas education system. Hamas’ senior officials and official broadcasts share the organisation’s genoci- dal worldview. Its leaders dehumanise Jews as enemies of God and Islam, frequently referring to them as ‘sons of pigs and monkeys’, an epithet originating in Islamic tradition. The war against them is portrayed as religious and existential in charac- ter. Jews are depicted as corrupt, conniving and hostile to Muslims by nature. Hamas officials make explicit calls to kill Jews, and describe this as a religious duty. These statements have been made over decades and in varying contexts. They cannot 90 ‘Hamas Has Introduced a Program in Gaza Strip Schools called Al-Futuwwa, which Provides Military Training for Tens of Thousands of Adolescent Boys’, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 24 April 2013, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il//Data/articles/Art_20511/E_069_ 13_65283962.pdf. 91 ‘UNRWA Education: Reform or Regression?’, IMPACT-Se, March 2023, https://unwatch.org/wp- content/uploads/2023/03/2023-Report-UNRWA.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 21 then be dismissed as mere bellicose rhetoric; rather, they reflect Hamas’ systematic incitement to the murder of Jews and the destruction of the State of Israel. Below is a brief list of examples. The Middle East Media Research Institute (MEMRI), Palestinian Media Watch, and the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center provided all examples and translations. • Islamic scholar Hussein Qasem spoke on al-Aqsa TV, Hamas’ official television state, on 23 June 2023, in which he repeated traditional Islamist canards of Jews as religious enemies of Islam and monotheism. He said: ‘The Jews are not the enemies of the Palestinians alone – they are the enemies of humanity as a whole and the enemies of every monotheist in the world … Why shouldn’t we be furious? Why shouldn’t we burn the ground under the Jews’ feet?’92 • Hamas official Sheikh Hamad al-Regeb, in a Friday sermon in Gaza on 7 April 2023, called for Allah to destroy the Jews. This destruction was not limited to divine action but called for divine aid in Hamas’ murderous actions. Al- Regeb used the traditional Islamist description of Jews as pigs and moneys. He said:93 [Allah] transformed them [the Jews] into filthy, ugly animals like apes and pigs because of the injustice and evil they had brought about … ‘Oh Allah, bring annihilation upon the Jews. Oh Allah, bring annihilation upon the Jews. Paralyze them, destroy their entity, tear them apart, and bring upon them a terrible punishment. Oh Allah, enable us to get to the necks of the Jews. Oh Allah, enable us to get to the necks of the Jews. Oh Allah, enable us to get to the necks of the Jews’. • Islamic scholar Wael al-Zard ‘mused’ on what Hamas would do to the Jews fol- lowing their destruction of Israel. He spoke on al-Aqsa TV on 8 March 2023: ‘What are we going to do with them [the Jews]? Will we throw them into the sea and make them into food for the fish?’.94 • Hamas TV Commentator Jamil Ziyada repeated the idea of Jews as irrecon- cilable enemies of Islam. The conflict is framed in religious terms, as the Jews killed the prophets as described in Islamic scriptures. On 23 June 2022 he said: ‘We cannot possibly coexist and have neighbourly relations with 92 ‘Palestine Islamic Scholars Association Member Hussein Qasem: Jews Are Enemies of Humanity; We Are Thirsty for Their Blood’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 23 June 2023, https://www. memri.org/tv/palestine-islamic-scholars-association-member-qasem-hamas-jews-enemies-humanity- thirsty-blood. 93 ‘Hamas Official Sheikh Hamad Al-Regeb Refers to Jews as “Brothers of Apes and Pigs” during a Rafah Friday Sermon, Prays for Annihilation of Polytheists and Atheists, Adds: “Oh Allah, Enable Us to Get to the Necks of the Jews”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 7 April 2023, https://www.memri. org/tv/rafah-gaza-friday-sermon-hamas-official-regeb-allah-necks-jews-annihilate-them . 94 ‘Gaza Islamic Scholar Wael Al-Zard on Hamas TV: “We Have Teams Planning What To Do with Israel’s Nuclear Missiles Once We Liberate Palestine and Whether To Throw the Jews into the Sea”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 8 March 2023, https://www.memri.org/tv/gaza-islamic-scholar- zard-making-plans-what-to-do-with-nukes-throw-jews-into-sea. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 22 Avraham Russell Shalev [the Jews, who are] slayers of prophets and messengers, and the slayers of the Palestinian people’.95 • Rajaa al-Halabi, head of Hamas Women’s Movement, similarly promoted the idea of Jews as irresolute enemies of Islam at a Gaza rally on 9 July 2020. The Palestinians have the good fate of being the divine tool of the Jews’ destruction:96 Indeed, these are the Israelites. These are the Jews. They are the ones who slayed the prophets, the ones who acted treacherously and violated [sanc- tities] … Indeed, my dear sisters, our conflict with the Zionist enemy is a matter of faith, not of borders. Needless to say, we will not make do with what we have here. We will not make do with partitioning the land and taking only a part of it. This land will be ours in its entirety, Allah will- ing because our conflict with the Zionist enemy is an existential conflict, not a conflict about borders. This enemy, who came from all corners of the world, has no place here, but this is what Allah wanted for them … This is our fate, my beloved sisters – to be Allah’s hand on Earth, the hand that will finish off the Israelites, this Zionist enemy, Allah willing. Allah brought them here in droves, so that Palestine becomes their graveyard, Allah willing. • Hamas Member of the Palestinian Parliament Ismail al-Ashqar gave a statement in the Palestinian parliament on 23 August 2020, in which he called ‘death to Israel’ and ‘burn the attacking sons of Zion’.97 • Hamas Member of Parliament Yunis al-Astal, in a 4 July 2020 sermon, framed the conflict as a religious one, according to which Hamas and Muslims must destroy Israel:98 There is no doubt that by occupying this land, the Jews have filled this land with corruption, because Allah described them by saying: ‘Whenever they kindle fire for war, Allah extinguishes it. They strive to spread cor- ruption in the land.’ Allah said that they are ‘the worst of living creatures in the sight of Allah,’ and that they are ‘the strongest in enmity towards the believers.’ There is no time to mention the many other evil attributes that Allah used to describe this kind of creature. Therefore, we must 95 ‘Hamas TV Commentator Jamil Ziyada: “We Cannot Coexist with the Jews; Life Is All about Fighting, Not Negotiations”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 23 June 2022, https://www.memri.org/ tv/gaza-resident-cannot-coexist-with-the-jews-must-fight-them. 96 ‘Rajaa Al-Halabi, Head of Hamas Women’s Movement: “We Are Destined To Do Allah’s Will, Finish off the Treacherous Jews; Palestine Will Be Their Graveyard”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 9 July 2020, https://www.memri.org/tv/rajaa-halabi-head-hamas-womens-movement-finish- off-jews-palestine-graveyard. 97 Jacques Zilberdik, ‘One Day of Hamas TV Hate and TerrorMessages: PMW Analysis’, Palestinian Media Watch, 7 September 2020, https://palwatch.org/page/18206. 98 ‘Hamas MP Yunis Al-Astal: “The Jews Are Evil, Spread Corruption; Israel Must Be Finished Off”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 4 July 2020 https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-mp-yunis- astal-jews-vile-creatures-spread-corruption-must-finish-off-israel. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 23 invest every effort in finishing off this phenomenon [i.e. Israel], which is considered a stain on humanity and its history. • Islamic Scholar Sheikh Nasser Maarouf promoted classical antisemitic theo- ries, according to which Jews are responsible for the misfortunes of the world. He quotes Quranic texts, portraying the battle against the Jews as eternal and divinely commanded. In an interview on Hamas TV on 3 July 2020, he said:99 Millions of people were killed, all because of these Jews, who ran wild, tyrannized the world and spread corruption in it. Their corruption affects all walks of life. Look at the poverty all over the world. Look at the blood that is being spilled all over the world. Look at the honour of women being violated all over the world. If you check, you find that it is the Jews who are behindallthat.Theyaretheonesfeedingallcorruptiononearth,andthey are the ones financing it. These are glad tidings for us, Allah willing. [The Quran says:] ‘Those who disbelieve spend their wealth to avert [people] from the way of Allah. So they will spend it, then it will be for them a [source] of regret, and then they will be vanquished. And those who have disbelieved – unto Hell they will be gathered’. • Hamas uses its media channels to incite genocide and murder of Jews. Song lyrics glorify terrorists and call upon Palestinians to emulate them. One such example is the song ‘Expel the Thieving Occupier’, broadcast on the official Hamas TV channel on 25 March 2019, 4 May 2019 and 12 November 2019. Its lyrics are: Expel the thieving occupier from the enraged land of Jerusalem, Rid your house of that one, that Zionist in his humiliation, Write ‘death, death, death to Israel’ with flowing blood, And with the bleeding body cause death, death, death to Israel. Khaibar, Khaibar,100 O Jews, The soldiers of Muhammad have started to return. Be red death. Have no mercy on the army of aggression that wears the clothes of the soldier and the settler.101 • Hamas Political Bureau member Fathi Hammad has made it clear in many state- ments that Hamas’ terrorism is not directed solely at the establishment of a Palestinian state in Gaza, Judea and Samaria but at the destruction of Israel and the annihilation of Jews worldwide. In July 2019 he said:102 99 ‘Palestinian Sheikh Nasser Maarouf: “The Jews Are behind All the Bloodshed, Corruption, Poverty in the World; They Will Ultimately Be Vanquished”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 3 July 2020, https://www.memri.org/tv/palestinian-sheikh-nasser-maarouf-jews-tyrannize-world-kill- millions-gathered-unto-hell. 100 ‘Khaibar’referstoaseventhcenturybattleinwhichtheProphetMuhammadslaughteredanArabian Jewish tribe. It is a common chant by modern Islamist groups. 101 Al-Aqsa TV, “‘Death to Israel” – Song on Hamas TV’, Palestinian Media Watch, 12 November 2019, https://palwatch.org/page/15465. 102 Al-Aqsa TV, ‘Top Hamas Official Calls to “Slaughter” – “Every Jew on the Planet”’, Palestinian Media Watch, 12 July 2019, https://palwatch.org/page/16693 (emphasis added). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 24 Avraham Russell Shalev There are seven million Palestinians abroad, enough of your warming up. You have Jews everywhere. We must attack every Jew on the planet – slaugh- ter and kill, Allah willing. Enough of the warming up, enough … we have exploded … You will be killed, by Allah, you will be killed by our [explo- sive] belts, Allah willing … Everyone who wants, stand in line – belt, belt, belt – off you go. Say ‘in Allah’s name’ and put yourtrust in Allah. However, to die when we are in this situation is impossible … let the Zionist enemy hear, this is a message… I will die as I blow up and cut – what? The necks of the Jews and their legs. We will tear them to shreds, Allah willing. • On 15 May 2019 he said:103 We have come to tell the Zionist enemy – including its people, its army, its government, and the Israeli Parliament – leave us, forthedayofyourslaugh- ter, extermination, and annihilation is near. Each one of you should search for a place for yourself in Europe, or in any kind of stronghold, or in hell, or in the sea, or in the ocean, or in the Bermuda Triangle. You have no place in Palestine. You have no place on the land of Jerusalem. You have no place in the Al-Aqsa Mosque plazas, or in Jaffa, or in Haifa, or in Acre, or anywhere … leave us, for the day of your annihilation is near. • Islamic scholar Dr Muhammad Suleiman al-Farra provided a religious ruling that the Quranic imperative of jihad applies to the Jews. He said in an interview on 3 February 2019:104 ‘Kill the polytheists wherever you may find them.’ Today, you can rest assured that, according to the religious ruling, Palestine in its entirety constitutes a battlefield between us and the Jews. Therefore, we must strive to fight them using any means that might enable us to get to them anywhere in our pure land, in the hope of driving them out, Allah willing … It is our duty today to fight this criminal enemy. First of all, we should try to kill them – ‘Kill the polytheists wherever you may find them …’ [The verse continues:] ‘… and seize them’ There is a second option of capturing them so we can swap them for our prisoners. • Hamas senior official Ismail Radwan held a speech on 5 November 2018 in which he said:105 103 Nan Jacques Zilberdik and Maurice Hirsch, ‘Fatah Seeks Reconciliation with Hamas; Hamas Promises “Extermination” of Israel’, Palestinian Media Watch, 23 May 2019, https://palwatch.org/page/15660 (emphasis in original). 104 ‘Gazan Scholar Dr. Muhammad Suleiman al-Farra: It Is Our Religious Duty To Fight the Jews and “Kill Them Wherever You May Find Them”’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 13 February 2019, https://www.memri.org/tv/gazan-scholar-suleiman-farra-religious-duty-fight-jews- capture-prisoner-swaps. 105 ‘A Senior Hamas Figure Delivers a Speech Replete with Anti-Semitic Motifs – Yet Another Expression of Hamas’s Long-Standing Tradition of Anti-Semitism’, The Meir Amit Intelligence and https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 25 The land will spew them [those who do not support Hamas] out, Allah will be fed up with them, and they will be burned in the fire (hellfire) along with the apes and pigs. • ‘Apes and pigs’ is a term for Jews in Islamist discourse, originating in Islamic exegetical tradition. • Yahya Sinwar, the mastermind of the October 7th massacre, forewarned in a speech on 6 April 2018 by the Gaza fence: ‘We will take down the border [with Israel] and we will tear out their hearts from their bodies’.106 This pervasive genocidal worldview, cultivated over decades, directly informed Hamas’ actions on October 7th 2023, transforming ideological rhetoric into concrete violence. The systematic propagation of antisemitic hatred – through education, media, and leadership pronouncements – ensured that the attack was not an iso- lated outburst but the culmination of a deliberate policy to destroy Israeli Jews as a group. By embedding this intent within its organisational ethos and oper- ational directives, Hamas bridged the gap between its doctrinal foundations and the mass killings, torture and sexual violence inflicted on that day. This continu- ity underscores that the October 7th atrocities were neither spontaneous nor merely tactical but rather the execution of a long-standing genocidal ambition, distinguish- ing Hamas’ actions from conventional terrorism and aligning them with the legal threshold for genocide under international law. 7.2. Patterns of conduct demonstrate dehumanisation of Jews According to ICTY case law, genocidal intent can also be inferred from ‘the general context, the perpetration of other culpable acts systematically directed against the same group, the scale of atrocities committed, the systematic targeting of victims on account of their membership in a particular group, or the repetition of destructive and discriminatory acts’.107 In terms of their scale, indiscriminate nature, sheer bru- tality, depravity, and nexus with other war crimes and crimes against humanity, the events of October 7th speak for themselves of Hamas’ intent to murder Jews. Hamas murdered 1,200 Israelis and committed acts of torture, mutilation, and sexual vio- lence in 30 communities and locations. At least 37 minors were killed, six of whom were under the age of five, as well as at least 70 elderly people.108 The nature of the attacks demonstrates Hamas’ successful dehumanisation of Jews in the eyes of its militants. Terrorism Information Center, 27 December 2018, https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/senior-hamas- figure-delivers-speech-replete-anti-semitic-motifs-yet-another-expression-hamass-long-standing- tradition-antisemitism. 