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Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 Available online 14 September 2021 0160-791X/© 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). The future of labor unions in the age of automation and at the dawn of AI Gadi Nissim a,1, Tomer Simon b,*,1 a Ruppin Academic Center, Israel b Tel Aviv University, Israel A R T I C L E I N F O Keywords: Automation Artificial intelligence Future of work Unions A B S T R A C T The COVID-19 crisis has accelerated an already-ongoing process of massive digitalization in economic produc­ tion and services. AI and robotics are getting, for the first time, autonomous and self-learning, with human-like capabilities. The discussion about digitalization and the future of work has become even more imperative. So far, labor unions were the leading institutions representing employees. However, the rising possibility of human substitution by intelligent machines puts in question the feasibility of labor unions’ policies. This development undermines their traditional power sources, which depend on the membership of masses of paid workers and on their ability to stop production. In this context, this paper aims to discuss the challenges confronting unions in capitalist democracies. Most scholarly literature on labor relations has embraced the assumption that the digital revolution will eventually bring new, better jobs. We suggest considering an alternative scenario, namely, a digital revolution that causes mass replacement of human workers and structural, technological unemployment, which might expand our point of view, particularly for designing public policy. We suggest that unions now have two crucial roles. The first is to safeguard workers’ rights and interests in the transition from an economy based on paid labor to an economy based on automated-autonomous production; and second, they should transform their primary calling from representing employees to representing the social rights of all citizens, and particu­ larly the material interests of lay people. 1. Introduction The world has been traversing a global health crisis that has forced governments everywhere to take unprecedented actions in an attempt to stop the spread of the SARS-CoV-2 virus (COVID-19 or coronavirus) and its variants. These actions have included closing borders to ground and air travel, closing schools and universities, shopping malls, production and manufacturing facilities, and requiring people to practice social distancing and undergo quarantines and full lockdowns. Companies in numerous countries have been required to change their work procedures to safeguard the health of their employees, which has led to remote work, often from home. Although many hi-tech companies previously allowed employees to work from home occasionally, it was extremely rare to find companies that operated fully and continuously in this mode. Companies are not the only entities modifying how they operate; educational institutions also closed their campuses and shifted to remote learning. The entire global healthcare sector changed, as doctors and nurses were forced to protect themselves and to provide remote- healthcare services to people infected with Covid-19 and those in quarantine. This abrupt change has forced organizations to adapt and create ways for their employees and students to continue to work and learn. The coronavirus crisis has significantly accelerated the adoption of digital technologies to allow “remote life” en masse (i.e., working, learning, and interacting using online technologies) so that people can continue to work, meet, communicate, collaborate, learn, and access information. Organizations are experiencing an extremely rapid digital transformation through the adoption and implementation of advanced technologies. The accelerated pace of implementing digital technologies and allowing different modes of work has also advanced the “future of work” more rapidly than anticipated. These changes have attracted the attention of many scholars, analysts, and influencers. In this context, this article focuses on how labor unions are being affected by this accelerated transition in the workplace. Taking a broad view of the multiple measures that governments and employers have undertaken to cope during the COVID-19 pandemic, * Corresponding author. Tel Aviv University, Address: 13 Arazim St., Mevaseret Zion, Israel. E-mail address: [email protected] (T. Simon). 1 Both authors contributed equally to this work. Contents lists available at ScienceDirect Technology in Society journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/techsoc https://doi.org/10.1016/j.techsoc.2021.101732 Received 6 August 2020; Received in revised form 2 September 2021; Accepted 4 September 2021 Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 2 four clear observations can be made. The first is that digital technology enables more tasks to be done with less human labor. The second is that digital platforms may offer people the opportunity to work and earn money, but often do not provide them with material security, job se­ curity, or the fulfillment that many traditional jobs gave them. The third is that massive structural-technological unemployment is not a dysto­ pian vision, but a reasonable expectation. The fourth is that govern­ ments will take on the crucial role in guaranteeing the material security of citizens, which means that we cannot solely rely on market logic, but need to embed it within a social rationale. In this context, we wish to discuss the role of unions. They were a key institutional player of the political-economic order that ripened in the developed countries between the mid-1940s and the mid-1970s. At that time, they represented large segments of the workforce and covered many workers under collective agreements. They provided welfare services and had a significant impact on macro social-economic policy. In fact, they were part of the organization of capitalism [1]. However, since the late-1970s unions have played a minor role in the post-Fordist and neoliberal order. Union density2 has dramatically declined in most countries [2]. Unions were constricted by business corporations and restricted by governmental policies. They were not relevant to emerging branches of the economy, such as hi-tech and others. They lost power and resources, and therefore were not able to provide their members with benefits and services, as they had done previously [3]; pp. 6–13). Since the global economic crisis of 2008 and the rise of more techno­ logically sophisticated modes of employment, the question of the role to be played by unions has re-emerged, particularly as the