106 ‘Hamas Leader Yahya Sinwar – We Will Tear out Their Hearts – April 6, 2018’, Legal Insurrection, YouTube, 8 April 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=klFbf6VG7uA. 107 ICTY, Prosecutor v Jelisić, Appeals Chamber, IT-95-10-A, 5 July 2001, para 47. 108 All-Party Parliamentary Group for UK-Israel, ‘7 October Parliamentary Commission Report: Chaired by Lord Roberts of Belgravia’, 46, https://static1.squarespace.com/static/67bf0490d422da027d74c55c/t/ 67d80d04b3bde77ec3ac2b66/1742212374048/The+7+October+Parliamentary+Commission+Report+- +The+Roberts+Report+-+APPG+UK-Israel.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 26 Avraham Russell Shalev According to Dr Chen Kugel, head of Israel’s forensics centre, scans revealed signs of torture and execution: people burned alive and bodies found with their hands bound before being executed.109 At the Re’im music festival, at least 347 civilians were massacred, and others forcibly abducted to Gaza. At Kibbutz Be’eri, terrorists entered and slaughtered entire families in their homes; 80 per cent of the recovered bodies showed signs of torture. In the small town of Sderot, terrorists on motorcycles and trucks killed civilians on the street, on buses and in cars.110 Other war crimes and crimes against humanity systematically committed along- side acts of genocide include intentionally directing attacks against the civilian population, intentionally directing attacks against vehicles involved in humanitar- ian assistance (such as ambulances), murder and wilful killing, forcible transfer and deportation, unlawful confinement and imprisonment, torture, rape, ethnic perse- cution, enforced disappearance, inhumane acts and other wilful acts causing great suffering, the taking of hostages, mutilation, outrages upon personal dignity and degrading treatment, and the use of civilian shields. The ICTR, in the Akayesu judgment, recognised that rape and sexual assault may constitute a form of genocide. During the Rwandan genocide, rape was used as a tool of destruction:111 … solely against Tutsi women, many of whom were subjected to the worst public humiliation, mutilated, and raped several times, often in public, in the Bureau Communal premises or other public places, and often by more than one assailant. These rapes resulted in the physical and psychological destruction of Tutsi women, their families and their communities. Sexual violence was an integral part of the process of destruction, specifically targeting Tutsi women and specifically contributing to their destruction and to the destruction of the Tutsi group as a whole. Rape was also an essential part of the genocide of the Yazidi minority in Iraq by ISIS terrorists in 2014–15.112 Israeli police investigations, corroborated by independent inquiries from journal- ists such as The New York Times and The Wall Street Journal, demonstrate that Hamas used widespread and systematic sexual violence and rape on October 7th. Women’s corpses were found naked with signs of genital abuse. An eyewitness at the Nova 109 Anat Peled and Rory Jones, ‘Israel’s “Black Sabbath”: Murder, Sexual Violence and Torture on Oct. 7’, The Wall Street Journal, 31 December 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/israel-hamas-oct- 7-murder-sexual-violence-torture-45aab439. 110 ‘Mapping the Massacres’, The October 7th Geo-visualization Project, https://oct7map.com; ‘Special Announcement – The Hamas Atrocities Documentation Center (HADC)’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 17 November 2023, https://www.memri.org/reports/special-announcement-%E2% 80%93-hamas-atrocities-documentation-center-hadc. 111 Akayesu (n 60) para 731. 112 Zeyad Jaffal, ‘Rape as Genocide Crime in International Criminal Law – The Case of Yazidi Women in Iraq’ (2020) 15(2) International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences (IJCJS) 230; Paula Castellano San José, ‘The Rapes Committed Against the Yazidi Women: A Genocide? A Study of the Crime of Rape as a Form of Genocide in International Criminal Law’ (2019) 18 Comillas Journal of International Relations; Kimberly Lowe Frank, ‘Rape as an Act of Genocide: History and Law’, Violence Against Women Conference, Lesley University, 11 September 2018. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 27 music festival saw 100 men in military fatigues passing Israeli women around ‘like an assembly point’, stabbing them while raping them, slicing off breasts and beheading victims.113 The mass rape was not a spur-of-the-moment exploitation by Palestinian terrorists but rather a premeditated assault on Jewish women. Documents captured on Hamas terrorists instructed them how to say in Hebrew ‘Take your pants off’ and ‘Open your legs’.114 7.3. The Hamas Covenant Hamas has made its intention to commit genocide against the Jewish people extremely clear in a long series of official documents and public statements. Hamas’ foundational charter, adopted in August 1988, is replete with virulent antisemitic conspiracy theories, even referencing the notorious Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion. The Covenant is explicit in its murderous intention to kill Jews. Some excerpts: • ‘Israel will exist and will continue to exist until Islam will obliterate it, just as it obliterated others before it’. • ‘The time will not come until Muslims will fight the Jews; until the Jews hide behind rocks and trees, which will cry: “O Muslim! There is a Jew hiding behind me, come on and kill him”’. • ‘The Nazism of the Jews does not skip women and children, it scares everyone. They make war against people’s livelihood, plunder their moneys and threaten their honor … They took advantage of key elements in unfolding events, and accumulated a huge and influential material wealth which they put to the service of implementing their dream’. • ‘[Jews] control the world media [and use their] wealth to stir revolutions … They stood behind the French and the Communist Revolutions’. • ‘There was no war that broke out anywhere without their [Jews’] fingerprints on it’.115 Hamas’ original charter makes it clear that the war against Israel and the Jews is an existential battle. Palestine is sacred Muslim land, making any compromise or recognition of the Jewish state impossible. The only possible solution to the Palestinian problem is uncompromising jihad and struggle until Israel is annihilated. The Covenant traffics in crude antisemitic tropes, including Jewish responsibility for the French and Communist Revolutions, the First and Second World Wars, the col- lapse of the Islamic Caliphate, and in the nefarious creation of secret societies such as the Freemason and Rotary Clubs. 113 JeffreyGettleman,AnatSchwartzandAdamSella,‘ScreamsWithoutWords:HowHamasWeaponized Sexual Violence on Oct. 7’, The New York Times, 30 December 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/ 28/world/middleeast/oct-7-attacks-hamas-israel-sexual-violence.html. 114 ‘Disturbing . On Nov 2, an Arabic-Hebrew transliteration glossary belonging to Hamas was dis- covered in Israel with sexual terminology, including “take your pants off ”. This evidence suggests that Hamas terrorists planned to systematically rape Israeli women. This Is a War Crime’: Official X account of the State of Israel, 12 November 2023, https://x.com/Israel/status/1723759157960953981. 115 Hamas Covenant (n 72). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 28 Avraham Russell Shalev Hamas issued a ‘kinder’ and ‘friendlier’ document in 2017, outlining its principles and goals. Although it removes most of the explicitly anti-Jewish language of the 1988 document, it remains eliminationist in its approach to Israel, denying any legitimacy to the Jewish state and justifying violent ‘resistance’ to bring about its destruction. • Article 19: ‘There shall be no recognition of the legitimacy of the Zionist entity. Whatever has befallen the land of Palestine in terms of occupation, settle- ment building, Judaisation changes to its features or falsification of facts is illegitimate. Rights never lapse’. • Article 25: ‘Resisting the occupation with all means and methods is a legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international norms and laws. At the heart of these lies armed resistance, which is regarded as the strategic choice for protecting the principles and the rights of the Palestinian people’.116 At the time of its adoption, some commentators argued that the new Covenant might herald ideological or pragmatic changes in Hamas behaviour.117 However, the new document reaffirms that Israel’s existence has no validity. Israel’s Jewish population must either leave Palestine or face destruction at the hands of the Islamic Resistance Movement. Furthermore, Hamas’ actions since 2017 havedemonstratedconclusively that its commitment to antisemitic violence has not abated. The antisemitic rhetoric discussed in previous sections of this article came after the new Covenant. Hamas has carried out hundreds of violent terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians since then.118 The October 7th attacks themselves, with their systematic atrocities, are conclusive proof that Hamas has not moderated or seriously changed its stance on Jewish statehood. 7.4. The existence of a genocidal plan While the existence of a plan or a policy to commit genocide is not a legal element of the crime, international case law has treated such plans as decisive evidence of genocidal intent.119 On 30 September 2021, Yahya Sinwar, leader of Hamas in Gaza, sponsored a conference in Gaza to prepare for the supposedly forthcoming ‘liberation of Palestine’. Entitled ‘The Promise of the Hereafter’, referencing the eschatological significance of Israel’s destruction, Sinwar emphasised that in the wake of the May 2021 Hamas–Israel War, ‘the battle for the liberation and the return to Palestine have become closer now than ever before’. Following Israel’s destruc- tion, Jews who have served in the army would be killed, while those who fled may be left alone or prosecuted for their crimes. Educated Jews and other experts would 116 ‘Hamas in 2017: The Document in Full’, Middle East Eye, 2 May 2017, https://www.middleeasteye.net/ news/hamas-2017-document-full. 117 Colin P Clarke, ‘Hamas’s Strategic Rebranding’, RAND, 17 May 2017, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ commentary/2017/05/hamas-strategic-rebranding.html. 118 ‘Monthly Reports’, Israel Security Agency (Shabak), https://www.shabak.gov.il/en/reports. 119 Jelisic (n 59) para 98; ICTR, Prosecutor v Kayishema and Ruzindana, Appeals Judgment, ICTR-95-1-A, Appeals Chamber, 1 June 2001, para 138; ICTY, Stakic (n 70) paras 546–547; ICTY, Prosecutor v Popovic and Others, Judgment, IT-05-88-T, Trial Chamber II, 10 June 2010, paras 856, 858, 886. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 29 be prevented from leaving until they repaid their debts to the Palestinians.120 It should be pointed out that according to the Hamas religious authorities, such as Sheikh Yousef Qaradawi, Israel is defined as a military society where every civilian is a potential soldier. As such, killing ‘soldiers’ refers to all Jewish civilians.121 In fact, according to a report in Ha’aretz newspaper, so confident was the Hamas leadership of its victory on October 7th, which would result in Israel’s destruction, that they divided the country into governing cantons. As described by a former high-ranking Fatah official:122 So strongly did they believe in the idea that Allah was with them and that they were going to bring Israel down, that they started dividing Israel into cantons, for the day after the conquest … One day, a well-known Hamas figure calls and tells me with pride and joy that they are preparing a full list of com- mittee heads for the cantons that will be created in Palestine. He offers me the chairmanship of the Zarnuqa Committee, where my family lived before 1948. More specifically, secret documents captured following the October 7th attack demonstrate that the massacre was meticulously and systematically planned in advance and had the goal of killing as many Jews as possible. Documents recovered on bodies of terrorists, for example, demonstrate detailed maps of the Israeli kib- butz of Sa’ad, with instructions to murder women and children. NBC News quoted an Israeli army official saying that ‘the level of specificity would cause anyone in the intelligence field’s jaw to drop’.123 In Kibbutz Beeri, Hamas terrorists were found with a notebook containing handwritten Quranic verses and orders to ‘[k]ill as many people and take as many hostages as possible’.124 Detailed maps were also found for Israeli communities such as Kfar Aza, Nahal Oz and Alumim, demonstrating 120 ‘Hamas-Sponsored “Promise of the Hereafter” Conference for the Phase Following the Liberation of Palestine and Israel’s “Disappearance”: We Must Differentiate between Jews Who Should and Should Not Be Killed, and Prevent a Jewish “Brain Drain” from Palestine’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 4 October 2021, https://www.memri.org/reports/hamas-sponsored-promise- hereafter-conference-phase-following-liberation-palestine-and. 121 ‘Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi and His Impact on the Dissemination of Radical Islam’, The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, 6 October 2022, https://www.terrorism-info.org. il/en/sheikh-yusuf-al-qaradawi-and-his-impact-on-the-dissemination-of-radical-islam. For Qaradawi as Hamas’ spiritual authority see Shaul Bartal and Nesya Rubinstein-Shemer, HamasandIdeology:SheikhYūsuf al-Qaraḍāwī on the Jews, Zionism and Israel (Routledge 2017). 122 Shlomi Eldar, ‘Hamas Actually Believed It Would Conquer Israel, and Divided It into Cantons’, Ha’aretz, 5 April 2024, https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-04-05/ty-article-magazine/. highlight/hamas-actually-believed-it-would-conquer-israel-and-divided-it-into-cantons/0000018e- ab4a-dc42-a3de-abfad6fe0000. 123 Anna Schecter, “‘Top Secret” Hamas Documents Show that Terrorists Intentionally Targeted Elementary Schools and a Youth Center’, NBC Universal News Group, 14 October 2023, https://www. nbcnews.com/news/investigations/top-secret-hamas-documents-show-terrorists-intentionally- targeted-elem-rcna120310; Patrick Kingsley and Ronen Bergman, ‘The Secrets Hamas Knew about Israel’s Military’, The New York Times, 14 October 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/10/13/world/ middleeast/hamas-israel-attack-gaza.html. 124 Shira Rubin and Joby Warrick, ‘Hamas Envisioned Deeper Attacks, Aiming to Provoke an Israeli War’, The Washington Post, 13 November 2023, https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2023/11/ 12/hamas-planning-terror-gaza-israel. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 30 Avraham Russell Shalev Hamas’ extensive intelligence gathering.125 The coordinated massacres took place in 22 Israeli towns and villages, although Hamas intended to move further to major Israeli cities.126 7.5. Statements by Hamas leaders and militants on October 7th Genocidal intent can also be inferred from statements demonstrating that the per- petrators selected the victims because of their membership of the group that they seek to destroy.127 Hamas’ intent to perpetrate genocide against Israeli Jews is clearly expressed in statements issued by its leaders in the immediate aftermath of the October 7th attack. On that day Hamas military commander Mohammed Deif issued a call:128 This is the day that you make this criminal enemy understand that its time is up. [The Quran says:] ‘Kill them wherever you may find them’ … I say to our people in occupied [pre-1967 Israel] – in the Negev, the Galilee, the Triangle, Haifa, Jaffa, Acre, Lod, and Ramla: Torch the earth under the feet of the plundering occupiers – kill, burn, destroy, and shut down roads. Make the cowardly occupiers understand that the Al-Aqsa Deluge is bigger than they think. Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh said on the day of the attack that the goal was the destruction of Israel and the murder and ethnic cleansing of its people.129 This intent was not limited to the Hamas leadership alone. For example, audio recordings sent by terrorists that perpetrated the massacres themselves have them bragging: ‘Look how many I killed with my own hands, your son killed Jews … Ten with my own bare hands. Their blood is on my hands’.130 125 ‘In Coded Doc, Hamas Instructed Terrorists to Kill Civilians, Take Captives’, The Times of Israel, 15 October 2023, https://www.timesofisrael.com/in-coded-doc-hamas-instructed-terrorists-to- kill-civilians-take-captives-report. 126 Ronen Bergman and Adam Goldman, ‘Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More than a Year Ago’, The New York Times, 30 November 2023, https://www.nytimes.com/2023/11/30/world/middleeast/israel- hamas-attack-intelligence.html. 127 Jelisic (n 59) para 73; ICTY, Prosecutor v Karadžić, Decision on Appeal of Trial Chamber’s Decision on Preliminary Motion to Dismiss Count 11 of the Indictment, IT-95-5/18-AR72.5, Appeals Chamber, 9 July 2009, paras 97–99. 128 ‘Hamas Military Commander Mohammed Deif Announces Launch of Operation Al-Aqsa Deluge, Calls on Palestinians in West Bank, Jerusalem, and Israel Proper to Attacks with Guns, Knives, Vehicles’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 7 October 2023, https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas- military-commander-deif-operation-aqsa-deluge-calls-palestinian-carry-out-attacks. 129 ‘Al-Jazeera Airs Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh’s Statement on Hamas’s Invasion of Southern Israel: I Call on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israeli Arabs, and the Entire Nation Abroad to Join the Battle; to the Enemy I Say: Get out of Our Land!’, MEMRI: Middle East Media Research Institute, 7 October 2023, https://www.memri.org/tv/hamas-leader-ismail-haniyeh-statement-jazeera-operation- aqsa-deluge-palestinains-west-bank-israel-abroad-join-battle. 130 ‘Listen: “Your Son Killed 10 Jews”, Hamas Terrorist Tells Gazan Parents’, The Jerusalem Post, 24 October 2023, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-769989. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 31 8. Weaponising genocide claims: South Africa’s ICJ case as a rhetorical shield 8.1. Genocide inversion:A defining feature of the Hamas attack Recognition of Hamas’ genocide cannot be fully understood without examining how accusations of genocide have themselves become weaponised in this conflict. A dis- tinctive feature of the Hamas genocide of October 7th is how its perpetrators and allies have simultaneously accused its victims of the same crime. This pattern of genocide inversion not only complicates efforts to establish legal accountability but also serves as a strategic tool to shield Hamas from the consequences of its actions. Hamas’ genocide of Israeli Jews is uniquely characterised by the immediate deployment of reverse accusations against its victims. Within weeks of the October 7th attacks, South Africa filed an application with the International Court of Justice alleging Israeli genocide in Gaza. This was not merely coincidental timing. The close ties between South Africa’s ruling party and Hamas, including meetings with the Hamas leadership in December 2023, suggest a coordinated strategy to use geno- cide accusations as both shield and sword.131 This pattern of genocide inversion serves three distinct purposes: (i) it deflects attention from Hamas’ own genocidal actions; (ii) it appropriates the moral weight of genocide accusations to delegitimise Israel’s military response; and (iii) it exploits and inverts Jewish historical trauma by comparing Israeli actions with the Nazi genocide. While, legally speaking, accusations of Israeli genocide are irrelevant to an analysis of Hamas’ actions, they are indeed linked in the public consciousness. Hamas has succeeded in tying ‘Israel’ and ‘genocide’ together. While a full-scale rebuttal of South Africa’s claims against Israel requires a separate article, it is nec- essary to examine the charges of genocide against Israel, as through their contrast the case against Hamas becomes clearer. The reverse genocide accusation against Israel is a defining feature of the October 7th Hamas genocide and any analysis that ignored it would therefore be incomplete. This section will briefly examine South Africa’s claims in its application and then proceed to demonstrate how claims of Israeli genocide are used, inten- tionally or incidentally, as a rhetorical shield to blunt recognition of the Hamas genocide. 8.2. Analysis of the South African application South Africa’s claims, detailed at length in an 84-page application, havetwo principal sections: it reviews various Israeli military actions in Gaza, describing them as genocidal acts, then couples these acts with belligerent statements made by Israeli politicians throughout the war as proof of genocidal intention. As will be demon- strated, South Africa relies on ascribing genocidal motivation to military actions without the necessary evidence of such motivation. South Africa’s legal team, in its oral presentation before the ICJ in January 2024, acknowledged Israel’s lack 131 Charles Asher Small, South Africa, Hamas, Iran, and Qatar: The Hijacking of the ANC and the International Court of Justice (Institute for the Study of Global Antisemitism and Policy (ISGAP) 2024) 42, https://isgap. org/wp-content/uploads/2024/11/SA_Report_Final_121124-2.pdf. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 32 Avraham Russell Shalev of a genocidal plan, stating that ‘genocides are never declared in advance’.132 Such a statement is historically false, as the Final Solution, the Rwandan geno- cide and the Yugoslav atrocities were all methodically and systematically planned in advance.133 The drafters of the Genocide Convention went to pains to distin- guish between the systematic destruction of a protected group and large-scale casualties on the battlefield. As legal scholars Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb describe:134 The infliction of losses, even heavy losses, on the civilian population in the course of operations of war, does not as a rule constitute genocide. In modern war belligerents normally destroy factories, means of communication, public buildings,etc.andthecivilianpopulationinevitablysuffersmoreorlesssevere losses. It would of course be desirable to limit such losses. Various measures might be taken to achieve this end, but this question belongs to the field of the regulation of the conditions of war and not to that of genocide. Paragraphs 45 to 49 of the South African application detail the ‘killing of Palestinians in Gaza’. South Africa’s central claim, based on the Hamas-run Health Ministry data, is that over 21,000 Palestinians had been reported killed and an additional 7,780 peo- ple missing (at that time).135 Of course, assuming the reliability of Hamas’ figures, this number does not distinguish between combatants and civilians. It assumes that civilians killed were intentionally targeted by Israel, as opposed to having been killed incidentally as part of a legitimate proportionality calculation according to the laws of armed conflict (LOAC). Finally, even if a disproportionate number of civilians were killed in a strike on a lawful target, this would be a violation of Israel’s obligations under the LOAC, not the Genocide Convention. It should be noted that there are at least six statistical analyses that question the reliability of the Hamas-run Health Ministry’s casualty figures.136 132 ‘Israel Shows “Chilling” Intent to Commit Genocide in Gaza, South Africa Tells UN Court’, The Guardian, 11 January 2024, https://www.theguardian.com/law/2024/jan/11/south-africa-accuses-israel- of-genocide-gaza-the-hague-international-court-of-justice. 133 See Hans Mommsen, ‘The Realization of the Unthinkable: The “Final Solution of the Jewish Question” in the Third Reich’ in Gerhard Hirschfeld (ed), The Policies of Genocide (RLE Nazi Germany & Holocaust) (Routledge 2015) 97; Jean Mukimbiri, ‘The Seven Stages of the Rwandan Genocide’ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 823. 134 Hirad Abtahi and Philippa Webb, TheGenocideConvention:TheTravauxPréparatoires (2 vols) (Brill 2008) 231. 135 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel), Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 29 December 2023, para 45. 136 Gabriel Epstein, ‘Gaza Fatality Data Has Become Completely Unreliable’, The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 26 May 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/gaza-fatality- data-has-become-completely-unreliable; Mark Zlochin, ‘The Numbers of Dead in Gaza Don’t Add up – and There Is No Easy Explanation’, The Telegraph, 28 March 2024, https://www.telegraph.co.uk/global-health/ terror-and-security/unrwa-staff-death-toll-gaza-israel-hamas-war-data; Tom Simpson, Lewi Stone and Gregory Rose, ‘Statistically Impossible: A Critical Analysis of Hamas’s Women and Children Casualty Figures’, Fathom Journal, March 2024, https://fathomjournal.org/statistically-impossible-a-critical- analysis-of-hamass-women-and-children-casualty-figures; Gabriel Epstein, ‘How Hamas Manipulates Gaza Fatality Numbers: Examining the Male Undercount and Other Problems’, The Washington Institute https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 33 Similarly, paragraphs 51 to 54 detail bodily injuries incurred by Palestinians as a result of Israeli operations, while paragraphs 88 to 94 describe the destruction of homes and property in the Gaza Strip. South Africa’s application does not consider the unique challenges and destructiveness of urban warfare.137 Nor does the appli- cation take into account Hamas’ well-documented practice of using human shields and hiding in densely populated civilian areas.138 Based on the South African appli- cation, there is no way of knowing whether the harm to persons or property was intentional, incidental to a valid proportionality analysis, or disproportionate under the LOAC. Israeli advance warnings, a humanitarian measure to distance civilians from the battlefield, are deliberately misconstrued as ‘mass expulsion from homes and displacement of Palestinians in Gaza’. The duty to provide ‘effective advance warning’ is enshrined in Article 57(2)(c) of Additional Protocol I of 1977139 and is recognised in many military manuals. It is also the practice of the United States, the United Kingdom and other Coalition forces in Afghanistan and Iraq.140 The supposed Israeli siege of Gaza is described in paragraphs 61 to 70 as proof of Israel’s intention to starve Palestinian civilians. Siege, meaning the encircling and isolation of enemy forces to induce their surrender, is a lawful tactic of war, regulated most notably in Article 27 of the Hague Convention of 1907141 and Articles 17 and 23 of the Fourth Geneva Convention,142 among others.143 Despite a brief ‘complete siege’ from 9 October until 21 October 2023, Israel imposes no limitations other than security arrangements on the entry of food and supplies into Gaza.144 Compared with for Near East Policy, 25 January 2024, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/how- hamas-manipulates-gaza-fatality-numbers-examining-male-undercount-and-other; Abraham Wyner, ‘How the Gaza Ministry of Health Fakes Casualty Numbers’, Tablet Magazine, 7 March 2024, https://www. tabletmag.com/sections/news/articles/how-gaza-health-ministry-fakes-casualty-numbers; Andrew Fox, ‘Questionable Counting: Analysing the Death Toll from the Hamas-Run Ministry of Health in Gaza’, Henry Jackson Society, December 2024, https://www.henryjacksonsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2024/12/HJS-Questionable-Counting-%E2%80%93-Hamas-Report-web.pdf. 137 See Margarita Konaev, ‘The Future of Urban Warfare in the Age of Megacities’, Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri), March 2019, https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/migrated_files/ documents/atoms/files/konaev_urban_warfare_megacities_2019.pdf. 138 Michael N Schmitt, ‘Human Shields in International Humanitarian Law’ (2008) 38 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 17. 139 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) (entered into force 7 December 1978) 1125 UNTS 3. 140 Pnina Sharvit Baruch and Noam Neuman, ‘Warning Civilians Prior to Attack under International Law: Theory and Practice’ (2011) 41 Israel Yearbook on Human Rights 137. 141 Hague Convention (IV) respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land (entered into force 26 January 1910) Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser 3) 461. 142 Geneva Convention (IV) relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (entered into force 21 October 1950) 75 UNTS 287. 143 US Department of Defense Law of War Manual (updated July 2023) s 5.19.1; ICRC Study (n 19) 188; Avraham Shalev, ‘The Death of Siege? The Future of Siege Warfare in the Wake of Gaza’ (2025) 26 San Diego Journal of International Law (forthcoming). 144 HCJ 2280/24 Gisha v Government of Israel, Response of the Government of Israel, 2 April 2024, para 15 (in Hebrew). https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 34 Avraham Russell Shalev other urban conflicts, such as those of Fallujah (2004), Mosul (2016–17) and Marawi (2017), food insecurity is a significant feature of urban warfare.145 In its order of 26 January 2024, the ICJ relied on statistics from the United Nations and other international organisations detailing the large-scale destruction in Gaza to conclude that some of the rights violations claimed by South Africa were plausible.146 However, the ICJ does not demonstrate that the destruction stems from intentional Israeli targeting, as opposed to valid (or even non-valid) collateral damage. According to long-standing military doctrine, battlefield decisions can be judged based only on the information available to the military commander at the time of the action.147 Without examining the information available to the Israeli army commanders at the moment of every attack, the resulting damage is mean- ingless to an analysis of genocide. Indeed, military necessity would be a reasonable inference of intent. South Africa presents martial statements by Israeli leaders as proof of genocidal intent. However, a careful analysis shows that these statements were not made by those who decide military policy, contradict actual Israeli conduct on the ground, or are ambiguous or taken out of context. South Africa relies on statements by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu that Israel would ‘operate forcefully everywhere’, that Israel was ‘striking [its] enemies with unprecedented might’, and that Israel was ready to ‘defeat the bloodthirsty monsters who have risen against [Israel] to destroy us’.148 Nowhere in these statements does Netanyahu indicate that Israel will not conduct its campaign according to international humanitarian law. A reasonable inference from this statement would be Israel’s resolve to combat Hamas. Another intentionally truncated statement is that of President Herzog, who said: ‘It’s an entire nation out there that is responsible. It’s not true this rhetoric about civilians not aware, not involved. It’s absolutely not true’. The South African application cut off the next sentence in which he makes evident that there are Palestinians who oppose Hamas terror.149 Herzog did not call for the targeting of Palestinian civilians but acknowledged the widespread popular support that Hamas enjoys among the Palestinian public. Herzog also reaffirmed that Israel conducts its operations according to international law.150 145 Cedric Turlan and Kasra Mofarah, ‘Military Action in an Urban Area: The Humanitarian Consequences of Operation Phantom Fury in Fallujah, Iraq’, Humanitarian Practice Network, No 35, November 2006, 18, https://odihpn.