vulnerability of large populations of working people becomes evident [4]; pp. 25–29). The extensive scholarly writing on digital technology and the labor market in fields of labor studies, sociology, and labor law has focused on platform capitalism and how it is intertwined with the gig economy. The gig economy is perceived as the next evolution in the labor market and is expected to be a transitional phase, or a type of “grace period,” from the current economy to a fully digitalized economy. However, the COVID-19 pandemic and the accompanying social distancing requirements heavily affected the gig economy [5], which is based on interpersonal in­ teractions mediated by a digital platform. For example, ride-sharing platforms such as Uber and Lyft have experienced a drastic decrease in use [6]. In some countries, ride-sharing platforms have ceased oper­ ations altogether to help stop the spread of the coronavirus [7], and some governments have banned ride-sharing [8]. The COVID-19 crisis has highlighted the risks and insecurities for those who work via gig platforms and rely on them as their main source of income [9,10]. However, some gig economy platforms have been experiencing a sig­ nificant increase in the demand for work and employees. For example, the social distancing measures and the mass closure of businesses have forced people to use delivery services on a massive scale [11]. It would appear, then, that the prospects of the gig economy are more limited than what was heretofore assumed. However, the COVID-19 crisis has had another, much more dramatic effect, in the form of massive job loss, layoffs, and unpaid leaves for millions of people around the world [12]. Retail, hotels and hospitality, airlines, travel and tourism, sporting events, restaurants, theaters, and concerts are all sectors that have been heavily affected [13,14]. The US has experienced the highest rates of job loss since 1948, a rate 50% higher than during the 2008 financial crisis [15,16]. These massive layoffs exerted enor­ mous stress on governments. This was especially apparent in the un­ employment and welfare agencies that had to handle unprecedented numbers of requests in a very short time [17]. Given the need to maintain strict social distancing, governments were also quickly adopting and implementing digital tools and solutions to be able to continue to function and support their citizens during this time of crisis. Major crises have long been powerful forces for change and have accelerated innovation and the creation and adoption of new technol­ ogies and ways to work. Following the 2008 financial crisis, the pro­ fessional world experienced a resurgence of the gig economy, driven globally by digital platforms such as Airbnb and Uber. The coronavirus crisis may also be the harbinger of fast-paced changes, driven by digital technologies, that will affect all aspects of our lives. The current mode of so-called “remote living” may become the new norm for numerous or­ ganizations worldwide, even after the coronavirus crisis has ended. The combination of massive layoffs, the inability of workers to access their workplaces, and the augmentation and replacement of human labor by digital technologies, especially Artificial Intelligence (AI), imply that the current changes in the labor market may not be tempo­ rary, but rather a prologue of a deeper transformation that might force masses of people to take up nonstandard jobs or face unemployment. The digital age has arrived faster than expected and is accelerating, and the result will be the mass replacement of human labor by automated labor. Traditionally, unions have been the main institutions that repre­ sented workers. How can unions stay relevant in this new context? What can they contribute in this new era, which may be characterized by a continuous reduction of their membership? These are the main ques­ tions addressed herein. 2. Goals and underlying assumptions Before developing the discussion, there is a need to state our as­ sumptions and points of departure for this article: • The goal of the present paper is to discuss two significant upcoming challenges that will confront unions in capitalist democracies and post-industrial societies. The first is the role of unions in the transi­ tion from an economy based on paid labor to an economy based on automated production. The second is unions’ new vision regarding how to position themselves, as the jobless economy becomes a reality. • The labor market scenario we present here is the most radical and remains under debate. However, we believe that unions must be prepared for it. Scholars do not necessarily agree about the extent of the future transformation of work, but a broad consensus exists that the change will be transformative [18].3 • AI is unlike previous technological breakthroughs in that it in­ troduces autonomy and autonomous capabilities, using hardware and software, that were not possible before. 3. Methods The purpose of this paper is to substantiate the aforementioned goals as we analyze the issue of job automation and its impact on the labor market. This is achieved through the integration of two research methodologies – intuitive logics, which is a branch of scenario planning, and a rigorous literature review of the contextual environment in times of disruption and change. Scenario planning methods are designed to achieve the following objectives: “1) enhancing the understanding of the causal processes, connections and logical sequences underlying events - thus uncovering how a future state of the world may unfold; 2) challenging the con­ ventional thinking and the common perceptions in organizations; and therefore - 3) improving decision making-making process in those 2 Union density is calculated as the rate of workers of the total workforce who are registered members of a trade union, as well as the total rate of workers who are covered by collective agreements signed by unions. 3 Given the new developments in the field of AI and automation, we do not refer here to literature about these technologies that were published prior to 2013, which is when the current debate about these issues was launched by Ref. [18]. G. Nissim and T. Simon Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 3 organizations” [19]; p. 633; [20]. We use the intuitive logics method as described by Wright et al. [19] to refute the long-held assumptions regarding the impact of advanced technology (AI and robotics) on jobs and on the labor market. The intuitive logics method is useful in situations in which past experiences are discontinued or disrupted, and “as a way of exploring alternative futures … in situations of extreme uncertainty when analytic and developmental approaches fail to capture the full range of possibilities” [21]; p. 505). In this paper the intuitive logics is also used to perform a kind of “wind tunneling” testing to our main claim, and to introduce a new agenda and how it may materialize in the near and long-term future [22]. 4. The prolonged discussion about technological progress and its social implications Any discussion about the implications of automation and AI for production and service processes must begin with a broad discussion of the impact of technological innovations on economic progress, and why the implications of the current breakthroughs are revolutionary. The debate about the implications of technological innovations on the labor market is not new. Early in 1930, the notable economist John Maynard Keynes wrote about the economic and social conditions a century ahead of his time, and the road to get there. Keynes claimed that the modern world, since the early days of the first industrial revolution, was accompanied by pessimistic visions of the future. The fear of dire consequences of economic development led to two radical movements: the reactionaries who wished to halt progress by avoiding any active measures to improve the economy, and the revolutionaries who saw no alternative but violent action to transform society. Unlike these voices, Keynes envisioned an optimistic yet realistic future. He saw the eco­ nomic and social problems of his times not as pathologies but as “growing pains of over-rapid changes” [23] [1930], p. 358). Keynes stated that capital accumulation and technological leaps would enable a level of production high above what the growing population could consume. He also predicted that advanced technology would make part of the human workforce redundant. However, he stated that would not be a problem, as people would work fewer hours and they would work for the sake of their well-being, not their material security. The debate about technological leaps and the future of society re- emerged in the 1960s when growing automation led to optimistic views of new possibilities that freed workers from their routine jobs, while concerns were also raised regarding workers’ health, structural unemployment, and other issues. One possible solution was automation funds, which were to be jointly administered by unions and employers to support workers during this transition [24]. David Ben Gurion, the founding father of the modern State of Israel, wrote the following in December 1969 (translated from the Hebrew): “… advanced technolo­ gies … will enable only one worker that is using cutting-edge techno­ logical tools to perform the work that now requires ten workers or more. And in my opinion, it demands a complete revolution in all occupations, and it depends on the government,” [25]. Based on the literature and data that we examined, we claim that the dramatic technological advancement of the present times will neces­ sarily lead to an extensive change, accompanied by two kinds of strains – temporary strains, which characterize the transition phase from the current economy into a completely digital economy, and structural strains that refer to endemic, permanent, social problems that the digital economy is likely to bring about. Each type requires different interventions. 5. What is a job and how can it be automated? Understanding the scope of this revolution and the interventions we suggest requires an in-depth account of job automation. A common approach to this issue is first to understand the types of tasks people do for each job and to divide them into a sequence of actions, and then to estimate the level of automation that could be applied to each task [26]. Usually, a person’s job combines different types of tasks, so, as Gibbs [27] stated, “the effect of technology on job design rests on a substitute-complement continuum.” Therefore, the concept of automa­ tion may be applied to an entire job or only to specific tasks within that job, whether it is done at home or in the workplace [28,29]. An unprecedented number of jobs are under threat of being made obsolete by technologies, including many skilled and non-manual jobs that were previously considered to be immune [30]. Such tasks include both routine and non-routine activities4 (Fig. 1). Until now, human labor has most often been replaced for routine tasks (physical or cognitive), which are more easily automated. But recently, human labor has begun to be replaced by rapidly advancing AI technologies, including for non-routine tasks (social and abstract), which have heretofore been perceived as harder to automate [27,31–33]. Today, the evidence more strongly supports the replacement thesis. The current development of automation is revolutionary due to its potentially extraordinary scope. Automation now encompasses not only routine tasks (physical and cognitive) but also non-routine tasks, so that many tasks and activities can be accomplished with minimal human intervention or supervision [29]. The major driver of automation is the rise of new computer hardware enabling the treatment of enormous amounts of data, which opened the gates to AI and machines that can learn algorithms [28]. Today, AI-enabled hardware allows robots to have delicate and much safer in­ teractions with humans when operating alongside them [26]. Service (social) robots, for example, such as personal-care robots, operate side-by-side with humans. Hospitals around the world have started deploying and using robots to provide remote care and treatment to coronavirus patients, which enabled continuity of care while protecting the medical and public healthcare staff [34]. Robots of this type have a real chance of further evolving into largely autonomous machines that will gradually replace human labor. Or, in the words of Autor and Sal­ omon [35]; the new automation technologies are “labor displacing” because they “reduce labor’s share of aggregate output.” Fig. 1. Types of tasks in a job. 4 In this article we choose to conduct the discussion on a task level, addressing whether it is routine or non-routine, rather than on a profession level as done by Eden and Gaggel [110], p. 8) because no profession is purely non-routine or routine. G. Nissim and T. Simon Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 4 6. Understanding the revolutionary transformation Advanced economies are currently undergoing a massive wave of technological change that may usher in major social implications. To­ day’s economy is experiencing what is known as the fourth industrial revolution, which began in 2013. This revolution is characterized by the use of advanced technologies involving AI, robotics, and the internet of things