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/11/humanitarianexchange035.pdf; ‘Mosul Battle: Iraqi Forces Seize Key Bridge’, BBC News, 27 February 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/ world-middle-east-39103701; Dennis Jay Santos, ‘Starvation Threatens Hundreds Trapped by Fighting in Philippine City’, The New Humanitarian, 19 June 2017, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news/2017/ 06/19/starvation-threatens-hundreds-trapped-fighting-philippine-city. 146 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel), Order: Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 26 January 2024, [46]–[49]. 147 United States Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, The Hostages Trial: Trial of Wilhelm List and Others, Case No 47, 1948, 68–69 (the ‘Rendulic Rule’). 148 South Africa v Israel, Application (n 135) para 101. 149 ‘One-On-One with Israeli President Isaac Herzog; Israel Warns of “Next Stages” of the War; Israel Expected to Conduct “Significant Ground Operations” soon in Gaza’, CNN, 15 October 2023, https:// transcripts.cnn.com/show/cnr/date/2023-10-15/segment/01. 150 Isaac Herzog, ‘The Case against Israel Rests on Lies’, The Wall Street Journal, 11 February 2024, https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-case-against-israel-rests-on-lies-the-hague-south-africa-genocide- gaza-bc7c264c. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 35 In its order of 26 January 2024, the ICJ relied on the above quote by President Herzog, as well as from Yoav Gallant (Israeli Minister of Defence) and Israel Katz (then Minister of Energy and Infrastructure) to indicate the plausibility of violation of Convention rights. Gallant’s full statement reads as follows:151 You saw what we are fighting against. We are fighting against human animals. This is the ISIS of Gaza. This is what we are fighting against. Gaza won’t return to what it was before. We will eliminate everything. It doesn’t take one day, it will take a week, it will take weeks, or even months, we will reach all places. There is no way that our brothers, our children, our parents will be killed and we won’t react because we are a state. So we understand that Hamas wanted to change the situation. It’ll change back 180 degrees and they’ll regret this moment. They will regret it. While this statement may be ambiguous as to whether it refers to Hamas or all Palestinians, the reference to ‘the ISIS of Gaza’ should be sufficient to clarify that it is aimed at Hamas. Once again, an inference of ‘genocidal intent’ would not be the only reasonable interpretation of this statement. 8.3. Genocide accusations as a rhetorical shield Accusations of genocide by Israel serve as a rhetorical device to blunt recogni- tion of the Hamas genocide against Israeli Jews. South Africa and the network of non-governmental organisations responsible for the charges against Israel have successfully linked Israel with genocide in the public sphere, making it more dif- ficult to recognise claims of genocide by Hamas. As stated by Judge Bennouna in his Declaration in the Provisional Measures proceedings between Russia and Ukraine:152 I am aware that this concept of genocide has been overused and indiscrim- inately employed by propagandists of all persuasions. This is neither in the interest of the human groups under serious threat of destruction, nor in the interest of the credibility and efficiency of the 1948 Convention, which has enjoyed massive support from States and their consent to the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the settlement of disputes relating to the Convention. Legal scholar Kenneth Marcus demonstrates that the reversal of genocide charges against the victim is a prevalent practice and was used by Nazi, Serbian and Hutu propagandists.153 The Nazis, before and during their systematic murder of European Jewry, claimed that the Jews in fact planned to annihilate Germans. In Mein Kampf, Hitler wrote: ‘[I]f, with the help of his Marxist creed, the Jew is victorious over the other peoples of the world, his crown will be the funeral wreath of humanity and this 151 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide in the Gaza Strip (South Africa v Israel), Provisional Measures, Order of 26 January 2024 [2024] ICJ Rep 3, [52]. 152 ICJ, Allegations of Genocide under the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Ukraine v Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 16 March 2022 [2022] ICJ Rep 211, Declaration of Judge Bennouna, [4]. 153 Kenneth L Marcus, ‘Accusation in a Mirror’ (2012) 43 Loyola University Chicago Law Journal 357. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 36 Avraham Russell Shalev planet will, as it did millions of years ago, move through the ether devoid of men’.154 Josef Goebbels, in a 1941 pamphlet, claimed that Germany was acting in self-defence: ‘Who should die, the Germans or the Jews? … You know what your eternal enemy and opponent intends for you. There is only one instrument against his plans for annihilation’.155 Rwandan politician Leon Mugesera, who was charged in Canada with incitement to murder Tutsis, publicly told Hutus that Tutsis were conspiring to murder them: ‘I am telling you, and I am not lying, … they only want to exterminate us. They only want to exterminate us: they have no other aim. We must tell them the truth’.156 The ICTY observed that ‘[i]n articles, announcements, television programs and pub- lic proclamations, Serbs were told that they needed to protect themselves from a fundamentalist Muslim threat … that the Croats and Muslims were preparing a plan of genocide against them’.157 Furthermore, the charge of genocide against Israel has been a decades-long sta- ple of contemporary antisemitism.158 As researcher Izabella Tabarovsky determines, already in the 1950s and 1960s the Soviet Union promoted the canard of Israeli (Jewish) genocide against Palestinians.159 Genocide accusations serve to appropriate terms and symbols associated with the genocide of Jews at the hands of the Germans and their collaborators and impose them on contemporary Jews. Turkey’s President Tayyip Erdogan has said that ‘Netanyahu has reached a level that would make Hitler jealous with his genocidal methods’.160 Tunisian President Kais Saied rejected claims of antisemitism in Tunisia and accused Jews of repaying Tunisian help from the Nazis with genocide against Palestinians.161 Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva said that ‘what is happening in the Gaza Strip with the Palestinian people hasn’t happened at any other moment in history’ except one, ‘[w]hen Hitler decided to kill the Jews’.162 154 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf (Ralph Manheim (tr), Houghton Mifflin 1971) 65. 155 Susan Benesch, ‘Vile Crime or Inalienable Right: Defining Incitement to Genocide’ (2008) 48 Virginia Journal of International Law 485, 511. 156 Supreme Court of Canada, Mugesera v Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), Case No 30025, 28 June 2005, [2005] 2 SCR 100, Appendix III, para 18. 157 Tadić (n 24) para 91. 158 Lesley Klaff, ‘Holocaust Inversion’ (2019) 24(2) Israel Studies 73; Robert Solomon Wistrich, ‘Antisemitism and Holocaust Inversion’ in Jeffrey Herf and Anthony McElligott (eds), Antisemitism Before and Since the Holocaust: Altered Contexts and Recent Perspectives (Palgrave Macmillan Cham 2017) 37; Dovid Katz, ‘Primary Holocaust Inversion and Eastern European Antisemitism’ in Charles Asher Small (ed), The ISGAP Papers: Antisemitism in Comparative Perspective (CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform 2018) 207. 159 Izabella Tabarovsky, ‘Demonization Blueprints: Soviet Conspiracist Antizionism in Contemporary Left-Wing Discourse’ (2022) 5(1) Journal of Contemporary Antisemitism 1. 160 ‘Erdogan Says Netanyahu’s “Genocidal Methods Would Make Hitler Jealous”’, The Times of Israel, 12 May 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/erdogan-says-netanyahus-genocidal-methods- would-make-hitler-jealous. 161 Gabe Friedman, ‘Days after Synagogue Attack, Tunisian President Criticizes Israel and Says His Country Saved Jews in WWII’, Jewish Telegraphic Agency, 16 May 2023, https://www.jta.org/2023/05/16/ global/days-after-synagogue-attack-tunisian-president-criticizes-israel-and-says-his-country-saved- jews-in-wwii. 162 Lazar Berman and TOI Staff, ‘Israel Livid as Brazil’s Lula Says Israel like “Hitler,” Committing Genocide in Gaza’, The Times of Israel, 18 February 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/israel-livid-as- brazils-lula-says-israel-like-hitler-committing-genocide-in-gaza. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 37 Finally, genocide charges appropriate symbols associated with Palestinian terror against Israelis and repackages them against Israel. For example, at the Oscars awards ceremony in March 2024, pro-Palestinian artists wore pins purportedly call- ing for a ceasefire in the form of red and bloody hands. While not necessarily intentional, for Israelis, raised and blood-soaked hands immediately recall the 2000 Ramallah lynching of Israeli reservists Vadim Norzhich and Yosef Avrahami. The two were detained by Palestinian police, beaten and then had their bodies mutilated by a Palestinian mob. One of the terrorists famously waved his bloody hands from the police station window, in what later became an iconic picture.163 Understanding this strategy of genocide inversion is crucial for two reasons: it helps to explain why Hamas’ genocide has not been widely recognised as such, and it underscores the urgency of establishing clear legal accountability. These consid- erations directly inform our analysis of the international community’s obligations under the Genocide Convention. 9. International legal obligations: Prevention, punishment and state responsibility Because of its customary legal status, the Genocide Convention imposes several significant legal duties on state parties and, it can be argued, on all states. The Genocide Convention, at its minimum, is a ‘suppression convention’, mean- ing that it obligates state parties to criminalise and prosecute cases of genocide.164 Article V contains the basic suppression obligation, according to which: [t]he Contracting Parties undertake to enact, in accordance with their respec- tive Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the provisions of the present Convention, and, in particular, to provide effective penalties for persons guilty of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III. As the state on the territory of which genocide was committed, the primary responsibility for prosecuting Hamas war criminals lies on Israel.165 Since the begin- ning of Israel’s defensive war against Hamas, it has arrested and detained thousands of Hamas militants, including those who actively participated in the October 7th killings. In 1950, Israel’s parliament, the Knesset, passed the Law on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Genocide Law), which is modelled closely on the Genocide Convention. Therefore, Israel must prosecute Hamas war criminals according to the Genocide Law. While the Genocide Convention does not require the prosecution of genocide under universal jurisdiction, nor does it bar it.166 The trial of Hamas war criminals 163 ‘Red “Ceasefire” Pin at Oscars Reminiscent of Ramallah Lynching of Jews’, Jewish News Syndicate, 13 March 2024, https://www.jns.org/oscars-attendees-wear-red-ceasefire-pin-linked-to-lynching-of- jews. 164 Roger S Clark, ‘State Obligations under the Genocide Convention in Light of the ICJ’s Decision in the Case concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide’ (2008) 61 Rutgers Law Review 75, 76–77. 165 Genocide Convention (n 1) art VI. 166 Amina Adanan, ‘Reflecting on the Genocide Convention in Its Eighth Decade: How Universal Jurisdiction Developed over Genocide’ (2021) 19 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1039. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 38 Avraham Russell Shalev by states the nationals of which were murdered on October 7th or by states that host Hamas perpetrators would be a welcome development towards the advancement of universal justice and human rights. Qatar, a non-state party to the Genocide Convention, hosts several top Hamas offi- cials: Khalil al-Hayya, head of the Hamas communications department, and Khaled Mashal, former politburo head and chief of the Hamas diaspora office.167 On 20 May 2024, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court applied for an arrest war- rant against Ismail Haniyeh;168 Israel has since killed Haniyeh and the ICC has not issued an arrest warrant against him.169 Iran, also a non-state party to the Convention, is another major patron of Hamas. Reports in The Wall Street Journal indicate that in the weeks before the October 7th attacks, close to 500 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants underwent specialised combat training in Iran. These sessions were led by the Quds Force, a division of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) responsible for train- ing paramilitary groups. They included senior Palestinian officials and Brigadier General Esmail Qaani, head of the Quds Force. The tactics and technology used by Hamas, such as aerial drones and motorcycle attacks, show clear Iranian influence.170 Another report reveals that the attack was carefully coordinated over months by the IRGC, Hamas and Hezbollah, with Iranian officials giving the final approval during a meeting in Beirut on the Monday before the attack.171 Given the status of the Genocide Convention as customary law, it can be argued that Qatar and Iran are required to prosecute Hamas leaders or to extradite them to states that are willing to prosecute them.172 In the Bosnian Genocide Case, the ICJ found Serbia responsible for failing its international obligations by failing to bring perpetrators to its domestic courts and to cooperate with the ICTY.173 Additionally, Qatar and Iran must refrain from providing safe haven for Hamas leaders, or from funding and training Hamas fighters. The ICJ, most notably in Gambia v Myanmar, has held that all states have a com- pelling interest in preventing genocide. In NicaraguavGermany, Nicaragua demanded that the Court order Germany to suspend its military aid to Israel and renew funding 167 Foundation for Defense of Democracies, ‘10 Things to Know about Hamas and Qatar’, 19 December 2023, https://www.fdd.org/analysis/2023/12/19/10-things-to-know-about-hamas-and-qatar. 168 Karim AA Khan, ‘Statement of ICC Prosecutor Karim A.A. Khan KC: Applications for Arrest Warrants in the Situation in the State of Palestine’, International Criminal Court, 20 May 2024, https://www.icc- cpi.int/news/statement-icc-prosecutor-karim-aa-khan-kc-applications-arrest-warrants-situation-state. 169 Ronen Bergman and others, ‘Bomb Smuggled into Tehran Guesthouse Months Ago Killed Hamas Leader’, The New York Times, 1 August 2024, https://www.nytimes.com/2024/08/01/world/middleeast/ how-hamas-leader-haniyeh-killed-iran-bomb.html. 170 Center for Strategic and International Studies, ‘Hamas’ October 7 Attack: The Tactics, Targets, and Strategy of Terrorists’, 7 November 2023, https://www.csis.org/analysis/hamas-october-7-attack- tactics-targets-and-strategy-terrorists. 