to automate tasks and jobs. The machines (hardware and/or software based) are becoming, for the first time, autonomous and able to learn. Prior to 2013, and contrary to previous waves of technological innovation in which technology was envisioned as augmenting people, the aim of the new technologies was to replace people [26]. Since 2013, the newest technologies can offer new “superhuman” capabilities that improve productivity, efficiency, and flexibility beyond what humans are capable of doing [26,36,37]. The conclusion is that more human workers are replaceable, and hence we are facing a much greater chal­ lenge than retraining the workforce to adapt to new production pro­ cesses [38]. We are facing a massive structural-technological unemployment: “this time new emerging jobs might not be able to compensate jobs endangered by the new technology” [28]. Some recent papers reject the scenario of massive job replacement by automation, and claim that augmentation is much more likely [35,39]. However, we should be skeptical about these studies because their data were acquired prior to 2007, an era in which AI technology was not available for industrial use and robots were much simpler than today [40].5 7. Predictions regarding job automation So far, we have discussed two opposing predictions regarding the effect of automation on jobs: replacement and augmentation. The replacement thesis broadly predicts “the collapse of the ‘full employ­ ment’ norm to which all developed economies have become accus­ tomed” [30]; p. 12). The augmentation thesis leads to a more moderate prediction: “we are likely to face substantial turbulence as careers and industries are disrupted all across the economy before the hoped-for ‘new jobs’ emerge in sufficient numbers” (p. 11). These opposing predictions have prompted abundant research assessing the relative probability of human replacement or augmenta­ tion by automation. These studies refer to the entire labor market, or specific branches or occupations within. In 2013, Frey and Osborne published the first comprehensive report on the potential and proba­ bility of the automation of more than 700 different jobs [18]. Brandes and Wattenhofer [28] extended their work by analyzing the tasks that comprise each job and calculating the probability of automation of each.6 By using O*Net historical data for the period 2001–2015, re­ searchers showed that jobs with a high probability of automation had already started showing a decrease in demand for employment during this time [28,41]. This was also validated on a national level, albeit with local variabilities [42,43]. Whereas these two reports provide a high-level overview of the po­ tential of automation, other studies have focused on specific domains and industries. Mass production industries are clearly the most inclined to be automated, and their workers are more likely to be replaced by AI- driven industrial robots [44]. The oil and gas industry have started adopting advanced automation technologies that reduce the need for human labor on ocean rigs [45]. Occupations that require enormous amounts of information to be performed (knowledge workers) have a high potential for improved efficiency by using AI, which would allow the automation of major routine processes [46]. In the medical and clinical domains, for instance, AI and robotics may automate the diag­ nosis, screening, and even counseling procedures. The US FDA has already approved more than 64 AI technologies to augment physicians’ work [47]. In the medical imaging domain, numerous tasks and tests can be automated by using AI for image recognition (e.g., for pathological tests) [46]. As the COVID-19 pandemic spread, AI technologies have been used to assist and augment the work of public health professionals and medical doctors for screening and diagnosis [48–50]. Automation and AI will transform other fields, one of which is the function of governance in organizations, particularly human resources, where AI and robotics may make the regular management supervision and guidance of humans redundant and eliminate the need for the traditional recruiting functions of human resources [51]. Another domain is the banking industry, which could leverage AI and robotics in various occupations and roles, starting from the contact-center and extending to front-desk tellers [52], with predictions that by 2030, 70% of front-office jobs (tellers, loan officers, customer service etc.) will be replaced by AI [53]. It appears, then, that automation and AI are certain to have a large impact of vast scope on multiple sectors and will likely penetrate deeply into domains that were heretofore considered immune. This will chal­ lenge the employment prospects of entire populations. 8. The (ir)relevance of education and training for automation A common belief is that education, training, and upskilling are a panacea against the threat of job loss caused by technological ad­ vancements. The assumption is that a higher level of education and training correlates with a lower probability of long-term unemployment. According to this view, unskilled and low-skilled workers in industrial factories are at a higher risk of automation because the routine tasks they perform are the easiest to program and automate by software or robotics [26,54]. In addition, jobs requiring high-level skills are more complex to automate than jobs requiring middle-level skills [27]. Therefore, those likely to be replaced are those whose jobs require middle-level skills (such as knowledge workers and service sector workers) [55]. Other research shows that skill level correlates positively with the level of education required for a job but negatively with the probability of its automation. For example, jobs that require pre-training (e.g., an apprenticeship) have a lower likelihood of automation than jobs that require on-the-job training [28]. The relevance of training also pertains to the types of workers and their skills, not just the type of jobs. Sorgner [31] showed that people who work in high-risk jobs or low-risk jobs are more likely to acquire new skills and training than those working in medium-risk jobs. The former group takes these steps as a self-preservation action to reduce the likelihood of them being replaced by automation. Workers with low-risk jobs possess the soft skills that are harder to automate and more important for innovation (e.g., creativity, abstract thinking; see Fig. 2) [33]. Furthermore, they are likely to try self-employment and the entrepreneurial model as well. To sum up, we still do not know what type of education or training would best reduce the risk of replacement by automation7 Sorgner [31]. However, we can conclude that jobs with the lowest risk of automation are those that require skills such as “deductive reasoning, originality, communication, training, problem-solving, and reading and writing” [27], as well as teaching employees to collaborate with and work alongside AI and robotics [33]. Nevertheless, education alone will probably cease to be the best investment and the key to our social mobility, as it was in the twentieth century [56]; pp. 153–168). 