171 Summer Said, Benoit Faucon and Stephen Kalin, ‘Iran Helped Plot Attack on Israel over Several Weeks, The Wall Street Journal, 8 October 2023, https://www.wsj.com/world/middle-east/iran-israel- hamas-strike-planning-bbe07b25. 172 Patricia M Wald, ‘Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity’ (2007) 6 Washington University Global Studies Law Review 621. 173 ICJ, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment [2007] ICJ Rep 47, [438]–[450], [471]. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Israel Law Review 39 to UNRWA in the light of Israel’s supposed violation of the Genocide Convention.174 While the Court did not order any provisional measures, it ruled that it had juris- diction over Nicaragua’s request. Accordingly, every state party may seize the Court over a state party’s failure of secondary obligations under the Convention. As such, states that provide safe haven for Hamas officials, and allow fundraising or recruit- ing, fail to criminalise Hamas, or fail to prosecute Hamas criminals may be seized for failure to fulfil their Convention duties. This applies also to states that conduct diplo- matic relations with Qatar and Iran without ensuring that they fulfil their duties to prevent genocide. States that have not recognised Hamas as a terrorist organisation must do so immediately and act to prevent Hamas from recruiting, operating, mobilising or fundraising on their territory. The Hamas network of terror incitement can be found on social media, television and radio, in its education system, mosques and public rallies. This means seizing and closing channels or platforms that allow incite- ment, and prosecuting those responsible for incitement to genocide. While some of these obligations stem from the various terrorism-related conventions, the Hamas genocide provides a new legal impetus to act.175 10. Conclusion TheevidenceexaminedinthisarticledemonstratesthattheattackonOctober7thby Hamas constitutes genocide under international law. This conclusion rests on three interconnected pillars. First, the physical acts committed – the systematic killing of over 1,200 Israelis, accompanied by torture, sexual violence and mutilation – sat- isfy the actus reus requirement of the Genocide Convention. Second, Hamas’ specific intent to destroy Israeli Jews as a group is evidenced through multiple channels: its foundational ideology of eliminationist antisemitism, its decades-long systematic policy of incitement, its detailed operational planning for mass killing, and explicit statements by its leadership before and during the attack. What distinguishes this case, however, is the third element: the immediate deployment of reverse genocide accusations against the victims. This strategy of genocide inversion, exemplified by South Africa’s application to the ICJ, represents a sophisticated evolution in how perpetrators shield themselves from accountabil- ity. By appropriating and weaponising genocide accusations, Hamas and its allies have created a rhetorical shield that both deflects attention from its own genocidal actions and exploits Jewish historical trauma – a pattern observed in previous genocides but never executed with such rapid precision. These findings have significant implications for international law and policy. States that provide safe haven for Hamas leaders or fail to prevent Hamas operations 174 ICJ, Alleged Breaches of Certain International Obligations in respect of the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Nicaragua v Germany), Application Instituting Proceedings and Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures, 1 March 2024, [101]. 175 See Andrea Gioia, ‘The UN Conventions on the Prevention and Suppression of International Terrorism’ in Giuseppe Nesi (ed), International Cooperation in Counter-Terrorism (Ashgate 2006) 3; Ilias Bantekas, ‘The International Law on Terrorist Financing’ in Ben Saul (ed), Research Handbook on International Law and Terrorism (Edward Elgar 2020) 97; Antonio Cassese, ‘The Multifaceted Criminal Notion of Terrorism in International Law’ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 933. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press 40 Avraham Russell Shalev on their territory may violate their obligations under the Genocide Convention. The international community must act to close the accountability gap for non-state actors who commit genocide, particularly when they control territory and civilian populations. Most urgently, the recognition of Hamas’ actions as genocide creates immediate legal obligations for all state parties to prevent and punish these acts. Beyond the immediate legal consequences, this analysis reveals the urgent need to protect the integrity of genocide as a legal concept. The weaponisation of geno- cide accusations threatens to undermine the Convention’s effectiveness as a tool for preventing and punishing the ‘crime of crimes’. As this article demonstrates, only by maintaining rigorous legal standards for proving genocide – while remaining alert to how these standards can be manipulated – can international law effectively address mass atrocities in an era of hybrid warfare and sophisticated information operations. Acknowledgements. I thank Professor Abraham Bell for providing the original idea for this paper and his guidance throughout its development. His expertise in international law greatly informed the analysis. Funding. The author reports there is no funding associated with the work featured in this article. Competing interests. The author declares none. Cite this article: Avraham Russell Shalev, ‘Hamas’ October 7th Genocide: Legal Analysis and the Weaponisation of Reverse Accusations – A Study in Modern Genocide Recognition and Denial’ (2025) Israel Law Review 1–40, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 https://doi.org/10.1017/S0021223725100009 Published online by Cambridge University Press Judicial View of the Higher Court of Frankfurt regarding the conviction of Genocide (upheld by the German High Court, highest Court instance in German) I. Einführung Der Angeklagte wurde wegen Völkermordes, hier nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB, zu einer lebenslangen Freiheitsstrafe verurteilt. Ein minder schwerer Fall nach § 6 Absatz 2 VStGB, der ohnehin nur eine Strafmaßmilderung nach sich gezogen hätte, wurde abgelehnt. Auch im Falle des § 6 Absatz 2 ist der Täter des Völkermordes schuldig. In Deutschland gibt es verschiedene Strafgesetzbücher. Das sog. Kernstrafrecht findet sich im Deutschen Strafgesetzbuch. Daneben gibt es für besondere Delikte weitere Strafgesetzbücher. Eines dieser speziellen Strafgesetzbücher ist das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch (VStGB - Völkerstrafgesetzbuch), das sich mit dem Völkerstrafrecht befasst. Das Völkerstrafgesetzbuch ist am 30.06.2002 in Kraft getreten. Es hatte den Zweck, neben dem Völkermord, dem sog. „crime of crimes“, auch andere völkerstrafrechtliche Delikte zu regeln. Das Delikt des Völkermords war schon zuvor im gewöhnlichen Strafgesetzbuch, dem Deutschen Strafgesetzbuch, unter Strafe gestellt worden. Nun findet sich die Strafbarkeit des Völkermordes in § 6 des Völkerstrafgesetzbuchs. Der Paragraph lautet (VStGB - Völkerstrafgesetzbuch): § 6 Völkermord (1) Wer in der Absicht, eine nationale, rassische, religiöse oder ethnische Gruppe als solche ganz oder teilweise zu zerstören, 1. ein Mitglied der Gruppe tötet, 2. einem Mitglied der Gruppe schwere körperliche oder seelische Schäden, insbesondere der in § 226 des Strafgesetzbuches bezeichneten Art, zufügt, 3. die Gruppe unter Lebensbedingungen stellt, die geeignet sind, ihre körperliche Zerstörung ganz oder teilweise herbeizuführen, 4. Maßregeln verhängt, die Geburten innerhalb der Gruppe verhindern sollen, 5. ein Kind der Gruppe gewaltsam in eine andere Gruppe überführt, wird mit lebenslanger Freiheitsstrafe bestraft. (2) In minder schweren Fällen des Absatzes 1 Nr. 2 bis 5 ist die Strafe Freiheitsstrafe nicht unter fünf Jahren. Nach dem Weltrechtsprinzip wird Völkermord in Deutschland immer und jederzeit verfolgt. In § 1 Satz 1 VStGB wird das Weltrechtsprinzip normiert. Danach gilt das deutsche Völkerstrafgesetzbuch für alle in ihm bezeichneten Straftaten und damit auch für den Völkermord nach § 6 VStGB, wenn die Tat weder in Deutschland begangen wurde und auch sonst keinen Bezug zum Inland, etwa durch das aktive oder das passive Personalitätsprinzip, aufweist. II. Strafbarkeit des Angeklagten nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB. Zunächst ist anzumerken, dass § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB weiter gefasst ist und damit weniger hohe Anforderung an das Vorliegen eines Völkermordes stellt, als es die internationale Rechtsprechung tut. Die weite Fassung des Gesetzeswortlautes wurde vom Gesetzgeber aufgrund der nationalsozialistischen Gewaltherrschaft bewusst gewählt. Nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB liegt ein Völkermord vor, wenn einem Mitglied der Gruppe schwere körperliche oder seelische Schäden zugefügt worden sind. In § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB findet sich hinsichtlich der näheren Bestimmung des Tatbestandsmerkmals der schweren körperlichen oder seelischen Schäden ein Verweis auf § 226 StGB, ein Gesetz aus dem gewöhnlichen deutschen Strafgesetzbuch. Schwere körerpliche oder seelische Schäden liegen demnach unter anderem, aber nicht ausschließlich (vgl. Wortlaut des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB: „insbesondere“) vor, wenn § 226 StGB erfüllt ist. § 226 StGB lautet (§ 226 StGB - Einzelnorm): (1) Hat die Körperverletzung zur Folge, daß die verletzte Person 1. das Sehvermögen auf einem Auge oder beiden Augen, das Gehör, das Sprechvermögen oder die Fortpflanzungsfähigkeit verliert, 2. ein wichtiges Glied des Körpers verliert oder dauernd nicht mehr gebrauchen kann oder 3. in erheblicher Weise dauernd entstellt wird oder in Siechtum, Lähmung oder geistige Krankheit oder Behinderung verfällt, (…) Darüber hinaus werden schwere oder körperliche Schäden nach der internationalen Rechtsprechung wie folgt definiert: Krstic, (Trial Chamber), August 2, 2001, para. 513: “[S]erious bodily or mental harm for purposes of Article 4 actus reus is an intentional act or omission causing serious bodily or mental suffering. [S]erious harm need not cause permanent and irremediable harm, but it must involve harm that goes beyond temporary unhappiness, embarrassment or humiliation. It must be harm that results in a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life. [I]nhuman treatment, torture, rape, sexual abuse and deportation are among the acts which may cause serious bodily or mental injury.” a) Im vorliegenden Fall hat das Gericht eine Strafbarkeit nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB bejaht. Die Strafbarkeit nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 1 VStGB wurde jedoch verneint, weil der Angeklagte diesbezüglich keinen Vorsatz hatte. Das deutsche Strafrecht unterscheidet zwischen verschiedenen Formen des Vorsatzes. So gibt es auf der ersten Stufe den Willen, dolus directus des 1. Grades, den Straftatbestand zu erfüllen. Sofern der Gesetzgeber einen dolus directus 1. Grades fordert, lässt sich dies an Worten wie „Absicht“ oder „beabsichtigt“, erkennen. Auf der zweiten Stufe gibt es das Wissen, dolus directus des 2. Grades, einen Straftatbestand zu erfüllen. Auf der dritten Stufe gibt es die billigende Inkaufnahme, sog. bedingter Vorsatz, einen Straftatbestand zu erfüllen. Grundsätzlich reicht im deutschen Straftat das Vorliegen eines bedingten Vorsatzes, sprich bereits die dritte Stufe, für den subjektiven Tatbestand aus. In § 6 VStGB findet sich jedoch das Wort „Absicht“, sodass für alle Ziffern und damit alle verschiedenen Tatausführungsmöglichkeiten der dolus directus 1. Grades gefordert wird. Die Strafbarkeit nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 1 VStGB wurde hier abgelehnt, weil der Angeklagte bezüglich der Ermordung des 5-jährigen Mädchens jedenfalls keinen dolus directus 1. Grades hatte. Es ist bereits mehr als fraglich, ob der Angeklagte überhaupt dolus eventualis diesbezüglich gehabt hatte. Das Gericht begründet dies damit, dass der Angeklagte das Mädchen zu Bestrafungszwecken bei großer Hitze im Hof festgebunden und der Sonne ausgesetzt hat. Da er dies zum Zwecke der Bestrafung und wohl gerade nicht zum Zwecke der Tötung tat, nahm das Gericht an, dass er das Mädchen nur schwer körperlich misshandeln, nicht aber töten wollte. b) Der Angeklagte hat sich nach § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB strafbar gemacht, weil er der Mutter des ermordeten fünfjährigen Mädchens schweren köprerlichen sowie seelischen Schaden zugefügt hat Der Angeklagte hat sich des Völkermordes gemäß § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB schuldig gemacht, indem er, in der Absicht die religiöse Gruppe der Jesiden als solche ganz oder teilweise zu zerstören, der Mutter A und ihrer Tochter B als Mitgliedern der Gruppe schwere körperliche (Tochter B) bzw. seelische (Mutter A) Schäden zufügte. aa) Objektiver Tatbestand des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB (1) Ein Mitglied einer religiösen Gruppe Bei der Mutter A und ihrer Tochter B handelt(e) es sich um Mitglieder einer religiösen Gruppe im Sinne des § 6 Absatz 1 VStGB. Denn die Jesiden definieren sich über eine gemeinsame Religion. Es handelt sich um eine eigenständige Religionsgemeinschaft und damit um eine abgrenzbare religiöse Gruppe im Sinne der Vorschrift. Die Mutter A und ihre Tochter waren als Jesidinnen im Sinne von § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB jeweils Mitglieder dieser religiösen Gruppe. Die Schädigung (nur) einzelner Gruppenmitglieder ist ausweislich des Wortlauts der Regelung ausdrücklich vom Tatbestand erfasst. Kommentar: Israelis sind keine religiöse, sondern eine nationale Gruppe, wenngleich die Mehrheit jüdisch ist. Diese wird jedoch ebenfalls von § 6 Völkerstrafgesetzbuch vor Völkermord geschützt. Natürlich war das Massaker vom 7. Oktober 2023 gegen Juden gerichtet, also eine ethnische bzw. rassische Gruppe, aber es wurden auch muslimische Israelis ermordert. Es wäre daher einfacher und zielführender, die Hamas wegen der beabsichtigten Zerstörung einer nationalen Gruppe, namentlich Israelis, anzuklagen. bb) Zufügung schwerer körperlicher oder seelischer Schäden Bei den der Regelung des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB unterfallenden schweren körperlichen bzw. seelischen Schäden muss es sich - soweit sie nicht ohnehin der in § 226 StGB normierten Art sind ("insbesondere") - um solche Schäden handeln, die die Fähigkeit des Opfers, ein normales Leben zu führen, nachhaltig beeinträchtigen, vgl. die internationale Rechtsprechung:"a grave and long-term disadvantage to a person’s ability to lead a normal and constructive life", Krstic, (Trial Chamber), August 2, 2001, para. 513). Insbesondere kann das Erlebnis der gewaltsamen Trennung von einem geliebten Menschen bei Ungewissheit über dessen Verbleib zu einer für den Einzeltatbestand des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB hinreichenden seelischen Schädigung führen (siehe ISTGH 08.04.2015 - IT-05-88/2-A, Nr. 207, 210 ff., Seite 85 ff. - Prosecutor v. Tolimir). Soweit in der internationalen Rechtsprechung darüber hinaus verlangt wird, dass die Tathandlung objektiv geeignet sein muss, einen Beitrag zur ganzen oder teilweisen Zerstörung der Gruppe zu leisten, ist dies nach dem klaren Gesetzeswortlaut der nationalen Regelung des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB im Lichte des Wortlauts des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 3 VStGB, der solches anders als § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB ausdrücklich formuliert, nicht zu fordern. (1) Schwere körperliche Schäden zum Nachteil von B Im Sinne der vorverstandenen Definition fügte der Angeklagte der B durch die unter II. 4. festgestellte Tat schwere körperliche Schäden zu, die die erforderliche Schwelle erreichen. Denn durch die über einen mehrwöchigen Zeitraum mittels Schlägen verübten täglichen Züchtigungen, darunter derart, dass B Prellungen am Rücken und starke Schmerzen erlitt, so dass sie mehrere Tage das Bett hütete, sowie das Schubsen mit der Folge einer Verletzung am Ellbogen, die unzureichende Ernährungssituation über den gesamten Zeitraum, so dass sie hungerte, und die Fesselung unter direkter Sonneneinstrahlung in der Mittagshitze über einige Zeit mit den Armen rechts und links in Kopfhöhe ohne sich bewegen zu können - unberücksichtigt des Umstandes des Versterbens durch einen Hitzschlag - erfuhr das Kind mit Bedacht auf das junge Alter von nur fünf Jahren in der Gesamtheit der Behandlung körperlich gravierende Einbußen. Angesichts des Gesamtbildes und des Umstandes, dass hierdurch Bs zum Führen eines normalen Lebens erforderliche Fähigkeit nachhaltig beeinträchtigt wurde, ist ein mit den in § 226 StGB normierten Schädigungen vergleichbarer Schweregrad erreicht worden, so dass die erlittenen körperlichen Einbußen als schwere körperliche Schäden im Sinne der Regelung zu qualifizieren sind. (2) Schwere seelische Schäden zum Nachteil der Mutter A Der Mutter A fügte der Angeklagte im Sinne vorstehender Definition durch die unter II. 4. festgestellte Tat schwere seelische Schäden zu, die ebenfalls die erforderliche Schwelle erreichen. Denn die Mutter A litt einerseits unter den ihr vom Angeklagten diktierten gesamten Lebensbedingungen und seiner Behandlung während des mehrwöchigen Aufenthaltes in seinem Haushalt in Falluja selbst seelisch in großem Ausmaß. Andererseits erfuhr sie nachhaltiges und schweres Leid dadurch, der Behandlung ihres Kindes durch den Angeklagten keinen Einhalt gebieten zu können. Der Angeklagte fügte ihr außerdem tiefen seelischen Schmerz zu, indem er sie in der Folgezeit des Fesselungsgeschehens über den Verbleib des Kindes nicht aufklärte, und ihr versagte, ihn zu begleiten, als er das Kind ins Krankenhaus verbrachte. Hierdurch begegnete sie in der Gesamtheit durch den Angeklagten massiven seelischen Nachteilen. Hinsichtlich des Gesamtbildes und wegen des Umstandes, dass hierdurch auch ihre Fähigkeit, ein normales Leben zu führen, nachhaltig beeinträchtigt wurde, ist ein mit den in § 226 StGB normierten Schädigungen vergleichbarer Schweregrad ebenfalls erreicht, so dass die erfahrenen seelischen Nachteile nach obiger Definition als schwere seelische Schäden im Sinne des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB einzuordnen sind. c) Subjektiver Tatbestand des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB aa) Vorsatz hinsichtlich der objektiven Tatbestandsmerkmale Der Angeklagte handelte vorsätzlich hinsichtlich aller objektiven Merkmale des Einzeltatbestandes des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB. Dem Angeklagten war klar, dass es sich bei der Mutter A und ihrer Tochter B um Angehörige der religiösen Gruppe der Jesiden handelte. In Bezug auf die weiteren objektiven Tatbestandsvoraussetzungen betreffend B handelte er überdies mit Vorsatz, weil ihm unter Billigung dessen klar war, dass sieu. a. körperlich in großem Ausmaß unter der von ihm im Einzelnen vorsätzlichen Behandlung insgesamt litt und sie in der Gesamtheit ihrer Misshandlungen hierdurch derart gravierende körperliche Einbußen erfuhr, dass ihre zum Führen eines normalen Lebens erforderliche Fähigkeit nachhaltig beeinträchtigt wurde, die nach vorstehenden Ausführungen als schwere körperliche Schäden gemäß § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB zu qualifizieren sind. Hinsichtlich der weiteren den objektiven Tatbestand begründenden Umstände in Bezug auf die Mutter A handelte der Angeklagte gleichfalls vorsätzlich. Denn es war ihm zum Einen klar und er billigte es, dass die Mutter A seelisch (u. a.) in großem Ausmaß unter den von ihm im Einzelnen vorsätzlich diktierten Lebensbedingungen bzw. seiner im Einzelnen vorsätzlichen Behandlungen insgesamt litt. Hinzu tritt, dass es ihm unter Billigung dessen bewusst war, dass die Mutter A nachhaltig und schwer darunter litt, seine Behandlung ihres Kindes erdulden zu müssen, ohne dem Einhalt gebieten zu können. Zum anderen war er sich darüber im Klaren und er billigte es, ihr tiefen seelischen Schmerz zuzufügen, indem er sie in der Folgezeit des Fesselungsgeschehens über den Verbleib des Kindes nicht aufklärte. Schließlich war ihm - dies billigend - bewusst, dass die Mutter A dadurch insgesamt derart massiven seelischen Nachteilen begegnete, dass ihre Fähigkeit, ein normales Leben zu führen, hiervon nachhaltig beeinträchtigt wurde, was nach den obigen Ausführungen schwere seelische Schäden im Sinne des § 6 Absatz 1 Nr. 2 VStGB darstellt. bb) Zerstörungsabsicht Der Angeklagte handelte bei der Zufügung der schweren körperlichen bzw. seelischen Schäden zum Nachteil der B einerseits und der Mutter A andererseits im Sinne des § 6 Absatz 1 VStGB in der Absicht, die religiöse Gruppe der Jesiden als solche ganz oder teilweise zu zerstören. Vorausgesetzt ist insoweit zielgerichtetes Wollen der teilweisen oder vollständigen Zerstörung einer von der Vorschrift geschützten Gruppe zumindest in ihrer sozialen Existenz (BGH, 3. Strafsenat, Urteil vom 21.05.2015 - 3 StR 575/14, zit. nach juris, dort Rdnr. 13). Es genügt, wenn die ganze oder teilweise Zerstörung der Gruppe das Zwischenziel des Täters bildet, sie muss im Sinne einer überschießenden Innentendenz geprägt sein, jedoch nicht Triebfeder bzw. Endziel, Beweggrund oder Motiv des Täters sein (BGH, 3. Strafsenat, Urteil vom 21.05.2015 - 3 StR 575/14, zit. nach juris, dort Rdnr. 16; Urteil vom 21.02.2001 - 3 StR 372/00, NJW 2001, 2728 ff. (2729)). Da der Angeklagte seinerseits durch die Zufügung der gravierenden körperlichen und seelischen Beeinträchtigungen zum Nachteil der B einerseits und der Mutter A andererseits im Sinne der IS-Ideologie zielgerichtet die jesidische Religion, das Jesidentum als solches und seine Angehörigen zur Errichtung eines islamischen Kalifats vernichten wollte, sind die nach vorstehender Definition an die Zerstörungsabsicht zu stellenden Voraussetzungen in seiner Person erfüllt. Bei den Jesiden handelt es sich nach dem oben Gesagten um eine eigenständige Religionsgemeinschaft und damit um eine abgrenzbare religiöse Gruppe im Sinne des § 6 Absatz 1 VStGB. Dass der Angeklagte im Sinne der IS-Ideologie zur Errichtung eines islamischen Kalifats handelte, ist unschädlich, da die Zerstörung der Jesiden selbst nicht sein Endziel gewesen sein muss. Auch dass der Angeklagte von der unentgeltlichen Haushaltsleistung der Mutter A profitierte, steht dem nicht entgegen. Der zielgerichtete Wille des Angeklagten zur Zerstörung der Jesiden durch seine gesamten - die schweren Schädigungen körperlicher Natur bei B und seelischer Natur bei der Mutter A begründenden - Handlungen stellte sich nämlich in der Innentendenz motivational als prägend dar. Dass der Angeklagte über den Sklavenhandel mit Mädchen und Frauen hinaus auch die Vielzahl an weiteren Maßnahmen im Zusammenhang mit den militärischen Aktionen gegen die im Sinjar-Gebiet ansässigen Mitglieder der Jesiden jedenfalls für möglich gehalten und gebilligt hat, ergibt sich vor diesem Gesamthintergrund insbesondere daraus, dass sich der Sklavenhandel nur auf weibliche Angehörige der Jesiden, die Vernichtungsideologie des IS zum Umgang mit Ungläubigen aber auf alle Geschlechter der Jesiden insgesamt bezog. Deshalb war zwangsläufig das Schicksal auch der männlichen Jesiden von seiner kognitiven Vorstellungswelt als im Bereich des Möglichen erfasst. In seiner Mitwirkung an dem Gesamtgeschehen durch den Kauf der Zeugin A und ihre Tochter als Sklavinnen zeigt sich wiederum die Billigung dessen. Dass der Angeklagte durch die Zufügung der gravierenden körperlichen Beeinträchtigungen zum Nachteil der B sowie der massiven seelischen Einbußen zum Nachteil der Zeugin A selbst im Sinne der IS-Ideologie zielgerichtet die jesidische Religion, das Jesidentum als solches und seine Angehörigen zur Errichtung eines islamischen Kalifats vernichten wollte, schließt der Senat aus dem Gesamtbild der von seinem Vorsatz getragenen entwürdigenden und entwertenden diktierten Lebensbedingungen und Behandlung zum Nachteil der Zeugin A und ihrer Tochter B in Verbindung damit, dass der Angeklagte von der Vernichtungsideologie des IS nach den vorstehenden Ausführungen Kenntnis hatte und sie guthieß. Der finale Zerstörungswille des Angeklagten kommt durch die von ihm diktierten Lebensbedingungen und die Art und Weise seiner Behandlung zum Nachteil der Zeugin A und ihrer Tochter B als seine Sklavinnen in ihrer Gesamtheit zum Ausdruck. Denn der Angeklagte hat ihnen hierdurch jedes Recht zur Selbstbestimmung und auf eine eigene Persönlichkeit abgesprochen, wodurch er sie in ihrer Identität entkernt hat. Besonders deutlich setzt sich der zielgerichtete Vernichtungswille des Angeklagten ins Bild durch die Art und Weise der Fesselung des Kindes, gleichsam einer Kreuzigung, in der Sonne und Mittagshitze mit den Armen rechts und links in Kopfhöhe, ohne dass sich B bewegen konnte - unabhängig davon, dass sie verstarb, was nicht von seinem Vorsatz umfasst war - und dem Umstand, dass er der Zeugin A trotz ihres offensichtlich extremen seelischen Leids versagte, ihn ins Krankenhaus zu begleiten und sie über den Verbleib des Kindes nicht aufklärte. Die religionsbezogene Verknüpfung mit dieser zielgerichteten Zerstörungsmotivation zeigt sich speziell an dem von ihm verordneten Zwang zum Gebet nach muslimischen Regeln entgegen dem jesidischen Glauben der Zeugin A und ihrer Tochter B sowie der Namensumbenennung des Kindes, mithin der Tilgung ihrer kulturell-religiösen Identität. Dass die Jesiden aufgrund ihrer Religionszugehörigkeit für ihn selbst nichts wert waren, hat überdies auch die Zeugin C so in der Hauptverhandlung bekundet. Verbunden damit, dass der Angeklagte als IS-Mitglied nach den obigen Ausführungen die Vernichtungsideologie des IS zum Nachteil der Jesiden wegen ihrer Religion kannte und guthieß, ist hieraus nach der Überzeugung des Senats allein zu folgern, dass der Angeklagte auch selbst durch die Zufügung der gravierenden körperlichen Beeinträchtigungen zum Nachteil der B sowie der massiven seelischen Einbußen zum Nachteil der Zeugin A zielgerichtet die jesidische Religion, das Jesidentum als solches und seine Angehörigen zur Errichtung eines islamischen Kalifats vernichten wollte. Zuletzt zeigt sich die tiefe Verwurzelung des Angeklagten in der Ideologie des IS daran, dass der Angeklagte sogar nach dem Geschehen zum Nachteil der B noch mehrere Jahre später in der Türkei in vielfältiger Weise weiter für den IS tätig war. Denn dies erlaubt als zusätzliches Indiz einen entsprechenden Rückschluss auf seine so gelagerte innere Haltung im Zeitraum des Aufenthaltes der Zeugin A und ihrer Tochter B in seinem Haushalt in Falluja. Zwar profitierte der Angeklagte - abseits einer ideologischen Motivation - über einen mehrwöchigen Zeitraum hinweg auch ganz persönlich davon, die Zeugin A unentgeltlich zur Hausarbeit heranziehen zu können. An der gesamten Ausdrucksform der an ihnen als seinen Sklavinnen vollzogenen Behandlung zeigt sich jedoch, dass es dem Angeklagten gerade nicht allein um die Unterstützung im Haushalt gegangen ist, sondern dies lediglich Nebenziel seiner Handlungen war und er innerlich im Sinne einer überschießenden Tendenz - in Übereinstimmung mit dem IS - das Ziel der Vernichtung der Religionsgemeinschaft der Jesiden verfolgte. Letztlich war dem Angeklagten nach alledem auch klar, dass er durch die Verbringung der Zeugin A und ihrer Tochter B von Syrien nach Falluja im Irak - nach wie vor fern ihres angestammten Sindjar-Gebietes im Nordwesten des Landes - die mit der Versklavung der jesidischen Frauen und Kinder, darunter auch dieser beiden Personen, einhergehende Verbringung aus dem angestammten Gebiet nach Syrien bzw. in andere Gebiete des Iraks durch den IS förderte. Ausgedrückt durch seinen objektiven Tatbeitrag billigte er dies auch. Aufgrund seiner inneren Einstellung liegt es fern, dass er diese von ihm erkannte Konsequenz seines Handelns ablehnte und sich hiermit nicht wenigstens abgefunden hat. לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם: החובה המשפטית והמוסרית להעמיד לדין את מבצעי ה טבח ב־7 באוקטובר מאת אברהם של"ו  מבוא כמעט שנה וחצי לאחר טבח ה־7 באוקטובר , וטרם הועמד לדין ולו מחבל אחד מבין אלה שביצעו את הזוועות הנוראיות. עובדה זו מעוררת חשש כבד שהמרצחים מן החמאס והג'יהאד האיסלמי יתחמקו מהעמדה לדין ונשיאה במחיר פשעיהם בשל .)מורכבויות משפטיות (בהינתן שההתמהמהות אינה מפני החשש לגורל החטופים במאמר זה תוצג החובה המוסרית, הציבורית והמשפטית להעמיד לדין את .)המרצחים בגין פשע השמדת עם (ג'נוסייד1 טבח ה־7 באוקטובר היה האירוע הקטלני ביותר נגד העם היהודי מאז השואה, ובו נחשף העולם לצורה שבה מתממשת האידיאולוגיה האנטישמית והרצחנית של חמאס. אירועים אלה לא היו פיגועי טרור "רגילים", אלא ניסיון מתוכנן להשמדה חלקית של העם היהודי, שבא לידי ביטוי בהוצאות להורג שיטתיות , עינויים, אונס ואלימות מינית, ביזוי גופות וחטיפות.  ה מאמר זה מבוסס על המאמרHamas' October 7th Genocide: Legal Analysis and the Weaponization of Reverse Accusations: A Study in Modern Genocide Recognition and Denial , העתיד לצאת לאור ב־Israel Law Review . 1 .במאמר, אשתמש בביטויים "השמדת עם" ו"רצח עם" לחילופין אברהם של"ו רשות הרבים "התשפ ה 2 במאמר זה אסביר את חובתה של מדינת ישראל לאור האמנה בדבר מניעתו וענישתו של הפשע השמדת עם (להלן: האמנה למניעת השמדת עם); אציג את התשתית המשפטית הקיימת להעמיד לדין את מבצעי הטבח; ואבהיר כיצד ניתן לקיים חובות אלו לפי הדין הפלילי הישראלי. בנוסף, אדגיש את חשיבותו של משפט פומבי בעניין רצח עם, אשר משמר את זיכרון האירועים בתודעה הלאומית והבין־ לאומית, ומסייע בהתמודדות עם הכחשת הזוועות והאידיאולוגיה שעמדה בבסיסן. במסגרת המאמר, לא אתייחס להצעות חקיקה בעניין שינוי דיני הראיות או סדרי .הדין א. אירועי ה ־7 "באוקטובר הם "פשע של רצח עם כידוע, ה־7 .באוקטובר היה הטבח הגדול ביותר שבוצע בעם היהודי מאז השואה כמו כן ידוע שהחמאס הוא ארגון איסלאמיסטי ואנטישמי הדוגל בהשמדת מדינת :ישראל. כפי שתיאר המזרחן פרופ' מאיר ליטבק את האידאולוגיה של החמאס "בראייתו של ארגון החמאס, הסכסוך הפלסטיני־ישראלי אינו רק סכסוך טריטוריאלי בין פלסטינים לישראלים, אלא בראש ובראשונה .'מלחמת דת ואמונה' בין האסלאם ליהדות ובין מוסלמים ליהודים ככזה, הוא מתואר כדיכוטומיה בלתי ניתנת לגישור בין שני מוחלטים מנוגדים– סכסוך היסטורי , דתי ותרבותי בין אמונה לכפירה, בין הדת האמיתית שמחליפה את כל הדתות שקדמו לה, כלומר האסלאם, לבין הדת המבוטלת והמוחלפת– היהדות. זוהי מלחמה בין הטוב, המגולם על־ידי המוסלמים המייצגים את מפלגת האל (חיזב אללה ), לבין הרע, "מפלגת השטן" (חיזב א ־)שיטאן המיוצגת על־ידי היהודים. כתוצאה מכך, הסכסוך נחשב ל'מאבק קיומי, ולא ( "סכסוך על גבולות מערכת וג'וד ולא חודוד.") 2 השמדת ישראל תמיד הייתה חלק בלתי נפרד מהאידיאולוגיה של חמאס, אולם מסמכים שנתפסו לאחרונה מראים שב־7 באוקטובר חמאס האמין שהשמדת ישראל הפכה למטרה ברת־השגה. על פי המסמכים שנתפסו על ידי כוחות צה"ל ברצועת עזה, הנהגת החמאס החלה, מאז מבצע שומר החומות ב־2021 , לראות את חיסול ישראל כאפשרות מעשית מאוד שעשויה להתממש בעתיד הקרוב. ארגון החמאס התכוון להצית מלחמה רב־חזיתית נגד ישראל, שתכלול את ערביי ישראל וקבוצות אחרות מ"ציר ההתנגדות" האיראני, ותוביל לקריסת המדינה היהודית. לכן, בשונה מפעולות טרור שגרתיות אחרות שביצע החמאס, ב אירועי ה־7 באוקטובר הייתה כוונה אמיתית ומיידית להשמיד את מדינת ישראל ולבצע רצח עם באוכלוסייתה .היהודית3 2 “Martyrdom is Life”: Jihad and martyrdom in the ideology Meir Litvak, of Hamas, 33(8) STUDIES IN CONFLICT & TERRORISM 717-718 (2010) ; ראו גםANDBOOK H , Resistance Movement s: The Islamic ā am Ḥ Shaul Bartal, (2021) 381 OVEMENTS M ECTS AND S SLAMIC I OF . 3 Destroy Israel: From Theory into Practice, Hamas' Strategy to Uri Rosset, NTELLIGENCE AND I MIT A EIR M , as Seen in Captured Documents TERRORISM INFORMATION CENTER (13.03.2025) . רשות הרבים "התשפ ה לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם 3 ב. אפקט הטבח בזירה הלאומית והבין־לאומית מתקפת ה־7 ,באוקטובר כללה מעשי זוועה כמו רצח המוני של אוכלוסייה אזרחית .