5 Therefore, in this article we covered only papers relating to job and work automation that were published after 2013. 6 They did this by calculating the percentage of work each task comprises within a job (task share). They also used other properties (metadata) of specific jobs to calculate their probability of being automated. 7 Sorgner’s contention about the uncertain prospects of education is also supported by the research of [32]. G. Nissim and T. Simon Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 5 9. Social implications of automation Structural-technological unemployment is a permanent condition of a labor market that does not provide enough jobs to meet the demand, due to advanced technology that makes human labor redundant [56]; pp.112-131). Structural unemployment may undermine advanced so­ cieties, since work has been a key institution of modern society from the outset. Not only has work provided for material subsistence, it has also defined the modern human psyche [57]; pp. 677–680). According to deprivation theory, employment is not only essential as a source of in­ come and subsistence but also for its psychological and social functions, such as a sense of purpose, identity, social status, and for maintaining social relationships [58,59] [1933]; [60]. Jahoda [60] articulated the five functions that jobs serve for our social existence: “First, employment imposes a time structure on the waking day; second, employment im­ plies regularly shared experiences and contacts with people outside the nuclear family; third, employment links individuals to goals and pur­ poses that transcend their own; fourth, employment defines aspects of personal status and identity; and finally, employment enforces activity,” [60]; p. 188). Hence, mass loss of jobs might have various effects on individuals and society as a whole. First and foremost, automation might push social mobility downward, meaning that people would either be demoted in their current workplace or moved to lower-level jobs in a different in­ dustry (Fig. 2) [31]. Moreover, displaced workers may find that retraining, re-skilling, and re-educating themselves to enter new in­ dustries require time and money, which might prove too costly for them [51]. The risk of job loss may also cause increased physical and mental health issues [61], loss of self-esteem and loss of confidence in their professional aptitude [62], as well as degraded family relationships and even family breakups [63,64]. People who lose their job due to tech­ nological advancement might also experience difficulties in maintaining their social status and self-value as their assets and finances decline [51]. Furthermore, the hope that they will find alternative livelihoods is dis­ counted by Sorgner [31]; who finds a significant rise in self-employment as the result of people who were replaced by automation launching in­ dependent enterprises. However, these businesses are not growth-focused and bring little value in terms of employment, innova­ tion, or market value [31]. The effects of automation and AI differ for various demographical groups, and therefore might intensify social unrest. Generally, techno­ logical innovation increases inequalities, because it usually displaces less-skilled workers and decreases demand for their services [32,51,65]. One outcome of the rising unemployment rates among the middle and lower classes is growing social and political unrest, which has manifested itself in the 2016 elections in the US and Brexit in the United Kingdom [66]; p. 205; [67]. Recently, a group of researchers from the International Monetary Fund stated that the “arguments for technological optimism do not work,” meaning that the current wave of automation technologies will destroy more jobs than it will create [32]. Therefore, we expect high rates of structural-technological unemployment, which differs signifi­ cantly from the familiar short-term frictional or cyclical unemployment [68]; pp. 4–8). This threat is already being felt around the world, raising fears, suspicion, and frustrations as the risk of workers losing their jobs to automation increases [69]. So far, we have demonstrated how AI and robotics may have a major impact on the future of work and the well-being of future generations. In order to complete our analysis, we will address the two major forces that comprise the labor market: employers and unions. 10. The interest of employers to automate jobs The automation of production and service processes may prevail because employers have an incentive to do it. Dirican [52] argues that “companies could achieve more profitability and sustainability only by following two options: minimizing costs or maximizing value.” Em­ ployers’ ultimate objective is to reduce the cost of each task while increasing output [35]. As automation and AI become prevalent, this dilemma may disappear because AI and robotics are expected to provide both cost reduction and increased output in parallel. For instance, the financial crisis of 2008 accelerated the adoption of new technologies because organizations were obliged to optimize and re-engineer their business processes to take part in the digital transformation [52]. The outcome was demonstrated by Gutelius and Theodore [70]; who found that the growth of the US economy after the Great Recession of the last decade skipped over the labor market. Companies have three main incentives to minimize costs. The first is to reduce not only the demand for employees who do routine jobs but also the number of highly skilled employees who receive high wages [51]. The second incentive is the prospect of reducing costs involved with the employment cycle, such as searching for and recruiting new employees, or the shadow costs that stem from the fact that labor costs are much greater than the actual salary paid to employees [26,27,51]. The third incentive is to reduce costs due to the “malfunctions” and limitations of their human workers. Although machines may break down and incur a high cost of maintenance, they never go on strike nor require any managerial attention, as do human employees [27,51]. Industrial robots are designed for reliability and durability so that they can work continuously, 24 h per day, 7 days per week [36]. Automation reduces differences in task execution that occurs with human workers, thereby removing almost all uncertainty and improving the final product [27]. According to Qureshi and Syed [71]; the use of robots can save employers up to 65% in labor costs while keeping their businesses working continuously without the need to manage human shifts. They added that robotics plays a major and growing role in the service sector in fields such as healthcare, where employees who work in unhealthy environments may be replaced by robots that can perform the same tasks without incurring the health risks. We thus conclude that employers are highly motivated by multiple streams of logic to replace human labor by robotic labor and AI. 11. Are unions an answer? Employers and employees do not share interests and “this relation­ ship is necessarily adversarial” [72]; p. 75). Unions were considered to be the main guardians of workers’ rights, since the early days of in­ dustrial society. Workers have leveraged unionization to increase their power for negotiating with the employers. The chief goal of the union movement “is to organize workers for concerted action in support of their interests to redress the power imbalance between those who Fig. 2. Implications of automation for human jobs. G. Nissim and T. Simon Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 6 provide labor and those who control the conditions of its use through their ownership or management of productive resources.” [72]; p. 75). This quote reveals three basic assumptions: (1) workers ought to orga­ nize to obtain a better bargaining position vis-`a-vis the employer, (2) the unions’ role is reactive, and (3) workers cannot count solely on the employers to represent their interests, but must do so independently. Unions’ basic objectives are representing workers’ economic in­ terests and expressing workers’ voices, therefore contributing to the democratization of work and to allocative justice [3]; pp. 35–57 [73]; p. 646). With time, they have also expanded their engagements to include social services such as pensions [74] and healthcare. Hence, their ac­ tivity affects not only their own membership but also workers as a whole, as demonstrated by their contribution to the institutionalization of minimum wage [75]; pp. 289–291). Unions, then, have been more than an instrumental tool to represent narrow economic interests of specific groups. They have been a political movement and an institu­ tional player influencing the entire economic system. Thus, they could play a major role in designing the emerging new labor market. Unions have also demonstrated their ability to respond to deep economic changes and providing answers for workers. They were strong as long as they kept pace with economic and institutional developments and provided solutions for their constituencies. They were especially successful from the 1930s to the 1970s, as a part of the bargaining tripartite mechanism together with employers’ associations, backed by the state. Unions were a key player of a “managed” or “organized” capitalism [1]. When unions lost their responsiveness, they also lost their relevance. For example, since the 1970s, unions have failed to adjust to rapid de­ velopments such as globalization, the introduction of advanced tech­ nologies, the transformation of the labor market [3]; pp. 81–93), or flexible employment arrangements [76]; pp. 175–177 [3,77,78]; pp. 3–6). Therefore, unions’ survival depends on their ability adjust to changes and challenges. Given the prolonged crisis they have been undergoing, they have been engaging in “revitalization” and “renewal” strategies since the 1990s.8 These included strategies as recruiting new members,9 organizing workplaces, internal restructuring, building coalitions with other social movements, partnering with employers [79,80], and partaking in political action to influence the higher power centers (e.g., political parties, legislation, state institutions) [81]; p. 9).10 Nevertheless, such revitalization and renewal strategies are only designed to address the challenge of nonstandard forms of employment and of the gig economy. Among them, one can find the cultivation of common class consciousness among digital workers, the establishment of a transnational digital workers’ trade union, and using the workers’ presence on the internet to protest against the digital platforms or even disrupt their operation [82]; pp. 155–156). Additional strategies are opening unions to self-employed workers (a definition that fits the legal status of those employed by platforms), establishing a union of self-employed workers,11 legal support for nonorganized workers, agenda-setting activities endorsing workers’ rights, and lobbying for standard and fair employment terms [83]. One may reasonably expect the scholarly literature to discuss the role of unions in the face of the ongoing and coming revolution, given the threat of mass unemployment. Unfortunately, this discussion is completely absent from the literature. In over fifty scientific articles dealing with automation and how it affects jobs, we found no mention of the role of unions in dealing with massive structural-technological un­ employment. Neither did we find any mention of the way unions cope with structural-technological employment in specific branches or in­ dustries. Interestingly, there is literature about the effects automation had on labor relations in the 1950s. One case was the Ford Motor Company, which automated the production process so as to be less dependent on unionized workers, who might strike. Another example was the demand of union workers to shorten the workday from eight to 6 h, due to the fear of extensive automation that would reduce the need for human labor [84]; pp. 112–113). Usually, unions see the effects of automation and AI as a source of friction, with technology leading to technological frictional unemployment [56]; pp. 112–131) in which people remain out of work because they have not acquired the suitable training to re-enter the technologically changing labor market. Ac­ cording to this view, unemployment can be solved by the right training policy and investment. The current literature about technology’s effect on unions extensively studies the growth of digital platforms and gig economy [4,85–87] and the challenge it set for the ability of unions to organize platforms workers [82,88,89]. The literature also discusses the way unions can utilize AI, for example using chatbots to reach margin­ alized workers [90]. Finally, it covers workers’ attempts to organize unions within large technology corporations. One of these is Amazon, especially its warehouses’ workers, who function under strict digital control and harsh labor conditions [91]. One possibility that has been ignored in the vast literature about the emerging challenges facing unions is the likelihood that production and service processes will need a much smaller workforce. 