אלימות מינית ואונס, כריתת איברים, עינויים, ביזוי גופות וחטיפות4 למרות אכזריותם של מחבלי החמאס, כבר באותו יום נערכו ברחבי העולם הפגנות בגנות .ישראל. המתקפה הציתה גל אדיר של אנטישמיות נגד קהילות יהודיות בתפוצות5 תוך זמן קצר יחסית, אפילו מדינות ידידותיות לכאורה קראו לישראל להימנע מ"הסלמה" ולהגיע להפסקת אש בעזה. באופן אבסורדי, ישראל הואשמה בביצוע רצח עם בעזתים, על אף היותה קורבן למתקפה רצחנית. דרום אפריקה, מדינה בעלת יחסים קרובים לחמאס, לאיראן ולקטאר, אף הגישה תלונ ה בבית דין הבין־ לאומי לצדק (ה־ICJ ) נגד מדינת ישראל בטענה שהיא מפרה את האמנה למניעת .השמדת עם6 בעקבות כך, קיימת חשיבות למשפט פומבי, בו ייחשפו מעשי הרצח והפשעים השיטתיים של החמאס, כמו גם המניעים הרצחניים והאנטישמים של .המבצעים, כדי לקבע את האמת בתודעה הישראלית והבין־לאומית לא זו אף זו, למשפט ישנה חשיבות לתודעת הלאומית בישראל. כך למשל, משפט אייכמן, שהתקיים בירושלים בין ה־11 באפריל ל־15 בדצמבר בשנת1961 , השפיע עמוקות על הזיכרון החברתי בישראל. אדולף אייכמן היה אחד ממתכנני השואה המרכזיים. הוא נתפס על ידי סוכנים ישראלים בארגנטינה ב־1960 , הובא לישראל ,ונשפט על פשעי מלחמה, פשעים נגד האנושות ופשעים נגד העם היהודי. המשפט שהסתיים בהרשעתו והוצאתו להורג ב־1962 , היה אירוע מכונן שעיצב את הזיכרון החברתי של השואה בישראל והפך אותו לחלק בלתי נפרד מהתודעה הלאומית. המשפט היה אירוע תקשורתי חסר תק דים, ששודר בשידור חי ברדיו ובטלוויזיה וסוקר בהרחבה בעיתונים ברחבי העולם. חשיפה זו הביאה את השואה לבתים .שמחוץ לישראל, והגיעה לקהלים בצפון אמריקה, אירופה ומעבר להם המשפט גם יצר ארכיון עצום של מסמכים משפטיים, עדויות וראיות, שרבים הפכו ברבות הזמן נגישים לציבור. עושר זה של מקורות ראשוניים הפך למשאב בסיסי עבור מחנכים וחוקרים ברחבי העולם. מוסדות כמו יד ושם בישראל ולאחר מכן מוזיאונים לשואה ברחבי העולם הסתמכו על חומרים אלה ,לפיתוח כלי הוראה תערוכות ותוכניות מחקר, והבטיחו שהשואה תילמד תוך דיוק היסטורי ולעומק. על אף ההבדלים הבולטים בהיקף הזוועות, משפט ציבורי בגין רצח עם עבור מבצעי הטבח ב־7 באוקטובר יכול לעורר דיון בין־לאומי בסוגיית האנטישמיות בחברה הפלסטינית, ערבית ומוסלמית. משפט פומבי ישמש גם כלי אפקטיבי לשימור הזיכרון הלאומי ולמאבק נגד תאוריות הקונספירציה וההכחשה של מעשי הטבח, ובמי.וחד האלימות המינית הפושות בעולם7 4 (2025). 7 October SRAEL I- UK ROUP FOR G ARLIAMENTARY P ARTY P - LL A Parliamentary Commission Report (L. Roberts, Chair). Retrieved from https://www.7octparliamentarycommission.co.uk/ . 5 (2024) ASHEM V AD Y , Global Antisemitism in the Wake of October 7 . 6 South Africa, Hamas, Iran, and Qatar: The Charles Asher Small, HE T , Hijacking of the ANC and the International Court of Justice INSTITUTE FOR THE STUDY OF GLOBAL ANTISEMITISM AND POLICY (ISGAP) 42 (2024) . 7 , Oct. 7th Atrocities & Rising Antisemitism – Echoes of Denial אברהם של"ו רשות הרבים "התשפ ה 4 ג. התשתית המשפטית לאור הקביעה כי אירועי ה־7 באוקטובר מהווים פשע של רצח עם , הן בשל מעשי הזוועה והן בשל הכוונה האנטישמית הברורה של חמאס, עולה הצורך הדחוף להבטיח צדק לקורבנות ולמנוע הכחשה של הפשעים. עם זאת, הכרזה על הפשע כרצח עם אינה מספיקה כשלעצמה – יש לתרגם קביעה זו לפעולה משפטית .קונקרטית באמצעות העמדה לדין של המבצעים ,לשם כך יש לבחון את התשתית המשפטית הקיימת בדין הישראלי והבין־לאומי, המאפשרת להעניש על פשע חמור זה. חלק זה ידון בתשתית המשפטית לפי הדין הישראלי והבין־לאומי ליישום .היסודות המשפטיים של פשע של רצח עם ישראל נמצאת בין מאה וחמישים המדינות החתומות על אמנה למניעת השמדת עם. אמנה זו הייתה הראשונה בעניין זכויות אדם שאימצה העצרת הכללית של האו"ם, והיא עיגנה לראשונה את פשע "השמדת עם" כפשע שעומד בפני עצמו .במשפט הבין־לאומי פשע "השמדת עם" מורכב משני חלקים: מעשה של השמדת עם המלווה ביסוד נפשי. האמנה מגדירה השמדת עם כדלהלן (סעיףII :) In the present Convention, genocide means any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group. בשנת1950 , הכנסת חוקקה את החוק בדבר מניעתו וענישתו של הפשע השמדת עם (להלן: חוק למניעת השמדת עם), המעגן את הוראות האמנה בתוך הדין הפלילי הישראלי. החוק מטיל עונש מוות על מבצעי השמדת עם וכולל עבירות של ביצוע עם קשר לביצוע, הסתה, ניסיון לבצע והשתתפות בהשמדת עם. האמנה הפכה כמעט אות מתה, עד להקמת בתי הדין הבינלאומיים המיוחדים ליוגוסלביה :(להלןICTY ) ולרואנדה :(להלן(ICTR בשנות ה־90 , כאשר החוקות של בתי הדין כללו את הגדרת "השמדת עם" כעבירה פלילית. על כן, עד היום עיקר הפסיקה והתפתחותו של הדין הפלילי סביב רצח עם מסתמכות על החלטות בתי דין .אלו8 בפסק דין 'צבקטוביץ , ההחלטה הישראלית היחידה שנשענת על חוק למניעת JERUSALEM INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, 6 (22.7.2024) ; ראו גםElizabeth HE T , Denial of the Oct. 7 Hamas Attack on Israel Is Spreading Dwoskin, , (21.1.2024) OST P ASHINGTON W :; ראו גםDenial and Distortion of the - NTI A , led October 7 Attack: An Overview of False Narratives - Hamas DEFAMATION LEAGUE (5.1.2025) . 8 The Evolution of the Notion of Genocide in the ska, ń Karolina Wierczy Context of the Jurisdiction of the National Courts, 28 POLISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 83-93 (2008) . רשות הרבים "התשפ ה לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם 5 השמדת עם, נקבע כי "ניתן ללמוד מפסקי דין אלו [פסקי הדין של בתי הדין הבינלאומיים המיוחדים] על הפרשנות הניתנת לעבירה של רצח עם, עבירה המנוסחת באופן זהה בחוק הישראלי, באמנה הבינלאומיות ובחוקה של ה ־ICTY . פסקי הדין הניתנים בערכאות זרות, בין אם המדינתיות ובין אם הבינלאומיות, הם אחד מהמקורות לפרשנותו של הדין הבינלאומי ואין כל פסול בהיעזרות בפסיקה זו בבואנו לפרש את ."החוק הישראלי. כמובן, שכל זאת בגדר השראה בלבד ולא בגדר דין מחייב9 רצח עם הוא פשע ייחודי בתוך פשעי המלחמה והפשעים נגד האנושות בכך שהוא ( דורש כוונה ספציפית או מיוחדתdolus specialis ), המחייבת שהפשע בוצע ,בכוונה להשמיד, באופן מלא או חלקי, קבוצה לאומית, אתנית, גזעית, או דתית .באשר היא כזו10 הכוונה המיוחדת הזו מתקיימת בכל מקרה שבו ניתן להוכיח שהכוונה לבצע רצח העם היא "המסקנה הסבירה היחידה שניתן להסיק מדפוס ."ההתנהגות האמור11 הכוונה הספציפית להשמיד את הקבוצה היא המאפיין המבחין של פשע רצח העם. לפי ה־ICTY בהכרעתו בעניין'ילישיץ : "הכוונה הפלילית היא זו שלמעשה, מעניקה לפשע רצח העם את ייחודיותו ומבדילה אותו מפשעים רגילים ומפשעים אחרים שמפרים ."את המשפט ההומניטרי הבינלאומי12 באופן דומה, ה־ICTR בהכרעתו בעניין אקאייסו הגדיר את ה־dolus specialis :בתור "כוונה ספציפית, הנדרשת כיסוד מכונן של הפשע, המחייבת שמבצע ."הפשע ביקש באופן ברור להפיק את המעשה שבו הוא מואשם13 כאשר המואשם אינו מגלה את מצבו הנפשי בעת ביצוע העבירה, אפשר להסיק את .כוונתו להשמדה מתוך מסכת העובדות14 בית המשפט העליון בישראל בעניין'צבטקוביץ עסק בפרשנות ליסוד הנפשי הנדרש. פסק הדין נסוב על בקשה סרבית להסגרתו של צבטקוביץ', שהואשם בעבירת רצח עם בגין השתתפותו בטבח של גברים מוסלמים בעיר סרברניקה בשנת 1995 . בית המשפט העליון אימץ את פרשנותו של בית המשפט המחוזי שיש לבחון אם המואשם היה מודע לכך שהוא מבצע השמדת עם, ואם הוא חפץ להשיג תוצאה זו. לפי בית המשפט, המערער היה מודע לכך שהוא נוטל חלק בביצוע רצח עם של .גברים מוסלמים15 9 ע"פ6322/11 'צבטקוביץ 'נ היועץ המשפטי לממשלה , פסקה18 (נבו29.11.12 ) (להלן: עניין 'צבטקוביץ .) 10 S, 4 - 23 - , Judgment and Sentence, ICTR 97 Prosecutor v Kambanda ICTR, December 1998, para 16 . 11 Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of ICJ, the Crime of Genocide (Croatia v. Serbia) Cr. Summary of the Judgment of 3 February 2015 [2015] ICGJ 470, 11 . 12 10, para 66 - 95 - , Trial Judgement, IT Prosecutor v Goran Jelisic ICTY, . 13 T, 1998, para 498 -4- 96 - , ICTR Paul Akayesu - The Prosecutor v. Jean ICTR, . 14 T, 2 - 96.4 - , Judgment, ICTR Paul Akayesu - Jean v. Prosecutor ICTR, September 1998, para 523 ; :ראו גםSylvestre Gacumbitsi v Prosecutor, Judgment, ICTR-2001-64-A,7 July 2006, para 40 . 15 עניין'צבטקוביץ , לעיל ה"ש9 , בפסקאות22 - 23 . אברהם של"ו רשות הרבים "התשפ ה 6 בפסק הדין של ערכאת הערעור של ה־ICTY בעניין קרסטיץ' ישנה הבהרה .למשמעות המונח "חלק מהקבוצה", שמתייחסת לחלק מהותי מאותה קבוצה קביעת ה'מהותיות' מתייחסת, אך אינה מוגבלת, לגודל החלק מהקבוצה. יש להתחשב גם בגודל הכולל של הקבוצה והמידה שבה ה"חלק" בולט בתוכה – האם החלק הספציפי הוא חלק סמלי של הקבוצה הכוללת או חיוני .להישרדותה16 עם זאת, בית המשפט ציין כי יש להתייחס גם להיקף המעשים ולמידת השליטה של .המבצעים באזורים בהם ביצעו את הפשע17 בפסק דין תקדימי שפורסם לאחרונה ,בגרמניה, פעילת דאע"ש הורשעה בגין רצח עם על רצח של ילדה יזידית אחת משום שפעלה במסגרת של תקיפה שיטתית להשמדת המיעוט היזידי בצפון .עיראק18 ד. תיאור היסוד העובדתי– ניתוח מעשי החמאס ב־7 באוקטובר לאחרונה, הקבוצה הפרלמנטרית העל־מפלגתית לקשרי בריטניה־ישראל בראשות הברון אנדרו רוברטס פרסמה את התיעוד המפורט והמקיף ביותר של אירועי ה־7 .באוקטובר שנערך עד כה19 על אף שהאירועים מוכרים בישראל, ישנו צורך לפרט .אותם מעט ב־7 באוקטובר2023 , אלפי מחבלי חמאס חמושים פרצו את גדר הביטחון בעזה .ופלשו לדרום ישראל. הפלישה לוותה במטח של אלפי רקטות שנורו לעבר המדינה ,תוך שימוש במגוון טכנולוגיות וטקטיקות מחבלי חמאס מאומנים היטב פרצו יותר מ־30 נקודות בגדר הביטחון לאורך64 קילומטר. מחבלי החמאס גם עברו את מכשול הגדר וחצו לתוך שטח ישראל באמצעות מצנחי רחיפה. המחבלים התפצלו, כבשו והשתלטו על יותר מעשרים יישובים ישראליים. מחבלים גם תקפו את פסטיבל המוזיקה 'נובה' שהתקיימה ליד היישוב רעים. מטרתם הייתה לרצוח כמה שיותר יהודים. במהלך אותו יום, יותר מ־1,200 ישראלים עונו, הושחתו ונטבחו, כולל נשים, ילדים וקשישים, ויותר מ־200 .נחטפו לעזה20 ,מבחינה יחסית מתקפת ה־7 באוקטובר הייתה הקטלנית ביותר בתולדות מדינת ישראל והשלישית .הקטלנית ביותר בהיסטוריה המודרנית21 מתקפת הרצח של חמאס לוותה גם באלימות מינית ואונס. על פי דוח שפרסם איגוד מרכזי הסיוע לנפגעות ונפגעי תקיפה מינית בישראל, תקיפות מיניות שיטתיות התרחשו באתר פסטיבל נובה, בקיבוצים ובכפרים, בבסיסי צה"ל ונגד חטופים 16 A, 19 August - 33 - 98 - Appeals Judgment, IT Prosecutor v Radislav Krstic, 2004, paras 6-23 . 17 ,שםPara. 13 . 18 Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt am Main. (2021, November 30). Urteil in der Strafsache gegen Taha Al-Jumailly (5-3 StE 3/20) . 19 Israel - UK Party Parliamentary Group for - See All , לעיל ה"ש4. 20 INISTRY OF M SRAELI I , Israel Conflict 2023: Key Legal Aspects - Hamas FOREIGN AFFAIRS, (16.7.2024) ; ראו גםWhat Happened in the October 7th Massacre?, ISRAEL DEFENSE FORCES (16.7.2024) . 21 Hamas’s October 7 Attack: Visualizing the Daniel Byman and others, TUDIES S NTERNATIONAL I TRATEGIC AND S ENTER FOR C , Data (CSIS) (16.7.2024) . רשות הרבים "התשפ ה לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם 7 המוחזקים בשבי. רבות מהתקיפות הללו התבצעו בידי מספר תוקפים ובנוכחות בני משפחה. נשים בפסטיבל שניסו להימלט נרדפו והותקפו כשנתפסו. הדוח מציין גם את הראיות לקשירה וכבילה, וכן להשחתת איברי המין של ילדות, נשים וגברים. 22 דוח של משרד הנציג המיוחד של מזכ"ל האו"ם בנושא אלימות מינית בסכסוך סיכם את ממצאיו לאחר משימה בת שבועיים וחצי בישראל: ,"על בסיס המידע שאסף צוות המשימה ממקורות מרובים ועצמאיים יש יסוד סביר להאמין שאלימות מינית הקשורה לסכסוך התרחשה במהלך תקיפות ה-7 ,באוקטובר במספר מיקומים ברחבי עוטף עזה כולל אונס ואונס קבוצתי, בשלושה מיקומים לפחות. במיקומים השונים של תקיפות ה-7 באוקטובר, צו ות המשימה מצא שמספר גופות עירומות לחלוטין או עירומות חלקית מהמותניים ומטה נמצאו - רובן נשים- עם ידיים קשורות וסימני ירי מרובה, לעתים קרובות בראש. אף שהראיות נסיבתיות, דפוס כזה של הפשטת קורבנות ."וריסונם עשוי להצביע על צורות מסוימות של אלימות מינית23 דו"ח הקבוצה הפרלמנטרית הבריטית מתאר במפורט פשעים שיטתיים של הרג ,חפים מפשע, חטיפה ועינוי חטופים הרג של חיילים שאינם נלחמים(hors de combats) .ואסירים, אלימות מינית, ביזוי גופות, עינויים וביזה ה. תיאור היסוד הנפשי– ניתוח האידאולוגיה החמאסית: כוונה להשמיד יהודים השאלה העיקרית והמורכבת הנדרשת כדי לבסס פשע של רצח העם היא האם המעשים התבצעו מתוך כוונה מיוחדת להשמיד קבוצה "באשר היא כזו". כפי שפסקו באופן עקבי ה־ICJ ובתי דין בין־לאומיים אחרים, ניתן להסיק את קיומה של כוונה מיוחדת הן מתוך ראיות ישירות והן מתוך שיטות פעולה. משום כך, ניתן להוכיח את הכוונה המיוחדת של חמאס להשמיד יהודים מתוך ניתוח של האידאולוגיה החמאסית, מתוך הרטוריקה של מתכנני ומבצעי הטבח, מתוך התכנון הקפדני שלהם ומתוך מעשי ה.זוועה עצמם חמאס היא תנועה סונית אסלאמית ופלסטינית לאומנית. היא התפתחה מתוך תנועת האחים המוסלמים הפלסטינית לארגון עצמאי בשנות ה־80 , והיא מחויבת לאידיאולוגיה של השמדת מדינת ישראל והקמת מדינה אסלאמית בכל שטחי "פלסטין" ההיסטורית. ארגון החמאס מדגיש את הג'יהאד ואת המאבק הא לים .כאמצעים הבלעדיים להשגת מטרה זו24 22 , Association of Rape Sexual Violence Crimes on October 7 - Silent Cry Crisis Centers in Israel (16.7.2024) . 23 General on Sexual Violence in - Special Representative of the Secretary Conflict (SRSG-SVC), Mission report: Official visit of the Office of the SRSG-SVC to Israel and the occupied West Bank 29 January – 14 February 2024, (4 March 2024), UN Doc, para 12 . 24 , The Avalon Project, Article CHOOL S AW L ALE Y , Hamas Covenant 1988 13 (16.7.2024) . אברהם של"ו רשות הרבים "התשפ ה 8 בעוד שתנועות סוניות על פי רוב ממעיטות בחשיבותה של המטרה המיליטריסטית .של הג'יהאד, חמאס העניק למלחמה נגד היהודים משמעות משיחית ואסכטולוגית .השמדת היהודים נדרשת כדי להקים את מלכות האל על פני האדמה25 האמנה המכוננת של החמאס, אותה הוא אימץ באוגוסט1988 , מתייחסת למסורת :אסלאמית לפיה "השעה [קץ הימים] לא תגיע עד שמוסלמים יילחמו ביהודים; עד !שהיהודים יסתתרו מאחורי סלעים ועצים, אשר יקראו: הוי מוסלמי ."...יש יהודי מסתתר מאחוריי, בוא והרוג אותו26 בכירי חמאס ושידוריו הרשמיים של הארגון מבטאים את השקפת העולם הרצחנית ,הזו. מנהיגי החמאס עושים דה־הומניזציה ליהודים כאויבי האל והאסלאם ומתייחסים אליהם לעתים קרובות כ"בני חזירים וקופים", כינוי שמקורו במסורת .האסלאמית27 המלחמה נגדם מתוארת כבעלת אופי דתי וקיומי. היהודים מתוארים כמושחתים ועוינים למוסלמים מטבעם. גורמי חמאס קוראים במפורש להרג של יהודים ומתארים זאת כחובה דתית. ראוי לציין כי הצהרות אלה נעשו לאורך עשרות שנים ובהקשרים שונים, כך שלא ניתן לפטור אותן כרטוריקה לוחמנ ית גרידא. הן .משקפות את ההסתה השיטתית של חמאס לרצח יהודים ולהשמדת מדינת ישראל28 לפי פסיקת ה־ICTY :, ניתן להסיק כוונה לביצוע רצח עם מתוך " ההקשר הכללי, מביצוע מעשים פליליים אחרים המכוונים באופן שיטתי נגד אותה קבוצה, מהיקף הזוועות, מהפגיעה השיטתית בקורבנות בשל השתייכותם לקבוצה מסוימת, או מהחזרה על מעשים."הרסניים ומפלים29 מבחינת היקפם, אופיים חסר ההבחנה, אכזריותם, ההשפלה המעורבת בהם והקשר שלהם לפשעי מלחמה ופשעים נגד האנושות אחרים, אירועי ה־7 באוקטובר כשלעצמם מעידים על כוונת חמאס לרצוח יהודים באשר הם יהודים. חמאס רצח 1,200 ישראלים וביצע מעשי עינויים, השחתה ואלימות מינית ב־30 קהילות ומיקומים. לפחות37 קטינים נהרגו, שישה מהם מתחת לגיל5 , וכן לפחות25 .קשישים30 אופי ההתקפות מעיד על כך שהחמאס הצליח להפוך את היהודים ,ליצורים לא־אנושיים בעיני מחבליו. לפי ד"ר חן קוגל, ראש המכון לרפואה משפטית סריקות של הגופות חשפו סימני עינויים והוצאה להורג: אנשים נשרפו חיים וגופות 25 Litvak , לעיל ה"ש2 ', בעמ727 . 26 Hamas Covenant 1988 , לעיל ה"ש24 , Article 7 . 27 נסים דנה "הרקע לכינוי היהודים, הנוצרים והמוסלמים בכינוי "קופים וחזירים"", בתוך למי ,שייכת הארץ הזאת?: עיון מחודש בקוראן ובמקורות אסלאמיים קלאסיים על עם ישראל תורתו וזיקתו לירושלים .)פרק שמיני (הוצאת אוניברסיטת אריאל שבשומרון, התשע"ד 28 :לפירוט מקיף של ההסתה להשמדת היהודים של בכירי החמאס, ראוAvraham Russell Hamas' October 7th Genocide: Legal Analysis and the Shalev, Weaponization of Reverse Accusations: A Study in Modern Genocide sec. 7.1 (17.3.2025) , EVIEW R AW L SRAEL I, Recognition and Denial . 29 A, 5 July - 10 - 95 - , Appeals Judgement, IT Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic ICTY, 2001, para 47 . 30 , (16.7.2024) ORCES F EFENSE D SRAEL I, Hamas Tactics - October 7 . רשות הרבים "התשפ ה לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם 9 .נמצאו עם ידיים קשורות לפני שהוצאו להורג31 בפסטיבל המוזיקה ברעים, לפחות 347 אזרחים נטבחו, ואחרים נחטפו בכוח לעזה. בקיבוץ בארי, מחבלים נכנסו וטבחו ;משפחות שלמות בבתיהן80% ,מהגופות שהושבו הראו סימני עינויים. גם בשדרות .מחבלים על אופנועים ומשאיות הרגו אזרחים ברחוב, באוטובוסים ובמכוניות32 בפסק הדין אקאייסו , ה־ICTR הכיר בכך שאונס ותקיפה מינית עשויים להוות צורה של רצח עם. במהלך רצח העם ברואנדה, האונס שימש ככלי להשמדה: "[...] נגד נשים מהטוטסי בלבד, שרבות מהן נחשפו להשפלה פומבית חמורה ביותר, הושחתו, ונאנסו מספר פעמים, לעתים קרובות בפומבי, במתחמי המשרד הקומונלי או במקומות ציבוריים אחרים, ולעתים קרובות על ידי יותר מתוקף אחד. מקרי אונס אלה הובילו להרס פיזי ופסיכולוגי של נשים מהטוטסי, משפחותיהן וקהילותיהן. אלימות מינית הייתה חלק בלתי נפרד מתהליך ההשמדה, שכוון באופן ספציפי נגד נשים מהטוטסי ותרם באופן ."ספציפי להשמדתן ולהשמדת קבוצת הטוטסי בכללותה33 אונס היה גם חלק חיוני מרצח העם של מיעוט היזידים בעיראק על ידי מחבלי דאע"ש בשנים2014 - 2015 . 34 למרות שקיומה של תוכנית או מדיניות לביצוע רצח עם אינו מרכיב משפטי של הפשע, הפסיקה הבין־לאומית התייחסה לתוכניות כאלה כראיה מכרעת לכוונה .