12. Unions in the transition to a jobless economy More than ever before, unions need to strengthen their strategic capacity and reinvent themselves as learning organizations if they want to remain relevant [92]. Real learning is the ability to destroy limiting patterns [93], so we suggest that unions should adopt a new paradigm and expand their mission beyond representing workers to representing the economic and social rights of all citizens. However, this shift can only materialize gradually. We will discuss two stages: the near future and the distant future. 13. The near future This involves the transition period from the current reality to a future automated, digital economy. In this phase, digital platforms still rely on human labor for more sophisticated or routine assignments, and while automation of other fields is progressing, human labor is still not completely redundant. The second phase may be an era in which the economy is widely based on automation and AI, replacing human labor in many sectors. Even though the manifestation of the second phase is still uncertain and under debate, we still suggest that union leaders adopt the most radical scenario as their point of departure. This will force them to innovate and reevaluate their basic assumptions about who they represent, what their goals are, and which strategies they embrace. In the near future, we recommend that unions adopt the following seven measures: 1. Developing research: This involves establishing or expanding specialized research units to study the accelerating changes in the economy and the course the economy is taking. In unions that 8 “Revitalization” aims to organize previously ignored populations of workers and rebuild grass-roots social movements. “Renewal” refers to the ways in which unions creatively rely on their existing capacities and familiar channels to strengthen their workers’ position in the new context of a globalized and more competitive economy [111]; p. 443). 9 “The American labor movement is at a watershed. For the first time since the early years of industrial unionism sixty years ago, there is near-universal agreement among union leaders that the future of the movement depends on massive new organizing” [78]; p. 1). 10 An example of how unions have used their capacities to improve worker conditions is illustrated by Ref. [111]. Danish unions used their long-lasting partnership with employers and their role in the local governance networks to improve their workers employability in the context of an unstable global economy and a liberalization policy. 11 This occurred in France. G. Nissim and T. Simon Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 7 already have research departments, we recommend that they adopt methodologies such as futurism and long-term planning, which are used today by numerous corporations around the world. 2. Onboard technology experts: To develop a deeper and broader understanding of the possibilities offered by new technologies, unions should recruit technology experts to their management teams and not be satisfied with general future scenarios. Recently, this gap in digital and technological knowledge in corporate boards was shown to diminish the success of the digital strategy of companies [94]. 3. Support an augmented workforce: Unions should empower workers in sectors where automation does not completely replace human labor. Unions should actively map industries and jobs that are likely to remain dominated by human labor, organize workers who are currently not organized, strengthen worker status, and improve working conditions. 4. Advocate for employee health, safety, and privacy in the age of AI: Unions should represent workers’ rights regarding health, safety, and ethics at workplaces that are undergoing automation. Workers that use cutting-edge technologies in the workplace are expected to lose some, if not all, of their privacy during work because they will be tracked and monitored by numerous sensors that collect data to improve and further optimize their work [27]. These complicated issues will be affected by the digital revolution, and workers cannot rely on employers or state regulations to safeguard their rights. 5. Join AI consortiums: To be connected to the main players in the AI field and remain up to date about developments as they occur and influence such developments, unions should join AI consortiums all over the world. 6. Managing dignified retirement: Unions must bargain for fair retirement conditions for employees in workplaces where human labor is certain to be replaced. In such cases, unions should channel their bargaining efforts away from hopeless struggles against dis­ missals to securing the best retirement compensations for workers and for their retraining to help them explore other career paths. This is called “outskilling” and is a new method that companies world­ wide have recently started to offer to employees that “don’t have a future at [the] company” [95]. 7. Facilitate re-skilling and upskilling: This involves cooperating with employers and governments to build upskilling and re-skilling programs for workers whose jobs are at risk of automation. The goal is to facilitate their re-assignment into industries and jobs with a lower risk of automation or to promote their conversion to other positions with the same employer. 8. Join ethical AI committees– today, organizations leading a wide implementation of AI into their processes and systems are encour­ aged to create ethical AI committees, or to establish ethical AI framework with their core principles [96]. Ungoverned AI imple­ mentation can lead to known issues and risks around bias, fairness, liability, privacy etc. Corrine Cath [97] wrote that “across the globe, industry representatives, governments, academics and civil society are debating” this, however, the only social actor that is not taking part are the unions. Therefore, their interest is to be part of the conversation and consideration, while the primary goal is to ensure that the AI implementation will not harm employees’ rights or dig­ nity, and that it will be carried out in an ethical way. 14. The distant future In the more distant future, when a jobless society may become a reality, unions can sustain their relevance only by adopting a new vision. They should transform their primary calling from representing em­ ployees to representing the social rights of all citizens. Thomas Marshall maintained that modern citizenship is based on three layers of rights. The first is civil rights, which are mainly legal and secure the freedom of individuals, such as freedom of speech and religion, the right to own private property, and more. Political rights are next; these guarantee the ability to elect and be elected to sovereign institutions where major decisions are taken. Finally, social rights form the most advanced layer. These endow citizens with material security. Everyone is entitled to have access to appropriate nutrition, healthcare, education, transportation, etc. [98]. Historically, political and social rights, among others, have been achieved because of pressure applied by worker groups, consisting mainly of organized workers. In Scandinavian countries, for example, not only have unions played an active role entrenching these rights, but they have also provided welfare services such as pensions and unemployment insurance [99,100]. The end of mass employment may jeopardize these rights. A jobless society might strip the working class of its structural power and turn former workers into liabilities in the eyes of employers and welfare costs in the eyes of governments. Governments are already pressured by corporations to cut their taxes, and the outcome might further reduce welfare budgets and widen the already huge inequality between the social classes [101]. In this context, the role of unions as the representatives of the material interests of lay people is crucial. They can organize and mobilize people to support essential solutions to the problem of material security for citizens. Without this, and with no other institutional protection, many jobless citizens will be exposed to the dangers of poverty. In this context, unions should consider shifting their main efforts from representing employees to representing broad social movements that champion the following agenda: • Open unions not only to employees and the self-employed but also to those who are left out of the labor market. • Endorsing a broad, holistic, economic perspective—the stake­ holders’ approach—which views each economic enterprise as embedded in the surrounding environment: investors, managers, workers, consumers, local community, public health, the environ­ ment, and more. This approach is an alternative to the dominant shareholders’ approach, which sees shareholder revenue as the ul­ timate goal of the corporation [4,102]. • Unions should pinpoint the human contribution to the economy, as opposed to the view of workers as liabilities and the concomitant motivation to cut labor costs by any means possible. In the new economy, humans will maintain crucial roles such as creating new ideas that AI can still not implement and addressing the moral as­ pects of material life [103]; pp. 1–10). • The case for a human-centric economic approach could also rein­ vigorate the potential role of unions as entrepreneurs. Unions may initiate new forms of ventures that fit into the new economy and enhance it. This trend worked well in the early days of the Israeli Histadrut (General Organization of Workers in Israel) [104] and in the Ghent System, in which unions operated the system of unem­ ployment insurance [100]. This can also be traced to other move­ ments (e.g., the Austrian Marxism or British Fabian movement), which were reformist rather than radical, and strove to build eco­ nomic institutions embedded with human and social aspects [105, 106]. • Function as lobbyists and lead the way for Universal Basic Income (UBI) [107]; pp. 35–37 [108]; or for other means that could secure the material needs of the citizenry. As elaborated above, numerous obstacles must be overcome before there is any hope that UBI will be implemented. A prime impediment is the question of financing UBI once most people no longer work and thus would pay no income tax. Recently, researchers from the International Monetary Fund stated that taxing capital to pay the UBI of workers would be extremely challenging because it would negatively affect the high returns of corporations on automation technologies [32]. • In addition to endorsing UBI, unions should consider amplifying other activities of universal benefit, some of which they have already engaged in, such as minimum wage, pensions, and public healthcare. This need for benefits to be spread equitably throughout the entire G. Nissim and T. Simon Technology in Society 67 (2021) 101732 8 society is also apparent in the current COVID-19 crisis, as demon­ strated by the call of the International Trade Union Confederation and the OECD Unions Advisory Committee for the G20 countries to support all workers, regardless of their employment status, including those in the informal economy, in the following ways: “paid sick leave from day one; wage/income protection; managed reduction of hours where necessary, government support to maximize income security; mortgage, rent and loan relief; universal social protection and free access to healthcare; and childcare support for frontline workers in health, supermarkets, pharmacies and other vital areas” [109]. The return to activities pertaining to public policy and social rights may create an incentive for lay citizens to join unions, even if they are unemployed, self-employed, or temporarily employed. Thus, at the dawn of the automation and AI revolution, unions have a new calling. 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Gadi Nissim, Ph.D., is a Sociologist and an Anthropologist, senior faculty member in the Department of Behavioral Sciences at Ruppin Academic Center, Emek Hefer, Israel. He is also a board member of the Industrial Relations Research Association of Israel. Gadi’s fields of interest are industrial relations, moral economy and economic ideologies, orga­ nized labor, and the transformation of employment arrangements. Tomer Simon, Ph.D., is a Futurist and Strategist. Today, Tomer is the Chief Scientist of Microsoft R&D Center in Israel. Previously he was the National Technology Officer for Microsoft Israel, and before that the futurist and senior director of Academic Research and Innovation in Amdocs. Tomer brings with him more than 20 years of experience in the technology and IT worlds, including technology research, software development and managing and establishing large development centers. Tomer has deep expertise in designing and leading digital transformations, AI, automation and the future of work. Today, Tomer works with numerous executives from the defense and private sectors in building organizational and national level strategies. Tomer is a faculty member in the Department of Disaster and Emergency Management at Tel Aviv University. G. Nissim and T. Simon