לבצע רצח עם35 ב־30 בספטמבר2021 , מנהיג חמאס בעזה יחיא סינוואר ארגן כנס בעזה שעסק בהכנות ל"שחרור פלסטין" המיועד. הכנס נקרא "הבטחת העולם הבא", כשהוא מתייחס למשמעות האסכטולוגית של השמדת ישראל. סינוואר הדגיש כי בעקבות מלחמת חמאס־ישראל במאי2021 , "הקרב לשחרור ולשיבה לפלסטין קרוב עתה יותר מאי פעם". עוד הדגיש כי לאחר חורבן ישראל, יהודים ששירתו בצבא יוצאו להורג, בעוד אלה שברחו יישארו לנפשם או יועמדו לדין על 31 'Israel’s ‘Black Sabbath’: Murder, Sexual Anat Peled and Rory Jones, , OURNAL J TREET S ALL W HE T , Violence and Torture on Oct. 7' (31.12.2023) . 32 visualization Project - The October 7th Geo 'Mapping the Massacres', (16.7.2024) https://oct7map.com/ ; the Hamas – Special Announcement MEMRI: Middle East Media , Atrocities Documentation Center (HADC) Research Institute, (17.11.2023) . 33 - 96 - ICTR Trial Judgement, Paul Akayesu, - The Prosecutor v. Jean ICTR, 4-T, 2 September 1998, para 731 . 34 The - Law Rape as Genocide Crime in International Criminal Zeyad Jaffal, Case of Yazidi Women in Iraq 15(2) INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SCIENCES 230-247 (2020) ; Paula Castellano San José, The rapes commited against the Yazidi women: a genocide? A study of the crime of rape as a form of genocide in 18 INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW, Comillas Journal of International Relations (2019) ; Kimberly Lowe Frank, Rape as an Act of Genocide: History and Law, Violence Against Women conference, (Lesley University, 11.9.2018) . 35 Prosecutor v. T; - 10 - 95 - , paras 48, 98; ICTRI T Prosecutor v. Jelisic ICTY Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana, Appeals Judgement, ICTR-95- 1-T, 21 May 1999, para 138; ICTY Prosecutor v. Stakic para 546; ICTY Prosecutor v Vujadin Popovic et al, Judgement, IT-05-88-T, 10 June 2010, paras. 856, 858, 882 . אברהם של"ו רשות הרבים "התשפ ה 10 פשעיהם. יהודים משכילים ומומחים אחרים יוכרחו להישאר עד שישלמו את .חובותיהם לפלסטינים36 ,יש לציין שלפי בעלי סמכות דתית בארגון החמאס, כמו השייח' יוסף קרדאווי ישראל מוגדרת כחברה צבאית שבה כל אזרח הוא חייל פוטנציאלי, כך שההוראה .להרוג "חיילים" מתייחסת לכלל האזרחים היהודים37 למעשה, לפי דיווח בעיתון הארץ, הנהגת החמאס הייתה כה בטוחה בניצחון העתידי של ה־7 באוקטובר שיבוא .בדמות השמדת ישראל, עד שחילק את המדינה לקנטונים שלטוניים38 ניתן להסיק כוונה לבצע רצח עם גם מהצהרות, המוכיחות שהמבצעים בחרו את .הקורבנות בשל השתייכותם לקבוצה אותה הם מבקשים להשמיד39 כוונת חמאס לבצע רצח עם נגד יהודים ישראלים מובעת בבירור בהצהרות שפרסמו מנהיגיו מיד לאחר מתקפת ה־7 באוקטובר. המפקד הצבאי של חמאס מוחמד דף פרסם קריאה ב־7 באוקטובר: " .זה היום שבו אתם גורמים לאויב הפושע הזה להבין שזמנו תם [הקוראן אומר:] "הרגו אותם בכל מקום שתמצאו אותם [...] אני אומר לעמנו בשטחים הכבושים [ישראל שלפני67 ] – ,בנגב, בגליל במשולש, בחיפה, ביפו, בעכו, בלוד וברמלה: הציתו את האדמה תחת רגלי הכובשים השודדים– הרגו, שרפו, השמידו, וחסמו כבישים. גרמו לכובשים הפחדנים להבין שמבול אל- אקצא גדול ."ממה שהם חושבים40 המנהיג הפוליטי של חמאס איסמעיל הנייה גם אמר ביום ההתקפה שהמטרה הייתה .השמדת ישראל ורצח וטיהור אתני של תושביה היהודים41 36 Sponsored ‘Promise of the Hereafter’ Conference for the Phase - Hamas We Following the Liberation of Palestine and Israel’s ‘Disappearance’: Must Differentiate between Jews Who Should and Should Not Be Killed, IDDLE M MEMRI: , and Prevent a Jewish ‘brain Drain’ from Palestine EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (4.10.2021) . 37 Qaradawi and His Impact on the Dissemination of - Sheikh Yusuf Al ERRORISM T NTELLIGENCE AND I MIT A EIR M HE T , Radical Islam INFORMATION CENTER, (23.10.2022) ; For Qaradawi as Hamas' spiritual authority, see SHAUL BARTAL AND NESYA RUBINSTEIN- SHEMER, HAMAS AND IDEOLOGY: SHEIKH YŪSUF AL-QARAḌĀWĪ ON THE JEWS, ZIONISM AND ISRAEL (Routledge, 2017) . 38 Hamas Actually Believed It Would Conquer Israel, and Shlomi Eldar, , (5.4.2024) ARETZ ' A H , Divided It into Cantons . 39 14 T, - 10 - 95 - IT Trial Judgement, Prosecutor v. Goran Jelisic, ICTY, December 1999, para 73; ICTY, Prosecutor v Karadžić (Radovan), Decision on appeal of Trial Chamber's decision on preliminary motion to dismiss count 11 of the indictment, IT-95-5/18-AR72.5, ICL 762, 2009, para 97-99 . 40 Hamas Military Commander Mohammed Deif Announces Launch of Aqsa Deluge, Calls on Palestinians in West Bank, - Operation Al , Jerusalem, and Israel Proper to Attacks with Guns, Knives, Vehicles MEMRI: MIDDLE EAST MEDIA RESEARCH INSTITUTE (8.10.2023) . 41 Jazeera Airs Hamas Leader Ismail Haniyeh’s Statement on Hamas’s - Al רשות הרבים "התשפ ה לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם 11 כוונה זו לא הייתה מוגבלת להנהגת חמאס בלבד. לדוגמה, הקלטות אודיו ששלחו מחבלים שביצעו את הטבח מתפארים: "תראו כמה הרגתי בידיים שלי, הבן שלך ."הרג יהודים [...] עשרה בידיי החשופות. הדם שלהם על הידיים שלי42 ו. קיומם של היסוד העובדתי והיסוד הנפשי גם יחד בפסק דין הערעור בעניין'טאדיץ , ה־ICTY פיתח את דוקטרינת המיזם הפלילי המשותף (JCE) לטיפול באחריות פלילית אישית של מבצעי תכנית משותפת. לפי הדוקטרינה, היסוד העובדתי מורכב מ: (א) ריבוי משתתפים; (ב) תוכנית או מטרה משותפת לביצוע פשע; (ג) השתתפות הנאשם בתכנון המשותף. לגבי היסוד הנפשי, בית המשפט הבחין בין שלוש קטגוריות (להלן: דוקטרינת ה־JCE :) JCE I – ;כל השותפים חולקים כוונה משותפת לבצע פשע מסויםJCE II – לכולם ;ידיעה אישית על שיטת התעללות והכוונה לקדמהJCE III – לכולם יש כוונה להשתתף ולקדם מטרה פלילית, כאשר יש סבירות שפשעים עלולים להתבצע על .ידי חברי הקבוצה והסיכון הזה מקובל על כולם43 ערכאת הערעור החילה את דוקטרינת ה־ JCE בעניין'טאדיץ , כדי להטיל את .האחריות להריגת חמישה גברים על מבצעים שהיו בתחתית היררכיית הפיקוד טאדיץ' השתתף בהתקפה האלימה על כפר לא־סרבי, בעוד שחלקו הישיר בהריגת הגברים לא היה ברור. לפי ערכאת הערעור, טאדיץ' התכוון לקדם את המטרה הפלילית של טיהור אתני של האזור מאוכלוסייתו הלא־סרבית באמצעות מעשים לא־אנושיים נגדם, והוא נטל ביודעין את הסיכון שיש צפי לכך ששותפיו עלולים .להרוג אנשים שאינם סרבים במסגרת התוכנית המשותפת שלהם44 בהחלת דוקטרינת ה־JCE ע ל פעולות החמאס ב־7 באוקטובר2023 , המסגרת המתאימה ביותר היא,JCE I שבה כל השותפים חולקים כוונה משותפת לבצע רצח עם נגד יהודים ישראלים. הנהגת חמאס הפגינה כוונה זו באמצעות הצהרות מפורשות, כמו קריאתו של דף ב־7 באוקטובר "להרוג אותם בכל מקום שתמצאו אותם", וכן דרך תכנון מבצעי, כפי שעולה ממסמכים שנתפסו ובהם הוראות ללוחמים לרצוח נשים וילדים. האידיאולוגיה השורשית של הארגון, המעוגנת באמנה של שנת1988 בקריאה "למחוק" את ישראל, וכן החינוך הצבאי של לוחמיו במשך עשורים, מצביעים בוודאות על כך שגם מחבלים בדרגים נמוכים יותר של ארגון החמאס פעלו בהתאם למטרה משותפת זו. הטבח המתואם של1,200 ישראלים ב־22 יישו בים ובפסטיבל הנובה, שהתאפיין בפגיעה שיטתית ביהודים, מספק גם את היסוד העובדתי של Invasion of Southern Israel: I Call on Palestinians in the West Bank, Israeli Arabs, and the Entire Nation Abroad to Join the Battle; to the EDIA M AST E IDDLE M MEMRI: , Enemy I Say: Get out of Our Land!” RESEARCH INSTITUTE (8.10.2023) . 42 , Listen: "your Son Killed 10 Jews", Hamas Terrorist Tells Gazan Parents THE JERUSALEM POST (24.10.2023) . 43 A, paras -1- 94 - Appeals Judgment, IT Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, ICTY, 227,228 . 44 A, para 232 -1- 94 - , Appeal Judgment, IT Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic ICTY, ff . אברהם של"ו רשות הרבים "התשפ ה 12 הריגה וגרימת נזק חמור וגם את היסוד הנפשי הקולקטיבי להשמיד את הקבוצה ""באשר היא כזו. המבנה הריכוזי של חמאס וההתניה האידיאולוגית הנרחבת מצדיקים ייחוס כוונה רצחנית לכלל החברים בארגון, ממנהיגי החמאס הבכירים ועד לפעילים בדרגים ,נמוכים. גם אם חלק מהלוחמים לא הבינו לעומק את הרעיון של רצח עם השתתפותם הנלהבת, כפי שעולה מהקלטות אודיו המתפארות בהריגת יהודים "בידיים שלי", משקפת הסכמה להוראות ההנהגה. סיכום טבח ה־7 באוקטובר היה אירוע מכונן בתולדות מדינת ישראל ובתולדות העם היהודי. הוא חשף בפני העולם את המציאות האכזרית שמחוללת האידיאולוגיה האנטישמית של חמאס, אשר רואה ביהודים מטרה להשמדה רק בשל היותם יהודים. כפי שהודגם במאמר, התשתית המשפטית להעמדה לדין של מבצעי הטבח בגין רצח עם היא איתנה, הן במשפט הישראלי והן במשפט הבין־לאומי. העמדה לדין של מבצעי הטבח אינה רק חובה משפטית, אלא גם אקט של צדק היסטורי. כפי שמשפט אייכמן היווה נקודת מפנה בזיכרון השואה ובתודעה הלאומית והבין־לאומית, כך גם משפט פומבי של מבצעי טבח ה־7 באוקטובר יכול לשמש כלי רב עוצמה לשימור הזיכרון, לחשיפת האמת, ולמאבק בהכ חשה ובאנטישמיות הגואות ברחבי העולם. מדינת ישראל עומדת בפני הזדמנות היסטורית לקבע את האמת המשפטית וההיסטורית אודות אירועי ה־7 באוקטובר. עליה לממש את חובתה המשפטית והמוסרית, ולהעמיד לדין את מבצעי הטבח בגין הפשע החמור ביותר במשפט הבין־לאומי– רצח עם. בכך, היא לא רק תביא צדק לקורבנות ולמשפחותיהם , אלא גם תתרום תרומה משמעותית למאבק העולמי נגד שנאת יהודים ופשעים נגד האנושות. זוהי חובתנו לדורות הבאים: להבטיח שהאמת תיזכר, הצדק ייעשה, והלקחים .יילמדו, כדי שאירועים כאלה לא יישנו לעולם אזכור מוצע: אברהם של"ו "לא רק טרור אלא רצח עם: החובה המשפטית והמוסרית להעמיד לדין את מבצעי טבח ב־7 "באוקטובר רשות הרבים ( 20.4.2025 .) עובדות המקרה– רצח העם של היזידים א .הערה מקדימה בשנת2023 הכיר הבונדסטאג(הפרלמנט הפדרלי של גרמניה ) בכך שמעשי ארגון הטרור המדינה האסלאמית(דאעש ) שבוצעו בשנת2014 נגד נשים וגברים מבני העדה היזידית מהווים רצח עם. ב .העובדות במסגרת שאיפתו להקים ח’ ליפות אסלאמית עולמית , ארגון הטרור הבינלאומי"המדינה האסלאמית( "דאעש ,) אשר פעל בשטחי סוריה ועיראק ,רדף את בני המיעוט הדתי היזידי ,המתגוררים בעיקר באזור סינג'אר בצפון עיראק , ואשר הוגדרו על ידו כ"כופרים ." לשם השמדת דתם של היזידים– היזידיות– וקהילתם ,לוחמי דאעש בי צעו בלילה שבין2 ל- 3 באוגוסט2014 התקפה צבאית מתוכננת ,מאורגנת ומתואמת כנגד היזידים שבאזור סינג'אר ,בכוונה תחילה . בעקבות אותה התקפה ,דאעש אילץ את הגברים היזידים להתאסלם ,כפה עליהם עבודת כפייה ,שיעבד נשים וילדות יזידיות , וביצע טבח נרחב בבני העדה. במהלך השת לטותו על אזור סינג' אר באוגוסט2014 ,המשיך דאעש ביישום שיטות הלחימה הטרוריסטיות שלו . בכל מקום שבו הצליח להשתלט ,נהגו אנשיו באכזריות קיצונית כלפי לוחמים אויבים ואוכלוסייה אזרחית . מאז סתיו2013 בוצעו הוצאות להורג פומביות בירי ובעריפת ראש , כאשר במקרים מסוימים הוצגו ראשי הקורבנות כשהם נעוצים במסמרים ,ואף הוצגו ברשת האינטרנט .מאז הכרזת הח’ ליפות ביוני2014 ,נשרפו , הוטבעו או פוצצו חיים מתנגדים שונים. הנאשם , אשר שהה בעיר רקה שבסוריה מאז מרץ2015 ושימש שם כראש"משרד הרוקיה( " משרד העוסק בגירוש שדים וריפוי על פי תפיסו ת דתיות אסלאמיות ,) רכש ביוני2015 את העדה א ' – אישה יזידית– ואת בתה בת החמש ב ,' אשר נשבו על ידי דאעש במסגרת ההתקפה על סינג' אר בקיץ2014 .הוא העבירן לעיר פלוג'ה שבעיראק , שם הוחזקו בכפייה בביתו במשך מספר שבועות ,יחד עם עדה נוספת ג.' הנאשם שלט לחלוטין בחייה ן של העדות ,אסר עליהן לצאת מהבית , והכה אותן מדי יום במטרה להשליט בהן פחד וצייתנות מוחלטת .כתוצאה מכך ,חיו העדות בפחד מתמיד ממנו וסבלו פיזית ונפשית במידה חמורה ביותר . הנאשם אסר עליהן לשתות או לאכול באופן עצמאי ,מנע מהן גישה למזון שבמקרר ,ואיפשר להן לשתות רק מים חמים מן הברז בשל הטמפרטורות הגבוהות באזור . המזון שסופק להן היה מועט ופשוט– לרוב אורז ,פסטה , ביצים או לחמניות– ולא הספיק לצורכיהן ,עד כי העדה א 'ויתרה על חלק ממנתה כדי להאכיל את בתה. הנאשם אסר עליהן להשתמש בחומרי ניקוי לצורכי כביסה או רחצה ,והקצה את חדר האמבטיה לשימושו בלבד . הן הורשו להתרחץ רק בכיור שבחצר .בנוסף ,הנאשם אילץ את העדה א ' ואת בתה לקיים תפילות מוסלמיות בזמנים קבועים ,להקריא פסוקים מן הקוראן ,ולהתעטף בלבוש מוסלמי מלא בכל יציאה מהבית . הוא אף שינה את שמה של הילדה ב ' לשם מוסלמי" א "על מנת למ חוק את זהותן הדתית היזידית. במקרה אחר קשר הנאשם את הילדה בת החמש לסורגי חלון הבית כשהיא עומדת יחפה תחת השמש היוקדת , כעונש על כך שרטבה במיטה בשל מחלה .הילדה סבלה ממכת חום ומתה .מותה היה צפוי והנאשם היה מודע לכך . לאחר מכן נלקח הנאשם למעצר על ידי אנשי דאעש , מאחר שגם לפי"חוקי "הארגון נאסר להרוג שפחה ללא הצדקה , אך שוחרר כעבור זמן קצר. עמדת בית המשפט העליון בפרנקפורט בנוגע להרשעת רצח עם (כפי שאושרה על ידי בית המשפט הפדרלי העליון – הערכאה הגבוהה ביותר בגרמניה) מבוא הנאשם הורשע בעבירת רצח עם לפי סעיף 6(1) מס’ 2 לחוק המשפט הפלילי הבין־לאומי הגרמני (Völkerstrafgesetzbuch – VStGB), ונגזר עליו עונש מאסר עולם. בית המשפט דחה את האפשרות להכיר במקרה כ”מקרה פחות חמור” לפי סעיף 6(2) לחוק, אשר אף לו היה מתקבל – היה מביא רק להקלה בעונש. לפיכך, גם לפי סעיף זה, נושא הנאשם באשמה מלאה בביצוע עבירת רצח עם. בגרמניה קיימים מספר קובצי חקיקה פלילית. הדין ה פלילי הכללי מצוי בספר החוקים הפלילי הגרמני (StGB), אך קיימים גם חוקים מיוחדים לעבירות מסוימות. אחד מחוקים אלה הוא ה־VStGB – חוק העונשין הבין־לאומי, המסדיר עבירות בינלאומיות חמורות כגון רצח עם, פשעים נגד האנושות ופשעי מלחמה. חוק זה נכנס לתוקף ביום 30 ביוני 2002, ומטרתו להחיל את עקרונות המשפט הפלילי הבין־לאומי בגרמניה – ובראשם את הפללת רצח העם, הנחשב ל”פשע שבפשעי האדם”. עוד קודם לכן נקבעה עבירת רצח העם גם ב־StGB, אך הועתקה במלואה אל ה־VStGB לשם יצירת מסגרת משפטית ייחודית. סעיף 6 לחוק העונשין הבין־לאומי – “צח ר עם” סעיף 6(1) קובע: “מי שבכוונה להשמיד, כולה או מקצתה, קבוצה לאומית, אתנית, גזעית או דתית, מבצע אחד מן המעשים הבאים: 1. הורג חבר בקבוצה; 2. גורם לחבר בקבוצה נזק גופני או נפשי חמור; 3. מעמיד את הקבוצה בתנאי חיים העלולים להביא להשמדתה; 4. נוקט צעדים שמטר תם למנוע לידות בתוך הקבוצה; 5. מעביר ילד מן הקבוצה לקבוצה אחרת בכפייה – דינו מאסר עולם.” סעיף 6(2) מוסיף כי במקרים פחות חמורים (ס"ק 2–5), העונש הוא לא פחות מחמש שנות מאסר. בהתאם לעקרון ה”סמכות השיפוט האוניברסלית” (Weltrechtsprinzip), גרמניה מוסמכת לדון כל ב עבירת רצח עם – ללא קשר למקום ביצועה או לזהות הקורבנות והעבריינים. סעיף 1(1) לחוק קובע כי החוק חל על כל העבירות הכלולות בו, גם כאשר אין להן קשר טריטוריאלי לגרמניה. אחריות פלילית של הנאשם לפי סעיף 6(1)(2) VStGB בית המשפט קבע כי סעיף זה מנוסח בהרחבה יחסי ת לפסיקה הבין־לאומית, ונועד להקל על הוכחת כוונת רצח העם – וזאת לאור לקחי תקופת שלטון הנאצים. לפיכך, די בכך שנגרם לחבר בקבוצה “נזק גופני או נפשי חמור” כדי לקיים את יסודות העבירה. לשם פרשנות הביטוי "נזק חמור", מפנה החוק לסעיף 226 ל־StGB, הקובע בין השאר כי זק נ חמור הוא: • אובדן ראייה, שמיעה, דיבור או כושר הפריה; • אובדן או שיתוק קבוע של איבר חיוני; • עיוות קבוע, מחלה, שיתוק או נכות נפשית. בהתאם לפסיקה הבין־לאומית (לדוגמה: Prosecutor v. Krstić, ICTY, 2.8.2001, פסקה 513), נזק חמור פירושו גרימת סבל פיזי או נפשי רציני, מעבר לאי־נוחות זמנית או השפלה, שיש בו כדי לפגוע לטווח ארוך ביכולת האדם לחיות חיים נורמליים ובעלי משמעות. מסקנת בית המשפט בית המשפט אישר את ההרשעה לפי סעיף 6(1)(2) (נזק חמור), אך דחה הרשעה לפי סעיף 6(1)(1) (הריגה), משום שלא הוכחה כוונת רצח מלאה (dolus directus). נקבע כי הנאשם פעל לשם ענישה והתעללות, לא לשם הריגה, ולכן היעדר “כוונה ישירה להרוג” שולל אחריות לפי סעיף 1. עם זאת, הנאשם הורשע משום שגרם נזק גופני חמור לבת החמש ב’ ונזק נפשי חמור לאמה א’, מתוך כוונה להשמיד חלק מן הקבוצה הדתית היזידית. היס וד העובדתי של העבירה האם ובתה היו חברות בקבוצה דתית מזוהה – היזידים – ולכן מוגנות לפי החוק. הנזק שנגרם להן נחשב לנזק חמור, הן במובן הפיזי (לּבת) והן במובן הנפשי (לאם), משום שפגע לצמיתות ביכולתן לחיות חיים נורמליים. בית המשפט השווה זאת למקרים שנדונו בבית הדין הפלילי הבין־לאומי ליוגוסלביה (Prosecutor v. Tolimir, ICTY 2015), שם נקבע כי עצם חוויית אובדן ילד וחרדה מתמשכת לגורלו מהווים נזק נפשי חמור במובן של רצח עם. היסוד הנפשי של העבירה (הכוונה להשמדה) הנאשם פעל במודעות מלאה לכך שהאם והילדה היו יזידיות, וביצ ע את מעשיו בכוונה לגרום להן סבל גופני ונפשי קשה. בית המשפט קבע כי מעשיו נבעו מהזדהות אידיאולוגית עם האידיאולוגיה של דאעש, שראתה ביזידים קבוצה כופרת שיש להשמידה לשם הקמת ח’ליפות אסלאמית. אף על פי שהנאשם הפיק תועלת אישית (עבודות כפייה של האם), הדבר אינו ר סות את המניע ההשמדתי, שהיה טבוע בהתנהלותו הכוללת. במכלול הנסיבות – ובייחוד: ההתעללות המתמשכת, ההכאות, ההרעבה, הרצחת הילדה, מניעת ידיעת גורלה מהאם, כפייה דתית לשנות אמונה, שם ולבוש – נקבע כי הנאשם פעל בכוונה ישירה להשמיד חלק מהקבוצה הדתית, במובן החברתי־ תרבות י שלה, וזאת לשם קידום יעדי דאעש. קביעות נוספות של בית המשפט מעשיו של הנאשם חיזקו את מדיניות דאעש לשעבד נשים וילדים יזידים, לפגוע בזהותם הדתית ולהעבירם בכפייה מאזורים יזידיים לסוריה ולעיראק. בית המשפט ציין כי “הרצון להשמיד” ניכר לא רק במעשי האלימות עצמם, אלא גם בהכחשת זהות הקורבנות ובניסיון למחוק את תרבותם הדתית. הנאשם המשיך לאחר מכן בפעילות למען דאעש גם בטורקיה, מה שמחזק את ההבנה כי מעשיו נבעו מאמונה אידיאולוגית עמוקה ולא ממניע אישי בלבד. סיכום בית המשפט בפרנקפורט קבע כי: • הנאשם אשם בעבירת רצח עם לפי עיף ס 6(1)(2) לחוק העונשין הבין־לאומי. • הוא גרם נזק גופני חמור לילדה ב’, ונזק נפשי חמור לאם א’, מתוך כוונה להשמיד חלק מהקבוצה הדתית היזידית. • בית המשפט הדגיש כי אף שמעשה הרצח עצמו לא נעשה בכוונת הריגה ישירה, הרי שכלל מעשיו התקיימו במסגרת כוונת השמדה אידיאו לוגית בהתאם לדוקטרינה של דאעש. על כן נגזר עליו מאסר עולם, וההרשעה אושרה גם בבית המשפט הפדרלי העליון של גרמניה.